Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) have gained increasing prominence in artificial intelligence, making a profound impact on society and various industries like business and science. However, the presence of false information on the internet and in text corpus poses a significant risk to the reliability and safety of LLMs, underscoring the urgent need to understand the mechanisms of how false information influences the behaviors of LLMs. In this paper, we dive into this problem and investigate how false information spreads in LLMs and affects related responses. Specifically, in our series of experiments, we investigate different factors that can influence the spread of information in LLMs by comparing three degrees of information relevance (direct, indirect, and peripheral), four information source styles (Twitter, web blogs, news reports, and research papers) and two common knowledge injection paradigms (in-context injection and learning-based injection). The experimental results show that (1)False information will spread and contaminate related memories in LLMs via a semantic diffusion process, i.e., false information has global detrimental effects beyond its direct impact. (2)Current LLMs are susceptible to authority bias, i.e., LLMs are more likely to follow false information presented in trustworthy styles such as news reports and research papers, which usually cause deeper and wider pollution of information. (3)Current LLMs are more sensitive to false information through in-context injection than through learning-based injection, which severely challenges the reliability and safety of LLMs even when all training data are trusty and correct. The above findings raise the need for new false information defense algorithms to address the global impact of false information, and new alignment algorithms to unbiasedly lead LLMs to follow essential human values rather than superficial patterns.

Achieving character animation that meets studio-grade production standards remains challenging despite recent progress. Existing approaches can transfer motion from a driving video to a reference image, but often fail to preserve structural fidelity and temporal consistency in wild scenarios involving complex motion and cross-identity animations. In this work, we present SCAIL (Studio-grade Character Animation via In-context Learning), a framework designed to address these challenges from two key innovations. First, we propose a novel 3D pose representation, providing a more robust and flexible motion signal. Second, we introduce a full-context pose injection mechanism within a diffusion-transformer architecture, enabling effective spatio-temporal reasoning over full motion sequences. To align with studio-level requirements, we develop a curated data pipeline ensuring both diversity and quality, and establish a comprehensive benchmark for systematic evaluation. Experiments show that SCAIL achieves state-of-the-art performance and advances character animation toward studio-grade reliability and realism.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) techniques have emerged as a promising solution to enhance the reliability of large language models (LLMs) by addressing issues like hallucinations, outdated knowledge, and domain adaptation. In particular, existing RAG methods append relevant documents retrieved from external corpus or databases to the input of LLMs to guide their generation process, which we refer to as the in-context knowledge injection method. While this approach is simple and often effective, it has inherent limitations. Firstly, increasing the context length and number of relevant documents can lead to higher computational overhead and degraded performance, especially in complex reasoning tasks. More importantly, in-context knowledge injection operates primarily at the input level, but LLMs store their internal knowledge in their parameters. This gap fundamentally limits the capacity of in-context methods. To this end, we introduce Parametric retrieval-augmented generation (Parametric RAG), a new RAG paradigm that integrates external knowledge directly into the parameters of feed-forward networks (FFN) of an LLM through document parameterization. This approach not only saves online computational costs by eliminating the need to inject multiple documents into the LLMs' input context, but also deepens the integration of external knowledge into the parametric knowledge space of the LLM. Experimental results demonstrate that Parametric RAG substantially enhances both the effectiveness and efficiency of knowledge augmentation in LLMs. Also, it can be combined with in-context RAG methods to achieve even better performance. We have open-sourced all the code, data, and models in the following anonymized GitHub link: https://github.com/oneal2000/PRAG

Identity-preserving video generation (IPVG) aims to synthesize high-fidelity videos that follow text prompts while faithfully preserving a reference identity. Despite recent progress, existing IPVG methods still struggle to balance high-level semantic control and low-level identity fidelity. To bridge this gap, we propose ST-DRC, an effective Spatial-Temporal Decoupled Reference Conditioning framework for identity-preserving text-to-video generation. At the framework level, ST-DRC performs latent in-context feature injection by encoding the reference image with the video VAE and concatenating it with noisy video latents, enabling rich low-level identity details to be accessed without additional adapters. To separate identity-aware reference retrieval from appearance copying, we introduce TASS-RoPE, a Temporal-Adjacent Spatial-Shifted RoPE scheme that places reference tokens near the video sequence in time but shifts them in space, allowing reference information to flow through spatio-temporal attention while suppressing pixel-level copy-paste shortcuts. To further prevent shortcut learning and strengthen the otherwise diluted identity supervision in the diffusion objective, we combine appearance-invariant reference augmentation with face-guided identity objectives, encouraging the model to preserve identity under variations in color, pose, and layout. At inference time, we introduce a three-stream reference classifier-free guidance strategy that independently controls text adherence and reference fidelity. Experiments demonstrate that ST-DRC achieves strong identity preservation, prompt alignment, temporal consistency, and video quality with a lightweight design built on LTX-2.3. Our method ranks among the top submissions in the facial identity-preserving video generation track, validating the effectiveness of spatial-temporal decoupled reference conditioning.

The inverse problem of multilayer thin-film optical coatings design represents a complex combinatorial-continuous optimization challenge. We present PRISM (Position-encoded Regressive Inverse Spectral Model), a unified decoder-only autoregressive transformer that streamlines this process by jointly predicting discrete material selection and continuous thickness regression within a single backbone. PRISM introduces two primary architectural innovations: (1) spectrum prefix conditioning, which utilizes standard prefix tokens for in-context target injection, and (2) cumulative-depth Rotary Position Embeddings, which encode continuous thickness directly into the positional representation to preserve the physical spatial relationships of the stack. Our benchmarks demonstrate that a PRISM-13M model reduces MAE by over 50\% compared to other transformer baselines while utilizing only one-fifth of the parameters. Furthermore, a 44M-parameter variant achieves state-of-the-art performance (MAE = 0.010) on our in-distribution validation benchmark and operates significantly faster than simulated annealing, offering a highly efficient alternative to classical optimization methods.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Effective multi-shot generation demands purposeful, film-like transitions and strict cinematic continuity. Current methods, however, often prioritize basic visual consistency, neglecting crucial editing patterns (e.g., shot/reverse shot, cutaways) that drive narrative flow for compelling storytelling. This yields outputs that may be visually coherent but lack narrative sophistication and true cinematic integrity. To bridge this, we introduce Next Shot Generation (NSG): synthesizing a subsequent, high-quality shot that critically conforms to professional editing patterns while upholding rigorous cinematic continuity. Our framework, Cut2Next, leverages a Diffusion Transformer (DiT). It employs in-context tuning guided by a novel Hierarchical Multi-Prompting strategy. This strategy uses Relational Prompts to define overall context and inter-shot editing styles. Individual Prompts then specify per-shot content and cinematographic attributes. Together, these guide Cut2Next to generate cinematically appropriate next shots. Architectural innovations, Context-Aware Condition Injection (CACI) and Hierarchical Attention Mask (HAM), further integrate these diverse signals without introducing new parameters. We construct RawCuts (large-scale) and CuratedCuts (refined) datasets, both with hierarchical prompts, and introduce CutBench for evaluation. Experiments show Cut2Next excels in visual consistency and text fidelity. Crucially, user studies reveal a strong preference for Cut2Next, particularly for its adherence to intended editing patterns and overall cinematic continuity, validating its ability to generate high-quality, narratively expressive, and cinematically coherent subsequent shots.

In-Context Learning (ICL) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform tasks by conditioning on input-output examples in the prompt, without requiring any update in model parameters. While widely adopted, it remains unclear whether prompting with multiple examples is the most effective and efficient way to convey task information. In this work, we propose Soft Injection of task embeddings. The task embeddings are constructed only once using few-shot ICL prompts and repeatedly used during inference. Soft injection is performed by softly mixing task embeddings with attention head activations using pre-optimized mixing parameters, referred to as soft head-selection parameters. This method not only allows a desired task to be performed without in-prompt demonstrations but also significantly outperforms existing ICL approaches while reducing memory usage and compute cost at inference time. An extensive evaluation is performed across 57 tasks and 12 LLMs, spanning four model families of sizes from 4B to 70B. Averaged across 57 tasks, our method outperforms 10-shot ICL by 10.2%-14.3% across 12 LLMs. Additional analyses show that our method also serves as an insightful tool for analyzing task-relevant roles of attention heads, revealing that task-relevant head positions selected by our method transfer across similar tasks but not across dissimilar ones -- underscoring the task-specific nature of head functionality. Our soft injection method opens a new paradigm for reducing prompt length and improving task performance by shifting task conditioning from the prompt space to the activation space.

With the emergence of strong visual-language capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated tremendous potential for real-world applications. However, the security vulnerabilities exhibited by the visual modality pose significant challenges to deploying such models in open-world environments. Recent studies have successfully induced harmful responses from target MLLMs by encoding harmful textual semantics directly into visual inputs. However, in these approaches, the visual modality primarily serves as a trigger for unsafe behavior, often exhibiting semantic ambiguity and lacking grounding in realistic scenarios. In this work, we define a novel setting: visual-centric jailbreak, where visual information serves as a necessary component in constructing a complete and realistic jailbreak context. Building on this setting, we propose the VisCo (Visual Contextual) Attack. VisCo fabricates contextual dialogue using four distinct visual-focused strategies, dynamically generating auxiliary images when necessary to construct a visual-centric jailbreak scenario. To maximize attack effectiveness, it incorporates automatic toxicity obfuscation and semantic refinement to produce a final attack prompt that reliably triggers harmful responses from the target black-box MLLMs. Specifically, VisCo achieves a toxicity score of 4.78 and an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85% on MM-SafetyBench against GPT-4o, significantly outperforming the baseline, which performs a toxicity score of 2.48 and an ASR of 22.2%. The code is available at https://github.com/Dtc7w3PQ/Visco-Attack.

Recently, extensive studies in Reinforcement Learning have been carried out on the ability of transformers to adapt in-context to various environments and tasks. Current in-context RL methods are limited by their strict requirements for data, which needs to be generated by RL agents or labeled with actions from an optimal policy. In order to address this prevalent problem, we propose AD^varepsilon, a new data acquisition approach that enables in-context Reinforcement Learning from noise-induced curriculum. We show that it is viable to construct a synthetic noise injection curriculum which helps to obtain learning histories. Moreover, we experimentally demonstrate that it is possible to alleviate the need for generation using optimal policies, with in-context RL still able to outperform the best suboptimal policy in a learning dataset by a 2x margin.

Character image animation aims to synthesize high-fidelity videos by transferring motion from a driving sequence to a static reference image. Despite recent advancements, existing methods suffer from two fundamental challenges: (1) suboptimal motion injection strategies that lead to a trade-off between identity preservation and motion consistency, manifesting as a "see-saw", and (2) an over-reliance on explicit pose priors (e.g., skeletons), which inadequately capture intricate dynamics and hinder generalization to arbitrary, non-humanoid characters. To address these challenges, we present DreamActor-M2, a universal animation framework that reimagines motion conditioning as an in-context learning problem. Our approach follows a two-stage paradigm. First, we bridge the input modality gap by fusing reference appearance and motion cues into a unified latent space, enabling the model to jointly reason about spatial identity and temporal dynamics by leveraging the generative prior of foundational models. Second, we introduce a self-bootstrapped data synthesis pipeline that curates pseudo cross-identity training pairs, facilitating a seamless transition from pose-dependent control to direct, end-to-end RGB-driven animation. This strategy significantly enhances generalization across diverse characters and motion scenarios. To facilitate comprehensive evaluation, we further introduce AW Bench, a versatile benchmark encompassing a wide spectrum of characters types and motion scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DreamActor-M2 achieves state-of-the-art performance, delivering superior visual fidelity and robust cross-domain generalization. Project Page: https://grisoon.github.io/DreamActor-M2/

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

While large language models (LLMs) excel in generating coherent and contextually rich outputs, their capacity to efficiently handle long-form contexts is limited by fixed-length position embeddings. Additionally, the computational cost of processing long sequences increases quadratically, making it challenging to extend context length. To address these challenges, we propose Long-form Context Injection with Recurrent Compression (LCIRC), a method that enables the efficient processing long-form sequences beyond the model's length limit through recurrent compression without retraining the entire model. We further introduce query dependent context modeling, which selectively compresses query-relevant information, ensuring that the model retains the most pertinent content. Our empirical results demonstrate that Query Dependent LCIRC (QD-LCIRC) significantly improves LLM's ability to manage extended contexts, making it well-suited for tasks that require both comprehensive context understanding and query relevance.

We propose IC-Effect, an instruction-guided, DiT-based framework for few-shot video VFX editing that synthesizes complex effects (\eg flames, particles and cartoon characters) while strictly preserving spatial and temporal consistency. Video VFX editing is highly challenging because injected effects must blend seamlessly with the background, the background must remain entirely unchanged, and effect patterns must be learned efficiently from limited paired data. However, existing video editing models fail to satisfy these requirements. IC-Effect leverages the source video as clean contextual conditions, exploiting the contextual learning capability of DiT models to achieve precise background preservation and natural effect injection. A two-stage training strategy, consisting of general editing adaptation followed by effect-specific learning via Effect-LoRA, ensures strong instruction following and robust effect modeling. To further improve efficiency, we introduce spatiotemporal sparse tokenization, enabling high fidelity with substantially reduced computation. We also release a paired VFX editing dataset spanning 15 high-quality visual styles. Extensive experiments show that IC-Effect delivers high-quality, controllable, and temporally consistent VFX editing, opening new possibilities for video creation.

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is widely used to inject new knowledge into language models, but it often degrades pretrained capabilities such as reasoning and general-domain performance. We argue this forgetting arises because fine-tuning targets from humans or external systems diverge from the model's autoregressive distribution, forcing the optimizer to imitate low-probability token sequences. To address this problem, we propose MixSD, a simple external-teacher-free method for distribution-aligned knowledge injection. Instead of training on fixed targets, MixSD constructs supervision dynamically by mixing tokens from two conditionals of the base model itself: an expert conditional that observes the injected fact in context, and a naive conditional that reflects the model's original prior. The resulting supervision sequences preserve the factual learning signal while remaining substantially closer to the base model's distribution. We evaluate MixSD on two synthetic corpora that we construct to study factual recall and arithmetic function acquisition in a controlled setting, together with established benchmarks for open-domain factual question answering and knowledge editing. Across multiple model scales and settings, MixSD consistently achieves a better memorization-retention trade-off compared to SFT and on-policy self distillation baselines, retaining up to 100% of the base model's held-out capability while maintaining near-perfect training accuracy, whereas standard SFT retains as little as 1%. We further show that MixSD produces substantially lower-NLL supervision targets under the base model and reduces harmful movement along Fisher-sensitive parameter directions. These results suggest that aligning supervision with the model's native generation distribution is a simple and effective principle for knowledge injection that mitigates catastrophic forgetting.

Finetuning provides a scalable and cost-effective means of customizing language models for specific tasks or response styles, with greater reliability than prompting or in-context learning. In contrast, the conventional wisdom is that injecting knowledge via finetuning results in brittle performance and poor generalization. We argue that the dichotomy of "task customization" (e.g., instruction tuning) and "knowledge injection" (e.g., teaching new facts) is a distinction without a difference. We instead identify concrete factors that explain the heterogeneous effectiveness observed with finetuning. To this end, we conduct a large-scale experimental study of finetuning the frontier Gemini v1.5 model family on a spectrum of datasets that are artificially engineered to interpolate between the strengths and failure modes of finetuning. Our findings indicate that question-answer training data formats provide much stronger knowledge generalization than document/article-style training data, numerical information can be harder for finetuning to retain than categorical information, and models struggle to apply finetuned knowledge during multi-step reasoning even when trained on similar examples -- all factors that render "knowledge injection" to be especially difficult, even after controlling for considerations like data augmentation and information volume. On the other hand, our findings also indicate that it is not fundamentally more difficult to finetune information about a real-world event than information about what a model's writing style should be.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Multimodal AI agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory to ground generation in past visual and textual episodes. We show that unconditional trust in visual data creates a critical vulnerability. We propose Lucid, a black-box adversarial framework that compromises multimodal memory pipelines under a strictly image-bounded threat model, requiring no access to the target MLLM, target retrieval encoder, or the text channel. Lucid crafts imperceptible perturbations to enable two distinct failure modes based on the availability of historical context: (1) Memory poisoning, an in-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one whose content is reinforced by prior textual context, reliably corrupting visual recall and steering the agent toward attacker-chosen narratives; (2) Memory injection, an out-of-context attack where the adversarial image replaces a benign one in a conversation turn devoid of prior textual grounding, causing the agent to generate attacker-influenced responses with no corrective signal from memory. We evaluate Lucid across various conversation domains and five black-box memory architectures, including graph-structured, LLM-summarized, and commercially deployed systems. Lucid achieves 61.6% ASR on poisoning and 58.4% ASR on injection, exposing a structural vulnerability in multimodal memory pipelines.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

Various approaches have been proposed to adapt Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to specialized domains for Video Question Answering, including fine-tuning and in-context learning. However, acquiring task-specific knowledge at the inference phase from only a small labeled support set without fine-tuning remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose a method that achieves adaptation solely through inference-time context injection. Our method first constructs a Reflective Dialogue (RD) -- a multi-turn conversation between two agents, in which Teacher poses each support question and delivers correctness feedback, and Solver answers and provides visual grounding explanations (or reflections) for both correct and incorrect answers. This dialogue history is then used as context at the inference phase. Experiments on the EgoCross benchmark demonstrate that our method outperforms both a baseline zero-shot setting and a standard in-context learning approach that passes support set examples directly, achieving 3rd place in the Open-source Track of the 1st Cross-Domain EgoCross Challenge at the CVPR 2026 EgoVis Workshop, for which this paper also serves as a technical report.

IDE-integrated AI coding assistants, which operate conversationally within developers' working codebases with access to project context and multi-file editing, are rapidly reshaping software development. However, empirical investigation of this shift remains limited: existing studies largely rely on small-scale, controlled settings or analyze general-purpose chatbots rather than codebase-aware IDE workflows. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first large-scale study of real-world conversational programming in IDE-native settings, analyzing 74,998 developer messages from 11,579 chat sessions across 1,300 repositories and 899 developers using Cursor and GitHub Copilot. These chats were committed to public repositories as part of routine development, capturing in-the-wild behavior. Our findings reveal three shifts in how programming work is organized: conversational programming operates as progressive specification, with developers iteratively refining outputs rather than specifying complete tasks upfront; developers redistribute cognitive work to AI, delegating diagnosis, comprehension, and validation rather than engaging with code and outputs directly; and developers actively manage the collaboration, externalizing plans into persistent artifacts, and negotiating AI autonomy through context injection and behavioral constraints. These results provide foundational empirical insights into AI-assisted development and offer implications for the design of future programming environments.

Multi-agent LLM systems on edge devices face a memory management problem: device RAM is too small to hold every agent's KV cache simultaneously. On Apple M4 Pro with 10.2 GB of cache budget, only 3 agents fit at 8K context in FP16. A 10-agent workflow must constantly evict and reload caches. Without persistence, every eviction forces a full re-prefill through the model -- 15.7 seconds per agent at 4K context. We address this by persisting each agent's KV cache to disk in 4-bit quantized format and reloading it directly into the attention layer, eliminating redundant O(n) prefill computation via direct cache restoration. The system comprises three components: a block pool providing per-agent isolated Q4 KV caches in safetensors format, a BatchQuantizedKVCache for concurrent inference over multiple agents' quantized caches, and cross-phase context injection that accumulates attention state across conversation phases without re-computation. Evaluated on three architectures (Gemma 3 12B, dense GQA, 48 layers; DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite 16B, MoE MLA, 27 layers; Llama 3.1 8B, dense GQA, 32 layers), cache restoration reduces time-to-first-token by up to 136x (Gemma: 22--136x at 4K--32K; DeepSeek: 11--76x at 4K--32K; Llama: 24--111x at 4K--16K; 3--10x at 1K). Q4 quantization fits 4x more agent contexts into fixed device memory than FP16. Perplexity measured with actual Q4 KV caches shows -0.7% for Gemma, +2.8% for Llama, and +3.0% for DeepSeek. Open-source at https://github.com/yshk-mxim/agent-memory

We introduce Calligrapher, a novel diffusion-based framework that innovatively integrates advanced text customization with artistic typography for digital calligraphy and design applications. Addressing the challenges of precise style control and data dependency in typographic customization, our framework incorporates three key technical contributions. First, we develop a self-distillation mechanism that leverages the pre-trained text-to-image generative model itself alongside the large language model to automatically construct a style-centric typography benchmark. Second, we introduce a localized style injection framework via a trainable style encoder, which comprises both Qformer and linear layers, to extract robust style features from reference images. An in-context generation mechanism is also employed to directly embed reference images into the denoising process, further enhancing the refined alignment of target styles. Extensive quantitative and qualitative evaluations across diverse fonts and design contexts confirm Calligrapher's accurate reproduction of intricate stylistic details and precise glyph positioning. By automating high-quality, visually consistent typography, Calligrapher surpasses traditional models, empowering creative practitioners in digital art, branding, and contextual typographic design.

Image-to-video generation has made remarkable progress with the advancements in diffusion models, yet generating videos with realistic motion remains highly challenging. This difficulty arises from the complexity of accurately modeling motion, which involves capturing physical constraints, object interactions, and domain-specific dynamics that are not easily generalized across diverse scenarios. To address this, we propose MotionRAG, a retrieval-augmented framework that enhances motion realism by adapting motion priors from relevant reference videos through Context-Aware Motion Adaptation (CAMA). The key technical innovations include: (i) a retrieval-based pipeline extracting high-level motion features using video encoder and specialized resamplers to distill semantic motion representations; (ii) an in-context learning approach for motion adaptation implemented through a causal transformer architecture; (iii) an attention-based motion injection adapter that seamlessly integrates transferred motion features into pretrained video diffusion models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves significant improvements across multiple domains and various base models, all with negligible computational overhead during inference. Furthermore, our modular design enables zero-shot generalization to new domains by simply updating the retrieval database without retraining any components. This research enhances the core capability of video generation systems by enabling the effective retrieval and transfer of motion priors, facilitating the synthesis of realistic motion dynamics.

Foundation models (FMs), particularly large language models (LLMs), have shown significant promise in various software engineering (SE) tasks, including code generation, debugging, and requirement refinement. Despite these advances, existing evaluation frameworks are insufficient for assessing model performance in iterative, context-rich workflows characteristic of SE activities. To address this limitation, we introduce SE Arena, an interactive platform designed to evaluate SE-focused chatbots. SE Arena provides a transparent, open-source leaderboard, supports multi-round conversational workflows, and enables end-to-end model comparisons. Moreover, SE Arena incorporates a new feature called RepoChat, which automatically injects repository-related context (e.g., issues, commits, pull requests) into the conversation, further aligning evaluations with real-world development processes. This paper outlines the design and capabilities of SE Arena, emphasizing its potential to advance the evaluation and practical application of FMs in software engineering.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Large language models (LLMs) make significant progress in Emotional Intelligence (EI) and long-context understanding. However, existing benchmarks tend to overlook certain aspects of EI in long-context scenarios, especially under realistic, practical settings where interactions are lengthy, diverse, and often noisy. To move towards such realistic settings, we present LongEmotion, a benchmark specifically designed for long-context EI tasks. It covers a diverse set of tasks, including Emotion Classification, Emotion Detection, Emotion QA, Emotion Conversation, Emotion Summary, and Emotion Expression. On average, the input length for these tasks reaches 8,777 tokens, with long-form generation required for Emotion Expression. To enhance performance under realistic constraints, we incorporate Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and Collaborative Emotional Modeling (CoEM), and compare them with standard prompt-based methods. Unlike conventional approaches, our RAG method leverages both the conversation context and the large language model itself as retrieval sources, avoiding reliance on external knowledge bases. The CoEM method further improves performance by decomposing the task into five stages, integrating both retrieval augmentation and limited knowledge injection. Experimental results show that both RAG and CoEM consistently enhance EI-related performance across most long-context tasks, advancing LLMs toward more practical and real-world EI applications. Furthermore, we conducted a comparative case study experiment on the GPT series to demonstrate the differences among various models in terms of EI. Code is available on GitHub at https://github.com/LongEmotion/LongEmotion, and the project page can be found at https://longemotion.github.io/.

Post-hoc context erasing over the KV cache is challenging because a local edit has a global consequence: once a span has been processed, its influence propagates into the cached states of all subsequent tokens. This issue arises naturally in long-context LLM applications, where stale retrieved facts, incorrect tool observations, retracted user preferences, or harmful prompt injections may be identified only after prefill. Exact erasing must then recompute all tokens after the deleted span, making its computational cost depend on suffix length rather than erased-span length. We introduce KVEraser, a learned KV-cache editing method for efficient localized context erasing. Given a processed context and a span to remove, KVEraser replaces only the KV states of the erased interval with learned steering states while reusing the remaining cache unchanged. To learn a transferable erasing mechanism, we build a two-stage training pipeline: generic span-neighbor pre-training teaches the eraser to suppress the influence of the erased span, while task-specific fine-tuning adapts this capability to downstream scenarios. Experiments show that KVEraser nearly matches full recomputation in post-erasure performance on in-domain tasks across 1K--32K context lengths, while its latency increases by only 24% compared with a 17.6x increase for full recomputation. KVEraser also generalizes to unseen long-document QA tasks with harmful factual distractors, achieving the best performance among approximate baselines with a 3--4x speedup over full recomputation.

Artificial neural networks have become a staple computing technique in many fields. Yet, they present fundamental differences with classical computing hardware in the way they process information. Photonic implementations of neural network architectures potentially offer fundamental advantages over their electronic counterparts in terms of speed, processing parallelism, scalability and energy efficiency. Scalable and high performance photonic neural networks (PNNs) have been demonstrated, yet they remain scarce. In this work, we study the performance of such a scalable, fully parallel and autonomous PNN based on a large area vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser (LA-VCSEL). We show how the performance varies with different physical parameters, namely, injection wavelength, injection power, and bias current. Furthermore, we link these physical parameters to the general computational measures of consistency and dimensionality. We present a general method of gauging dimensionality in high dimensional nonlinear systems subject to noise, which could be applied to many systems in the context of neuromorphic computing. Our work will inform future implementations of spatially multiplexed VCSEL PNNs.

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Long-context large language models (LLMs), such as Gemini-2.5-Pro and Claude-Sonnet-4, are increasingly used to empower advanced AI systems, including retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines and autonomous agents. In these systems, an LLM receives an instruction along with a context--often consisting of texts retrieved from a knowledge database or memory--and generates a response that is contextually grounded by following the instruction. Recent studies have designed solutions to trace back to a subset of texts in the context that contributes most to the response generated by the LLM. These solutions have numerous real-world applications, including performing post-attack forensic analysis and improving the interpretability and trustworthiness of LLM outputs. While significant efforts have been made, state-of-the-art solutions such as TracLLM often lead to a high computation cost, e.g., it takes TracLLM hundreds of seconds to perform traceback for a single response-context pair. In this work, we propose AttnTrace, a new context traceback method based on the attention weights produced by an LLM for a prompt. To effectively utilize attention weights, we introduce two techniques designed to enhance the effectiveness of AttnTrace, and we provide theoretical insights for our design choice. We also perform a systematic evaluation for AttnTrace. The results demonstrate that AttnTrace is more accurate and efficient than existing state-of-the-art context traceback methods. We also show that AttnTrace can improve state-of-the-art methods in detecting prompt injection under long contexts through the attribution-before-detection paradigm. As a real-world application, we demonstrate that AttnTrace can effectively pinpoint injected instructions in a paper designed to manipulate LLM-generated reviews. The code is at https://github.com/Wang-Yanting/AttnTrace.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) incorporates external knowledge into large language models (LLMs), improving their adaptability to downstream tasks and enabling information updates. Surprisingly, recent empirical evidence demonstrates that injecting noise into retrieved relevant documents paradoxically facilitates exploitation of external knowledge and improves generation quality. Although counterintuitive and challenging to apply in practice, this phenomenon enables granular control and rigorous analysis of how LLMs integrate external knowledge. Therefore, in this paper, we intervene on noise injection and establish a layer-specific functional demarcation within the LLM: shallow layers specialize in local context modeling, intermediate layers focus on integrating long-range external factual knowledge, and deeper layers primarily rely on parametric internal knowledge. Building on this insight, we propose Layer Fused Decoding (LFD), a simple decoding strategy that directly combines representations from an intermediate layer with final-layer decoding outputs to fully exploit the external factual knowledge. To identify the optimal intermediate layer, we introduce an internal knowledge score (IKS) criterion that selects the layer with the lowest IKS value in the latter half of layers. Experimental results across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that LFD helps RAG systems more effectively surface retrieved context knowledge with minimal cost.

Drag-based image editing aims to modify visual content followed by user-specified drag operations. Despite existing methods having made notable progress, they still fail to fully exploit the contextual information in the reference image, including fine-grained texture details, leading to edits with limited coherence and fidelity. To address this challenge, we introduce ContextDrag, a new paradigm for drag-based editing that leverages the strong contextual modeling capability of editing models, such as FLUX-Kontext. By incorporating VAE-encoded features from the reference image, ContextDrag can leverage rich contextual cues and preserve fine-grained details, without the need for finetuning or inversion. Specifically, ContextDrag introduced a novel Context-preserving Token Injection (CTI) that injects noise-free reference features into their correct destination locations via a Latent-space Reverse Mapping (LRM) algorithm. This strategy enables precise drag control while preserving consistency in both semantics and texture details. Second, ContextDrag adopts a novel Position-Consistent Attention (PCA), which positional re-encodes the reference tokens and applies overlap-aware masking to eliminate interference from irrelevant reference features. Extensive experiments on DragBench-SR and DragBench-DR demonstrate that our approach surpasses all existing SOTA methods. Code will be publicly available.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak. The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) with external tools via protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) introduces critical security vulnerabilities, including prompt injection, data exfiltration, and other threats. To counter these challenges, we propose MCP-GUARD, a robust, layered defense architecture designed for LLM-tool interactions. MCP-GUARD employs a three-stage detection pipeline that balances efficiency with accuracy: it progresses from lightweight static scanning for overt threats and a deep neural detector for semantic attacks, to our fine-tuned E5-based model which achieves 96.01\% accuracy in identifying adversarial prompts. Finally, an LLM arbitrator synthesizes these signals to deliver the final decision. To enable rigorous training and evaluation, we introduce MCP-ATTACKBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 70,448 samples augmented by GPT-4. This benchmark simulates diverse real-world attack vectors that circumvent conventional defenses in the MCP paradigm, thereby laying a solid foundation for future research on securing LLM-tool ecosystems.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how large language model (LLM) agents discover, describe, and call external tools. While MCP unlocks broad interoperability, it also enlarges the attack surface by making tools first-class, composable objects with natural-language metadata, and standardized I/O. We present MSB (MCP Security Benchmark), the first end-to-end evaluation suite that systematically measures how well LLM agents resist MCP-specific attacks throughout the full tool-use pipeline: task planning, tool invocation, and response handling. MSB contributes: (1) a taxonomy of 12 attacks including name-collision, preference manipulation, prompt injections embedded in tool descriptions, out-of-scope parameter requests, user-impersonating responses, false-error escalation, tool-transfer, retrieval injection, and mixed attacks; (2) an evaluation harness that executes attacks by running real tools (both benign and malicious) via MCP rather than simulation; and (3) a robustness metric that quantifies the trade-off between security and performance: Net Resilient Performance (NRP). We evaluate nine popular LLM agents across 10 domains and 405 tools, producing 2,000 attack instances. Results reveal the effectiveness of attacks against each stage of MCP. Models with stronger performance are more vulnerable to attacks due to their outstanding tool calling and instruction following capabilities. MSB provides a practical baseline for researchers and practitioners to study, compare, and harden MCP agents. Code: https://github.com/dongsenzhang/MSB

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

Large Language Models can break through knowledge and timeliness limitations by invoking external tools within the Model Context Protocol framework to achieve automated execution of complex tasks. However, with the rapid growth of enterprise-scale MCP services, efficiently and accurately matching target functionalities among thousands of heterogeneous tools has become a core challenge restricting system practicality. Existing approaches generally rely on full-prompt injection or static semantic retrieval, facing issues including semantic disconnection between user queries and tool descriptions, context inflation in LLM input, and high inference latency. To address these challenges, this paper proposes Z-Space, a data-generation-oriented multi-agent collaborative tool invocation framework Z-Space. The Z-Space framework establishes a multi-agent collaborative architecture and tool filtering algorithm: (1) A structured semantic understanding of user queries is achieved through an intent parsing model; (2) A tool filtering module (FSWW) based on fused subspace weighted algorithm realizes fine-grained semantic alignment between intents and tools without parameter tuning; (3) An inference execution agent is constructed to support dynamic planning and fault-tolerant execution for multi-step tasks. This framework has been deployed in the Eleme platform's technical division, serving large-scale test data generation scenarios across multiple business units including Taotian, Gaode, and Hema. Production data demonstrates that the system reduces average token consumption in tool inference by 96.26\% while achieving a 92\% tool invocation accuracy rate, significantly enhancing the efficiency and reliability of intelligent test data generation systems.

We present Infinite-Story, a training-free framework for consistent text-to-image (T2I) generation tailored for multi-prompt storytelling scenarios. Built upon a scale-wise autoregressive model, our method addresses two key challenges in consistent T2I generation: identity inconsistency and style inconsistency. To overcome these issues, we introduce three complementary techniques: Identity Prompt Replacement, which mitigates context bias in text encoders to align identity attributes across prompts; and a unified attention guidance mechanism comprising Adaptive Style Injection and Synchronized Guidance Adaptation, which jointly enforce global style and identity appearance consistency while preserving prompt fidelity. Unlike prior diffusion-based approaches that require fine-tuning or suffer from slow inference, Infinite-Story operates entirely at test time, delivering high identity and style consistency across diverse prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art generation performance, while offering over 6X faster inference (1.72 seconds per image) than the existing fastest consistent T2I models, highlighting its effectiveness and practicality for real-world visual storytelling.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) currently struggle to sequentially add new memories and integrate new knowledge. These limitations contrast with the human ability to continuously learn from new experiences and acquire knowledge throughout life. Most existing approaches add memories either through large context windows or external memory buffers (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation), and studies on knowledge injection rarely test scenarios resembling everyday life events. In this work, we introduce a continual learning framework, Memory Embedded in Gated LLMs (MEGa), which injects event memories directly into the weights of LLMs. Each memory is stored in a dedicated set of gated low-rank weights. During inference, a gating mechanism activates relevant memory weights by matching query embeddings to stored memory embeddings. This enables the model to both recall entire memories and answer related questions. On two datasets - fictional characters and Wikipedia events - MEGa outperforms baseline approaches in mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Our model draws inspiration from the complementary memory system of the human brain.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Recent advances in Video Foundation Models (VFMs) have revolutionized human-centric video synthesis, yet fine-grained and independent editing of subjects and scenes remains a critical challenge. Recent attempts to incorporate richer environment control through rigid 3D geometric compositions often encounter a stark trade-off between precise control and generative flexibility. Furthermore, the heavy 3D pre-processing still limits practical scalability. In this paper, we propose ONE-SHOT, a parameter-efficient framework for compositional human-environment video generation. Our key insight is to factorize the generative process into disentangled signals. Specifically, we introduce a canonical-space injection mechanism that decouples human dynamics from environmental cues via cross-attention. We also propose Dynamic-Grounded-RoPE, a novel positional embedding strategy that establishes spatial correspondences between disparate spatial domains without any heuristic 3D alignments. To support long-horizon synthesis, we introduce a Hybrid Context Integration mechanism to maintain subject and scene consistency across minute-level generations. Experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, offering superior structural control and creative diversity for video synthesis. Our project has been available on: https://martayang.github.io/ONE-SHOT/.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

Diffusion Large Language Models (DLLMs) enable fully parallel token decoding but often remain impractical at inference time due to the many denoising iterations required to refine an information-free, fully masked initialization into coherent text. Most existing acceleration methods focus on traversing this generative trajectory more efficiently via improved solvers or sampling strategies. We advance a complementary perspective: shorten the trajectory itself by starting closer to the target distribution through context-aware initialization. We propose a training-free interface that injects prompt-conditioned priors from a lightweight auxiliary model into the diffusion initialization, and instantiate it with two mechanisms: discrete token injection and representation-level embedding interpolation. Because injected priors can be imperfect and unmask-only decoding can over-commit early, we also introduce a simple confidence-based remasking mechanism as a form of prior skepticism. Preliminary evidence on GSM8K suggests that context-aware initialization can substantially reduce denoising iterations (about 35\% fewer function evaluations in our setting), while also exposing a key open challenge: naive warm-starting can degrade final accuracy relative to strong diffusion baselines. We use these findings to motivate a research agenda around calibration, revision mechanisms, and representation alignment for reliable warm-started diffusion decoding.

The limited context window of contemporary large language models (LLMs) remains a huge barrier to their broader application across various domains. While continual pre-training on long-context data is a straightforward and effective solution, it incurs substantial costs in terms of data acquisition and computational resources. To alleviate this issue, we propose SharedLLM, a novel approach grounded in the design philosophy of multi-grained context compression and query-aware information retrieval. SharedLLM is composed of two short-context LLMs such as LLaMA-2, termed upper model and lower model. The lower model functions as a compressor while the upper model acts as a decoder. The upper model receives compressed, multi-grained context information from the lower model and performs context-aware modeling on the running text. Information transfer between the compressor and decoder occurs only at the lowest layers to refrain from long forward paths in the lower model and redundant cross-attention modules in the upper model. Based on this architecture, we introduce a specialized tree-style data structure to efficiently encode, store and retrieve multi-grained contextual information for text chunks. This structure, combined with a search algorithm, enables rapid encoding and retrieval of relevant information from various levels of the tree based on the input query. This entire process, wherein the sender and receiver are derived from the same LLM layer, is referred to as self-injection.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

In domains such as biomedicine, materials, and finance, high-stakes deployment of large language models (LLMs) requires injecting private, domain-specific knowledge that is proprietary, fast-evolving, and under-represented in public pretraining. However, the two dominant paradigms for private knowledge injection each have pronounced drawbacks: fine-tuning is expensive to iterate, and continual updates risk catastrophic forgetting and general-capability regression; retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) keeps the base model intact but is brittle in specialized private corpora due to chunk-induced evidence fragmentation, retrieval drift, and long-context pressure that yields query-dependent prompt inflation. Inspired by how multimodal LLMs align heterogeneous modalities into a shared semantic space, we propose Generation-Augmented Generation (GAG), which treats private expertise as an additional expert modality and injects it via a compact, representation-level interface aligned to the frozen base model, avoiding prompt-time evidence serialization while enabling plug-and-play specialization and scalable multi-domain composition with reliable selective activation. Across two private scientific QA benchmarks (immunology adjuvant and catalytic materials) and mixed-domain evaluations, GAG improves specialist performance over strong RAG baselines by 15.34% and 14.86% on the two benchmarks, respectively, while maintaining performance on six open general benchmarks and enabling near-oracle selective activation for scalable multi-domain deployment.

Navigation agents powered by large language models (LLMs) convert natural language instructions into executable plans and actions. Compared to text-based applications, their security is far more critical: a successful prompt injection attack does not just alter outputs but can directly misguide physical navigation, leading to unsafe routes, mission failure, or real-world harm. Despite this high-stakes setting, the vulnerability of navigation agents to prompt injection remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose PINA, an adaptive prompt optimization framework tailored to navigation agents under black-box, long-context, and action-executable constraints. Experiments on indoor and outdoor navigation agents show that PINA achieves high attack success rates with an average ASR of 87.5%, surpasses all baselines, and remains robust under ablation and adaptive-attack conditions. This work provides the first systematic investigation of prompt injection attacks in navigation and highlights their urgent security implications for embodied LLM agents.

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) suffers from exploration inefficiency, where models struggle to generate successful rollouts, resulting in minimal learning signal. This challenge is particularly severe for tasks that require the acquisition of novel reasoning patterns or domain-specific knowledge. To address this, we propose Context Bootstrapped Reinforcement Learning (CBRL), which augments RLVR training by stochastically prepending few-shot demonstrations to training prompts. The injection probability follows a curriculum that starts high to bootstrap early exploration, then anneals to zero so the model must ultimately succeed without assistance. This forces the policy to internalize reasoning patterns from the demonstrations rather than relying on them at test time. We validate CBRL across two model families and five Reasoning Gym tasks. Our results demonstrate that CBRL consistently improves success rate, provides better exploration efficiency, and is algorithm-agnostic. We further demonstrate CBRL's practical applicability on Q, a domain-specific programming language that diverges significantly from mainstream language conventions.

Long-context large language models (LLMs)-for example, Gemini-3.1-Pro and Qwen-3.5-are widely used to empower many real-world applications, such as retrieval-augmented generation, autonomous agents, and AI assistants. However, security remains a major concern for their widespread deployment, with threats such as prompt injection and knowledge corruption. To quantify the security risks faced by LLMs under these threats, the research community has developed heuristic-based and optimization-based red-teaming methods. Optimization-based methods generally produce stronger attacks than heuristic attacks and thus provide a more rigorous assessment of LLM security risks. However, they are often resource-intensive, requiring significant computation and GPU memory, especially for long context scenarios. The resource-intensive nature poses a major obstacle for the community (especially academic researchers) to systematically evaluate the security risks of long-context LLMs and assess the effectiveness of defense strategies at scale. In this work, we propose FlashRT, the first framework to improve the efficiency (in terms of both computation and memory) for optimization-based prompt injection and knowledge corruption attacks under long-context LLMs. Through extensive evaluations, we find that FlashRT consistently delivers a 2x-7x speedup (e.g., reducing runtime from one hour to less than ten minutes) and a 2x-4x reduction in GPU memory consumption (e.g., reducing from 264.1 GB to 65.7 GB GPU memory for a 32K token context) compared to state-of-the-art baseline nanoGCG. FlashRT can be broadly applied to black-box optimization methods, such as TAP and AutoDAN. We hope FlashRT can serve as a red-teaming tool to enable systematic evaluation of long-context LLM security. The code is available at: https://github.com/Wang-Yanting/FlashRT

Long-horizon tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and dynamic re-planning remain challenging for large language models (LLMs). Sequential prompting methods are prone to context drift, loss of goal information, and recurrent failure cycles, while hierarchical prompting methods often weaken cross-level continuity or incur substantial runtime overhead. We introduce ReCAP (Recursive Context-Aware Reasoning and Planning), a hierarchical framework with shared context for reasoning and planning in LLMs. ReCAP combines three key mechanisms: (i) plan-ahead decomposition, in which the model generates a full subtask list, executes the first item, and refines the remainder; (ii) structured re-injection of parent plans, maintaining consistent multi-level context during recursive return; and (iii) memory-efficient execution, bounding the active prompt so costs scale linearly with task depth. Together these mechanisms align high-level goals with low-level actions, reduce redundant prompting, and preserve coherent context updates across recursion. Experiments demonstrate that ReCAP substantially improves subgoal alignment and success rates on various long-horizon reasoning benchmarks, achieving a 32% gain on synchronous Robotouille and a 29% improvement on asynchronous Robotouille under the strict pass@1 protocol.

We revisit a universally accepted but under-examined design choice in every modern LLM: a token index is looked up once at the input embedding layer and then permanently discarded. This single-injection assumption induces two structural failures: (i) the Rare Token Problem, where a Zipf-type distribution of vocabulary causes rare-token embeddings are chronically under-trained due to receiving a fraction of the cumulative gradient signal compared to common tokens; and (ii) the Contextual Collapse Problem, where limited parameters models map distributionally similar tokens to indistinguishable hidden states. As an attempt to address both, we propose TIDE, which augments the standard transformer with EmbeddingMemory: an ensemble of K independent MemoryBlocks that map token indices to context-free semantic vectors, computed once and injected into every layer through a depth-conditioned softmax router with a learnable null bank. We theoretically and empirically establish the benefits of TIDE in addressing the issues associated with single-token identity injection as well as improve performance across multiple language modeling and downstream tasks.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in 2D visual tasks but still exhibit limited physical spatial awareness when processing real-world visual streams. Recently, feed-forward geometric foundation models, which implicitly extract geometric priors, have provided a new pathway to address this issue. However, existing geometry-aware MLLMs are predominantly constrained by the paradigm of single deep-layer extraction and input-level fusion. This flattened fusion leads to the loss of local geometric details and causes semantic mismatches in the early layers. To break this bottleneck, we propose GUIDE (Geometric Unrolling Inside MLLM Early-layers), a progressive geometric priors injection framework. GUIDE performs multi-level sampling within the geometric encoder, comprehensively capturing multi-granularity features ranging from local edges to global topologies. Subsequently, we rigorously align and fuse these multi-level geometric priors step-by-step with the early layers of the MLLM. Building upon the injection of multi-granularity geometric information, this design guides the model to progressively learn the 2D-to-3D transitional process. Furthermore, we introduce a context-aware gating that enables the model to fetch requisite spatial cues based on current semantics, thereby maximizing the utilization efficiency of spatial priors and effectively suppressing redundant geometric noise. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GUIDE significantly outperforms existing baselines on multiple complex spatial reasoning and perception tasks, establishing a novel paradigm for integrating 3D geometric priors into large models.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a common interface for connecting large language model (LLM) agents to external tools, but its reliance on stateless, eager schema injection imposes a hidden per-turn overhead the MCP Tax or Tools Tax that practitioner reports place between roughly 10k and 60k tokens in typical multi-server deployments. This payload inflates the key-value cache, is associated with reasoning degradation as context utilization approaches published fracture points around 70%, and turns token budgets into a recurring operational cost. We introduce Tool Attention, a middleware-layer mechanism that generalizes the "Attention Is All You Need" paradigm from self-attention over tokens to gated attention over tools. Tool Attention combines (i) an Intent Schema Overlap (ISO) score from sentence embeddings, (ii) a state-aware gating function enforcing preconditions and access scopes, and (iii) a two-phase lazy schema loader that keeps a compact summary pool in context and promotes full JSON schemas only for top-k gated tools. We evaluate on a simulated 120-tool, six-server benchmark whose per-server token counts are calibrated to public audits of real MCP deployments. In this simulation, Tool Attention directly reduces measured per-turn tool tokens by 95.0% (47.3k -> 2.4k) and raises effective context utilization (a token-ratio quantity) from 24% to 91%. End-to-end figures for task success, latency, cost, and reasoning quality are reported as projections derived from the measured token counts combined with published deployment telemetry; they are not measured on live LLM agents, and we mark projected values explicitly throughout. Taken together, the results support a simple thesis: protocol-level efficiency, not raw context length, is a binding constraint on scalable gentic systems. The code for this work is accessible at https://github.com/asadani/tool-attention

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically personalized via prompt engineering or parameter-efficient fine-tuning such as LoRA. However, writing style can be difficult to distill into a single prompt, and LoRA fine-tuning requires computationally intensive training and infrastructure. We investigate a possible lightweight alternative: steering a frozen LLM with n-gram style priors injected in logit space at decoding time. We train an n-gram model on stylistically distinct corpora -- including Don Quixote, CNN/DailyMail news headlines, and arXiv abstracts -- constructing an interpolated 1-to-3-gram prior over next-token probabilities. During generation we modify the LLM's logits by adding a weighted sum of style log-probabilities from each n-gram order that matches the current context, scaled by a control parameter lambda in [0, 1]. We sweep lambda and style corpora and report style perplexity under the n-gram model, base-model perplexity as a proxy for fluency, Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence between the original and steered token distributions, and token-overlap statistics. On TinyLlama-1.1B we identify a single narrow regime (for the Don Quixote corpus at lambda=0.1) where style perplexity improves by 24.7% and base-model perplexity improves by 51.4% relative to the frozen model. Outside this regime, and for multi-author corpora such as CNN/DailyMail and arXiv abstracts, even small nonzero lambda values generally result in worse style and fluency, and larger lambda values lead to collapse with extreme perplexities and incoherent text. Logit-space injection of n-gram style priors provides lightweight, tunable style control, but it is fragile: it operates effectively only within a narrow range of low lambda values and is consistently outperformed by prompting and LoRA.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Recent advances in video insertion based on diffusion models are impressive. However, existing methods rely on complex control signals but struggle with subject consistency, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we focus on the task of Mask-free Video Insertion and aim to resolve three key challenges: data scarcity, subject-scene equilibrium, and insertion harmonization. To address the data scarcity, we propose a new data pipeline InsertPipe, constructing diverse cross-pair data automatically. Building upon our data pipeline, we develop OmniInsert, a novel unified framework for mask-free video insertion from both single and multiple subject references. Specifically, to maintain subject-scene equilibrium, we introduce a simple yet effective Condition-Specific Feature Injection mechanism to distinctly inject multi-source conditions and propose a novel Progressive Training strategy that enables the model to balance feature injection from subjects and source video. Meanwhile, we design the Subject-Focused Loss to improve the detailed appearance of the subjects. To further enhance insertion harmonization, we propose an Insertive Preference Optimization methodology to optimize the model by simulating human preferences, and incorporate a Context-Aware Rephraser module during reference to seamlessly integrate the subject into the original scenes. To address the lack of a benchmark for the field, we introduce InsertBench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising diverse scenes with meticulously selected subjects. Evaluation on InsertBench indicates OmniInsert outperforms state-of-the-art closed-source commercial solutions. The code will be released.

Learning domain adaptive policies that can generalize to unseen transition dynamics, remains a fundamental challenge in learning-based control. Substantial progress has been made through domain representation learning to capture domain-specific information, thus enabling domain-aware decision making. We analyze the process of learning domain representations through dynamical prediction and find that selecting contexts adjacent to the current step causes the learned representations to entangle static domain information with varying dynamical properties. Such mixture can confuse the conditioned policy, thereby constraining zero-shot adaptation. To tackle the challenge, we propose DADP (Domain Adaptive Diffusion Policy), which achieves robust adaptation through unsupervised disentanglement and domain-aware diffusion injection. First, we introduce Lagged Context Dynamical Prediction, a strategy that conditions future state estimation on a historical offset context; by increasing this temporal gap, we unsupervisedly disentangle static domain representations by filtering out transient properties. Second, we integrate the learned domain representations directly into the generative process by biasing the prior distribution and reformulating the diffusion target. Extensive experiments on challenging benchmarks across locomotion and manipulation demonstrate the superior performance, and the generalizability of DADP over prior methods. More visualization results are available on the https://outsider86.github.io/DomainAdaptiveDiffusionPolicy/.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Recent advancements in video generation have seen a shift towards unified, transformer-based foundation models that can handle multiple conditional inputs in-context. However, these models have primarily focused on modalities like text, images, and depth maps, while strictly time-synchronous signals like audio have been underexplored. This paper introduces In-Context Audio Control of video diffusion transformers (ICAC), a framework that investigates the integration of audio signals for speech-driven video generation within a unified full-attention architecture, akin to FullDiT. We systematically explore three distinct mechanisms for injecting audio conditions: standard cross-attention, 2D self-attention, and unified 3D self-attention. Our findings reveal that while 3D attention offers the highest potential for capturing spatio-temporal audio-visual correlations, it presents significant training challenges. To overcome this, we propose a Masked 3D Attention mechanism that constrains the attention pattern to enforce temporal alignment, enabling stable training and superior performance. Our experiments demonstrate that this approach achieves strong lip synchronization and video quality, conditioned on an audio stream and reference images.

In-context Learning (ICL) empowers large language models (LLMs) to adapt to unseen tasks during inference by prefixing a few demonstration examples prior to test queries. Despite its versatility, ICL incurs substantial computational and memory overheads compared to zero-shot learning and is susceptible to the selection and order of demonstration examples. In this work, we introduce Implicit In-context Learning (I2CL), an innovative paradigm that addresses the challenges associated with traditional ICL by absorbing demonstration examples within the activation space. I2CL first generates a condensed vector representation, namely a context vector, from the demonstration examples. It then integrates the context vector during inference by injecting a linear combination of the context vector and query activations into the model's residual streams. Empirical evaluation on nine real-world tasks across three model architectures demonstrates that I2CL achieves few-shot performance with zero-shot cost and exhibits robustness against the variation of demonstration examples. Furthermore, I2CL facilitates a novel representation of "task-ids", enhancing task similarity detection and enabling effective transfer learning. We provide a comprehensive analysis of I2CL, offering deeper insights into its mechanisms and broader implications for ICL. The source code is available at: https://github.com/LzVv123456/I2CL.

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) are central to modern information retrieval but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Existing attacks often rely on heuristics or surrogate models, limiting effectiveness and transferability. We propose CRAFT, a supervised framework for black-box adversarial rank attacks powered by large language models (LLMs). CRAFT operates in three stages: adversarial dataset generation via retrieval-augmented generation and self-refinement, supervised fine-tuning on curated adversarial examples, and preference-guided optimization to align generations with rank-promotion objectives. Extensive experiments on the MS MARCO passage dataset, TREC Deep Learning 2019, and TREC Deep Learning 2020 benchmarks show that CRAFT significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving higher promotion rates and rank boosts while preserving fluency and semantic fidelity. Moreover, CRAFT transfers effectively across diverse ranking architectures, including cross-encoder, embedding-based, and LLM-based rankers, underscoring vulnerabilities in real-world retrieval systems. This work provides a principled framework for studying adversarial threats in NRMs, underscores the risks of generative AI in rank manipulation, and provides a foundation for developing more robust retrieval systems. To support reproducibility, we publicly release our source code, trained models, and prompt templates.

Generating controllable character animation from a reference image and motion guidance remains a challenging task due to the inherent difficulty of injecting appearance and motion cues into video diffusion models. Prior works often rely on complex architectures, explicit guider modules, or multi-stage processing pipelines, which increase structural overhead and hinder deployment. Inspired by the strong visual context modeling capacity of pre-trained video diffusion transformers, we propose FramePrompt, a minimalist yet powerful framework that treats reference images, skeleton-guided motion, and target video clips as a unified visual sequence. By reformulating animation as a conditional future prediction task, we bypass the need for guider networks and structural modifications. Experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms representative baselines across various evaluation metrics while also simplifying training. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of sequence-level visual conditioning and demonstrate the potential of pre-trained models for controllable animation without architectural changes.

The Mechanistic Interpretability (MI) program has mapped the Transformer as a precise computational graph. We extend this graph with a conservation law and time-varying AC dynamics, viewing it as a physical circuit. We introduce Momentum Attention, a symplectic augmentation embedding physical priors via the kinematic difference operator p_t = q_t - q_{t-1}, implementing the symplectic shear q_t = q_t + γp_t on queries and keys. We identify a fundamental Symplectic-Filter Duality: the physical shear is mathematically equivalent to a High-Pass Filter. This duality is our cornerstone contribution -- by injecting kinematic momentum, we sidestep the topological depth constraint (L geq 2) for induction head formation. While standard architectures require two layers for induction from static positions, our extension grants direct access to velocity, enabling Single-Layer Induction and Spectral Forensics via Bode Plots. We formalize an Orthogonality Theorem proving that DC (semantic) and AC (mechanistic) signals segregate into orthogonal frequency bands when Low-Pass RoPE interacts with High-Pass Momentum. Validated through 5,100+ controlled experiments (documented in Supplementary Appendices A--R and 27 Jupyter notebooks), our 125M Momentum model exceeds expectations on induction-heavy tasks while tracking a 350M baseline within sim2.9% validation loss. Dedicated associative recall experiments reveal a scaling law γ^* = 4.17 times N^{-0.74} establishing momentum-depth fungibility. We offer this framework as a complementary analytical toolkit connecting Generative AI, Hamiltonian Physics, and Signal Processing.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Agent systems increasingly use textual skills to encode reusable task procedures, but injecting these skills into the prompt at every step incurs substantial context overhead and exposes skill content as plaintext. We present LatentSkill, a framework that converts textual skills into plug-and-play LoRA adapters through a pretrained hypernetwork. LatentSkill stores skill knowledge in weight space rather than context space, removing per-step skill tokens while preserving modular loading, scaling, and composition. On ALFWorld and Search-QA, LatentSkill outperforms the corresponding in-context skill baseline while using substantially fewer prefill tokens: it improves ALFWorld success by 21.4 and 13.4 points on the seen and unseen splits with 64.1% fewer prefill tokens, and improves Search-QA exact match by 3.0 points with 72.2% lower skill-token overhead. Further analysis shows that generated skill LoRAs form a structured semantic geometry, can be precisely controlled via the LoRA scaling coefficient, and can be composed through parameter-space arithmetic when skill components are aligned. These findings suggest that weight-space skills provide an efficient, modular, and less exposed substrate for extending LLM agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

Large language models (LLMs) are often used in environments where facts evolve, yet factual knowledge updates via fine-tuning on unstructured text often suffers from 1) reliance on compute-heavy paraphrase augmentation and 2) the reversal curse. Recent studies show diffusion large language models (dLLMs) require fewer training samples to achieve lower loss in pre-training and are more resistant to the reversal curse, suggesting dLLMs may learn new knowledge more easily than autoregressive LLMs (arLLMs). We test this hypothesis in controlled knowledge fine-tuning experiments and find that while arLLMs rely on paraphrase augmentation to generalize knowledge text into question-answering (QA) capability, dLLMs do not require paraphrases to achieve high QA accuracy. To further investigate whether the demasking objective alone can induce such a knowledge injection advantage in dLLMs regardless of their diffusion denoising paradigm, we propose masked fine-tuning for arLLMs, which prompts an arLLM to reconstruct the original text given a masked version in context. The masked fine-tuning for arLLMs substantially improves the efficacy of knowledge injection, i.e. no paraphrase needed and resistant to the reversal curse, closing the gap between arLLMs and dLLMs. We also demonstrate that the same demasking objective improves supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on math tasks over standard SFT, suggesting broader applicability of the demasking objective.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has demonstrated great utilization in post-training of Large Language Models (LLMs). In GRPO, prompts are answered by the model and, through reinforcement learning, preferred completions are learnt. Owing to the small communication volume, GRPO is inherently suitable for decentralised training as the prompts can be concurrently answered by multiple nodes and then exchanged in the forms of strings. In this work, we present the first adversarial attack in decentralised GRPO. We demonstrate that malicious parties can poison such systems by injecting arbitrary malicious tokens in benign models in both out-of-context and in-context attacks. Using empirical examples of math and coding tasks, we show that adversarial attacks can easily poison the benign nodes, polluting their local LLM post-training, achieving attack success rates up to 100% in as few as 50 iterations. We propose two ways to defend against these attacks, depending on whether all users train the same model or different models. We show that these defenses can achieve stop rates of up to 100%, making the attack impossible.

Dense embedding-based text retrievalx2013retrieval of relevant passages from corpora via deep learning encodingsx2013has emerged as a powerful method attaining state-of-the-art search results and popularizing the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). Still, like other search methods, embedding-based retrieval may be susceptible to search-engine optimization (SEO) attacks, where adversaries promote malicious content by introducing adversarial passages to corpora. To faithfully assess and gain insights into the susceptibility of such systems to SEO, this work proposes the GASLITE attack, a mathematically principled gradient-based search method for generating adversarial passages without relying on the corpus content or modifying the model. Notably, GASLITE's passages (1) carry adversary-chosen information while (2) achieving high retrieval ranking for a selected query distribution when inserted to corpora. We use GASLITE to extensively evaluate retrievers' robustness, testing nine advanced models under varied threat models, while focusing on realistic adversaries targeting queries on a specific concept (e.g., a public figure). We found GASLITE consistently outperformed baselines by geq140% success rate, in all settings. Particularly, adversaries using GASLITE require minimal effort to manipulate search resultsx2013by injecting a negligible amount of adversarial passages (leq0.0001% of the corpus), they could make them visible in the top-10 results for 61-100% of unseen concept-specific queries against most evaluated models. Inspecting variance in retrievers' robustness, we identify key factors that may contribute to models' susceptibility to SEO, including specific properties in the embedding space's geometry.

Content Warning: This paper may contain unsafe or harmful content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers. Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as tooling platforms through structured output APIs, but the grammar-guided decoding that powers this feature opens a critical control-plane attack surface orthogonal to traditional data-plane vulnerabilities. We introduce Constrained Decoding Attack (CDA), a new jailbreak class that targets the LLM control plane. CDA is best characterized as a control-to-semantic pipeline: (1) schema-enforced logit masking injects a malicious prefix into the generation trajectory, and (2) the model itself completes the harmful intent. Unlike data-plane jailbreaks that rely on bypassing alignment with visible inputs, CDA acts on the decoding process itself, so internal safety alignment alone cannot stop it. We instantiate CDA with EnumAttack, which hides malicious content in enum fields, and the more evasive DictAttack, which decouples the payload across a benign prompt and a dictionary-based grammar. Across 13 proprietary/open-weight models and five standard benchmarks, DictAttack achieves 94.3--99.5% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on flagship models including gpt-5, gemini-2.5-pro, deepseek-r1, and gpt-oss-120b. While basic grammar auditing mitigates EnumAttack, DictAttack still sustains 75.8% ASR against SOTA jailbreak guardrails, exposing a "semantic gap" that demands cross-plane defenses bridging the data and control planes. Project page and code are available at https://ict-cda.github.io/.

Generating accurate and calibrated confidence estimates is critical for deploying LLMs in high-stakes or user-facing applications, and remains an open challenge. Prior research has often framed confidence as a problem of eliciting a model's "self-knowledge", i.e., the ability of an LLM to judge whether its own answers are correct; this approach implicitly assumes that there is some privileged information about the answer's correctness that is accessible to the model itself. However, our experiments reveal that an LLM attempting to predict the correctness of its own outputs generally performs no better than an unrelated LLM. Moreover, we hypothesize that a key factor in building a "Correctness Model" (CM) is exposure to a target model's historical predictions. We propose multiple methods to inject this historical correctness information, creating a Generalized Correctness Model (GCM). We first show that GCMs can be trained on the correctness data from many LLMs and learn patterns for correctness prediction applicable across datasets and models. We then use CMs as a lens for studying the source of correctness prediction ability and its generalization, systematically controlling their training data and finding that answer phrasing is a strong predictor for correctness. We further explore alternative methods of injecting history without training an LLM, finding that including history as in-context examples can help improve correctness prediction, and post-hoc calibration can provide complementary reductions in calibration error. We evaluate GCMs based on Qwen3-8B across 5 model families and the MMLU and TriviaQA datasets, as well as on a downstream selective prediction task, finding that reliable LLM confidence estimation is a generalizable and model-agnostic skill learned by systematically encoding correctness history rather than a model-specific skill reliant on self-introspection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Vision language models (VLMs) extend the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to cross-modal settings, yet remain highly vulnerable to multimodal jailbreak attacks. Existing defenses predominantly rely on safety fine-tuning or aggressive token manipulations, incurring substantial training costs or significantly degrading utility. Recent research shows that LLMs inherently recognize unsafe content in text, and the incorporation of visual inputs in VLMs frequently dilutes risk-related signals. Motivated by this, we propose Risk Awareness Injection (RAI), a lightweight and training-free framework for safety calibration that restores LLM-like risk recognition by amplifying unsafe signals in VLMs. Specifically, RAI constructs an Unsafe Prototype Subspace from language embeddings and performs targeted modulation on selected high-risk visual tokens, explicitly activating safety-critical signals within the cross-modal feature space. This modulation restores the model's LLM-like ability to detect unsafe content from visual inputs, while preserving the semantic integrity of original tokens for cross-modal reasoning. Extensive experiments across multiple jailbreak and utility benchmarks demonstrate that RAI substantially reduces attack success rate without compromising task performance.

LLMs see the world as a single stream of text, partitioned into roles like <user> or <tool>. We trace prompt injection to role confusion: models perceive the source of text from how it sounds, not its labeled role. A command hidden in a webpage hijacks an agent simply because it sounds like <user> text, despite its <tool> label. We design role probes to measure how LLMs internally perceive "who is speaking," and find that injected text occupies the same representational space as the trusted role it imitates. We demonstrate this with CoT Forgery, a zero-shot attack that injects fabricated reasoning into user prompts and tool outputs. Models mistake the forgery for their own thoughts, yielding 60% attack success against frontier models with near-zero baselines. Strikingly, the degree of role confusion predicts attack success before a single token is generated. This mechanism generalizes beyond CoT Forgery to standard agent prompt injections, revealing prompt injection as a measurable consequence of role perception. To the model, sounding like a role is indistinguishable from being one. Project page and writeup: https://role-confusion.github.io

As Large Language Models (LLMs) grow increasingly powerful, multi-agent systems are becoming more prevalent in modern AI applications. Most safety research, however, has focused on vulnerabilities in single-agent LLMs. These include prompt injection attacks, where malicious prompts embedded in external content trick the LLM into executing unintended or harmful actions, compromising the victim's application. In this paper, we reveal a more dangerous vector: LLM-to-LLM prompt injection within multi-agent systems. We introduce Prompt Infection, a novel attack where malicious prompts self-replicate across interconnected agents, behaving much like a computer virus. This attack poses severe threats, including data theft, scams, misinformation, and system-wide disruption, all while propagating silently through the system. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that multi-agent systems are highly susceptible, even when agents do not publicly share all communications. To address this, we propose LLM Tagging, a defense mechanism that, when combined with existing safeguards, significantly mitigates infection spread. This work underscores the urgent need for advanced security measures as multi-agent LLM systems become more widely adopted.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Retrieval-augmented QA pipelines often route retrieved passages through an LLM rewriter before a smaller reader, lifting F1 by tens of points on multi-hop benchmarks; this gain is typically credited to improved evidence quality. We ask whether that lift is causally driven by the gold answer string appearing in the rewritten context rather than by curation per se, using a controlled intervention audit. For each rewritten context we re-run the reader after one of four controlled edits to the compile output: removing the gold answer span, replacing a length-matched random non-answer span (placebo), or injecting the gold into rewrites where it was absent (at the prefix or at a midpoint sentence boundary). Across twelve completed (cell, baseline) intervention runs spanning three reader families (Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen3.5-35B, GLM-4.7), two datasets (HotpotQA, 2WikiMultihopQA), and three compiler arrangements (MA-only, MB-only, MA+verify), removing the gold answer drops reader F1 by 28 to 64 points beyond the length-matched placebo on paired answer-in-compile strata, and prepending the gold into rewrites that lacked it raises F1 by +0.7 to +9.7 points in 10 of 12 (cell, baseline) combinations. A companion five-sentinel audit shows the conventional single-[MASK] probe is itself sentinel-fragile: on 2Wiki it reports a +4.12~F1 ``non-leakage residual'' that flips to -3.33 to -7.81~F1 under four alternative sentinels and fails an equivalence test for three of those four (1/4~pass). We do not propose a new rewriter or mitigation; we release the intervention runner and the sentinel panel so that other rewriter-gain claims can be tested against the same standard.

Text-driven video generation witnesses rapid progress. However, merely using text prompts is not enough to depict the desired subject appearance that accurately aligns with users' intents, especially for customized content creation. In this paper, we study the task of video generation with image prompts, which provide more accurate and direct content control beyond the text prompts. Specifically, we propose a feed-forward framework VideoBooth, with two dedicated designs: 1) We propose to embed image prompts in a coarse-to-fine manner. Coarse visual embeddings from image encoder provide high-level encodings of image prompts, while fine visual embeddings from the proposed attention injection module provide multi-scale and detailed encoding of image prompts. These two complementary embeddings can faithfully capture the desired appearance. 2) In the attention injection module at fine level, multi-scale image prompts are fed into different cross-frame attention layers as additional keys and values. This extra spatial information refines the details in the first frame and then it is propagated to the remaining frames, which maintains temporal consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VideoBooth achieves state-of-the-art performance in generating customized high-quality videos with subjects specified in image prompts. Notably, VideoBooth is a generalizable framework where a single model works for a wide range of image prompts with feed-forward pass.

Style transfer is an inventive process designed to create an image that maintains the essence of the original while embracing the visual style of another. Although diffusion models have demonstrated impressive generative power in personalized subject-driven or style-driven applications, existing state-of-the-art methods still encounter difficulties in achieving a seamless balance between content preservation and style enhancement. For example, amplifying the style's influence can often undermine the structural integrity of the content. To address these challenges, we deconstruct the style transfer task into three core elements: 1) Style, focusing on the image's aesthetic characteristics; 2) Spatial Structure, concerning the geometric arrangement and composition of visual elements; and 3) Semantic Content, which captures the conceptual meaning of the image. Guided by these principles, we introduce InstantStyle-Plus, an approach that prioritizes the integrity of the original content while seamlessly integrating the target style. Specifically, our method accomplishes style injection through an efficient, lightweight process, utilizing the cutting-edge InstantStyle framework. To reinforce the content preservation, we initiate the process with an inverted content latent noise and a versatile plug-and-play tile ControlNet for preserving the original image's intrinsic layout. We also incorporate a global semantic adapter to enhance the semantic content's fidelity. To safeguard against the dilution of style information, a style extractor is employed as discriminator for providing supplementary style guidance. Codes will be available at https://github.com/instantX-research/InstantStyle-Plus.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems put more and more emphasis on grounding their responses in user-generated content found on the Web, amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning. We provide OpenRAG-Soc, a compact, reproducible benchmark-and-harness for web-facing RAG evaluation under these threats, in a discrete data package. The suite combines a social corpus with interchangeable sparse and dense retrievers and deployable mitigations - HTML/Markdown sanitization, Unicode normalization, and attribution-gated answered. It standardizes end-to-end evaluation from ingestion to generation and reports attacks time of one of the responses at answer time, rank shifts in both sparse and dense retrievers, utility and latency, allowing for apples-to-apples comparisons across carriers and defenses. OpenRAG-Soc targets practitioners who need fast, and realistic tests to track risk and harden deployments.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

Despite recent advances in multimodal content generation enabled by vision-language models (VLMs), their ability to reason about and generate structured 3D scenes remains largely underexplored. This limitation constrains their utility in spatially grounded tasks such as embodied AI, immersive simulations, and interactive 3D applications. We introduce a new paradigm that enables VLMs to generate, understand, and edit complex 3D environments by injecting a continually evolving spatial context. Constructed from multimodal input, this context consists of three components: a scene portrait that provides a high-level semantic blueprint, a semantically labeled point cloud capturing object-level geometry, and a scene hypergraph that encodes rich spatial relationships, including unary, binary, and higher-order constraints. Together, these components provide the VLM with a structured, geometry-aware working memory that integrates its inherent multimodal reasoning capabilities with structured 3D understanding for effective spatial reasoning. Building on this foundation, we develop an agentic 3D scene generation pipeline in which the VLM iteratively reads from and updates the spatial context. The pipeline features high-quality asset generation with geometric restoration, environment setup with automatic verification, and ergonomic adjustment guided by the scene hypergraph. Experiments show that our framework can handle diverse and challenging inputs, achieving a level of generalization not observed in prior work. Further results demonstrate that injecting spatial context enables VLMs to perform downstream tasks such as interactive scene editing and path planning, suggesting strong potential for spatially intelligent systems in computer graphics, 3D vision, and embodied applications.

We present a training-free framework for style-personalized image generation that controls content and style information during inference using a scale-wise autoregressive model. Our method employs a three-path design--content, style, and generation--each guided by a corresponding text prompt, enabling flexible and efficient control over image semantics without any additional training. A central contribution of this work is a step-wise and attention-wise intervention analysis. Through systematic prompt and feature injection, we find that early-to-middle generation steps play a pivotal role in shaping both content and style, and that query features predominantly encode content-specific information. Guided by these insights, we introduce two targeted mechanisms: Key Stage Attention Sharing, which aligns content and style during the semantically critical steps, and Adaptive Query Sharing, which reinforces content semantics in later steps through similarity-aware query blending. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves competitive style fidelity and prompt fidelity compared to fine-tuned baselines, while offering faster inference and greater deployment flexibility.

Despite the impressive generative capabilities of diffusion models, existing diffusion model-based style transfer methods require inference-stage optimization (e.g. fine-tuning or textual inversion of style) which is time-consuming, or fails to leverage the generative ability of large-scale diffusion models. To address these issues, we introduce a novel artistic style transfer method based on a pre-trained large-scale diffusion model without any optimization. Specifically, we manipulate the features of self-attention layers as the way the cross-attention mechanism works; in the generation process, substituting the key and value of content with those of style image. This approach provides several desirable characteristics for style transfer including 1) preservation of content by transferring similar styles into similar image patches and 2) transfer of style based on similarity of local texture (e.g. edge) between content and style images. Furthermore, we introduce query preservation and attention temperature scaling to mitigate the issue of disruption of original content, and initial latent Adaptive Instance Normalization (AdaIN) to deal with the disharmonious color (failure to transfer the colors of style). Our experimental results demonstrate that our proposed method surpasses state-of-the-art methods in both conventional and diffusion-based style transfer baselines.

This paper tackles the memory hurdle of processing long context sequences in Large Language Models (LLMs), by presenting a novel approach, Dropping In Convolutions for Long Context Compression (LoCoCo). LoCoCo employs only a fixed-size Key-Value (KV) cache, and can enhance efficiency in both inference and fine-tuning stages. Diverging from prior methods that selectively drop KV pairs based on heuristics, LoCoCo leverages a data-driven adaptive fusion technique, blending previous KV pairs with incoming tokens to minimize the loss of contextual information and ensure accurate attention modeling. This token integration is achieved through injecting one-dimensional convolutional kernels that dynamically calculate mixing weights for each KV cache slot. Designed for broad compatibility with existing LLM frameworks, LoCoCo allows for straightforward "drop-in" integration without needing architectural modifications, while incurring minimal tuning overhead. Experiments demonstrate that LoCoCo maintains consistently outstanding performance across various context lengths and can achieve a high context compression rate during both inference and fine-tuning phases. During inference, we successfully compressed up to 3482 tokens into a 128-size KV cache, while retaining comparable performance to the full sequence - an accuracy improvement of up to 0.2791 compared to baselines at the same cache size. During post-training tuning, we also effectively extended the context length from 4K to 32K using a KV cache of fixed size 512, achieving performance similar to fine-tuning with entire sequences.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Recent Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been challenged by the computational overhead resulting from massive video frames, often alleviated through compression strategies. However, the visual content is not equally contributed to user instructions, existing strategies (\eg, average pool) inevitably lead to the loss of potentially useful information. To tackle this, we propose the Hybrid-level Instruction Injection Strategy for Conditional Token Compression in MLLMs (HICom), utilizing the instruction as a condition to guide the compression from both local and global levels. This encourages the compression to retain the maximum amount of user-focused information while reducing visual tokens to minimize computational burden. Specifically, the instruction condition is injected into the grouped visual tokens at the local level and the learnable tokens at the global level, and we conduct the attention mechanism to complete the conditional compression. From the hybrid-level compression, the instruction-relevant visual parts are highlighted while the temporal-spatial structure is also preserved for easier understanding of LLMs. To further unleash the potential of HICom, we introduce a new conditional pre-training stage with our proposed dataset HICom-248K. Experiments show that our HICom can obtain distinguished video understanding ability with fewer tokens, increasing the performance by 2.43\% average on three multiple-choice QA benchmarks and saving 78.8\% tokens compared with the SOTA method. The code is available at https://github.com/lntzm/HICom.

Autonomous web agents promise to automate everyday browsing tasks, but inherit one of the web's oldest attack surfaces. Cross-Site Scripting proved that mixing trusted and untrusted content is dangerous, even on benign pages. Agents resurface this risk by interpreting natural language as instructions, allowing third-party and user-generated content to hijack the agent via prompt injection. The core challenge is that deriving a task-specific security policy requires reasoning over page structure that is entangled with the attacker's content. We present Prismata, a defense enforcing contextual least privilege for web agents, constraining both what the agent sees and what it can do. Prismata's dynamic trust derivation produces permission labels for page content, with structural confinement guarantees, inspired by classical integrity models, that bound any labeling errors so that labels can only decrease in privilege and mislabelings are bounded. Prismata's mechanical confinement enforces these labels by redacting content and restricting agent capabilities. Importantly, these mechanisms require no developer annotations, so Prismata supports the long tail of websites. Across recent published web agent attacks, including adaptive variants, Prismata substantially reduces attack success while preserving benign task utility.

The diffusion model has shown exceptional capabilities in controlled image generation, which has further fueled interest in image style transfer. Existing works mainly focus on training free-based methods (e.g., image inversion) due to the scarcity of specific data. In this study, we present a data construction pipeline for content-style-stylized image triplets that generates and automatically cleanses stylized data triplets. Based on this pipeline, we construct a dataset IMAGStyle, the first large-scale style transfer dataset containing 210k image triplets, available for the community to explore and research. Equipped with IMAGStyle, we propose CSGO, a style transfer model based on end-to-end training, which explicitly decouples content and style features employing independent feature injection. The unified CSGO implements image-driven style transfer, text-driven stylized synthesis, and text editing-driven stylized synthesis. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in enhancing style control capabilities in image generation. Additional visualization and access to the source code can be located on the project page: https://csgo-gen.github.io/.

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but their performance in complex logical reasoning tasks remains unsatisfactory. Although some prompting methods, such as Chain-of-Thought, can improve the reasoning ability of LLMs to some extent, they suffer from an unfaithful issue where derived conclusions may not align with the generated reasoning chain. To address this issue, some studies employ the approach of propositional logic to further enhance logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. However, the potential omissions in the extraction of logical expressions in these methods can cause information loss in the logical reasoning process, thereby generating incorrect results. To this end, we propose Logic-of-Thought (LoT) prompting which employs propositional logic to generate expanded logical information from input context, and utilizes the generated logical information as an additional augmentation to the input prompts, thereby enhancing the capability of logical reasoning. The LoT is orthogonal to existing prompting methods and can be seamlessly integrated with them. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoT boosts the performance of various prompting methods with a striking margin across five logical reasoning tasks. In particular, the LoT enhances Chain-of-Thought's performance on the ReClor dataset by +4.35%; moreover, it improves Chain-of-Thought with Self-Consistency's performance on LogiQA by +5%; additionally, it boosts performance of Tree-of-Thoughts on ProofWriter dataset by +8%.

A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases. While this makes agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior. In this work, we study prompt injection attacks in memory-based agentic systems using a sandboxed synthetic workspace. We evaluate two agentic systems, Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, across four models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.2, and GPT-5.5. Our results show that although it is difficult to make an agent overwrite its own memory files using untrusted external content, payloads already planted in those files can successfully attack current and future sessions. Attack success and payload persistence vary substantially across systems, models, adversarial goals, and multi-session attack sequences. These findings show that persistent memory changes the threat model for prompt injection and motivate defenses that protect memory updates without removing useful agent adaptation.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Recent soft prompt research has tried to improve reasoning by inserting trained vectors into LLM inputs, yet whether the gain comes from the learned content or from the act of injection itself has not been carefully separated. We study Random Soft Prompts (RSPs), which drop the training step entirely and append a freshly drawn sequence of random embedding vectors to the input. Each RSP vector is sampled from an isotropic Gaussian fitted to the entrywise mean and variance of the pretrained embedding table; the sequence carries no learned content, and yet reaches accuracy comparable to optimized soft prompts on math reasoning benchmarks in several settings. The mechanism unfolds in two stages: because attention has to absorb a never-seen-before random position, the distribution over the first few generated tokens flattens and reasoning trajectories branch, and as generation continues this influence dilutes naturally so the response commits to a single completion. We show that during inference RSPs lift early-stage token diversity and, combined with temperature sampling, widen Pass@N, the probability that at least one out of N attempts is correct. Beyond inference, we carry the same effect into DAPO training and demonstrate practical gains. Our contributions are: (i) RSP isolates the simplest form of soft prompt -- training-free, freshly resampled -- providing a unified lens for the structural effect of injection that variants otherwise differing in training and form all share; (ii) a theoretical and empirical validation of the underlying mechanism; and (iii) an extension from inference to training.

Recent generative engine optimisation (GEO) research has shown that prompt-injection attacks can push a target product to the top of an LLM's recommendation list, with the strongest attacks reporting around 80% success and raising serious security concerns about RAG-based recommendation. However, these results assume the attacked document is always fed directly to the generator, bypassing the retriever and reranker. This is unrealistic: in deployed RAG systems, the attack modifies the document content, which can in turn change whether the document is retrieved and reranked highly enough to reach the generator at all. In this paper, we re-evaluate seven GEO attacks under a realistic three-stage pipeline (retriever\,to\,LLM reranker\,to\,LLM generator). We find that prior protocols substantially overstate attack effectiveness: gradient-based and instruction override attacks largely collapse before reaching the generator, and only LLM-driven prompt injections remain effective end-to-end. Our analysis further reveals that current GEO attacks are easily detectable: a lightweight prompt-injection guard finetuned on a small attack dataset already detects every attack. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/ielab/geo_injection_rag_survival.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

In this work, we propose a method to address the challenge of rendering a 3D human from a single image in a free-view manner. Some existing approaches could achieve this by using generalizable pixel-aligned implicit fields to reconstruct a textured mesh of a human or by employing a 2D diffusion model as guidance with the Score Distillation Sampling (SDS) method, to lift the 2D image into 3D space. However, a generalizable implicit field often results in an over-smooth texture field, while the SDS method tends to lead to a texture-inconsistent novel view with the input image. In this paper, we introduce a texture-consistent back view synthesis module that could transfer the reference image content to the back view through depth and text-guided attention injection. Moreover, to alleviate the color distortion that occurs in the side region, we propose a visibility-aware patch consistency regularization for texture mapping and refinement combined with the synthesized back view texture. With the above techniques, we could achieve high-fidelity and texture-consistent human rendering from a single image. Experiments conducted on both real and synthetic data demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and show that our approach outperforms previous baseline methods.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

Tuning-free long video diffusion has been proposed to generate extended-duration videos with enriched content by reusing the knowledge from pre-trained short video diffusion model without retraining. However, most works overlook the fine-grained long-term video consistency modeling, resulting in limited scene consistency (i.e., unreasonable object or background transitions), especially with multiple text inputs. To mitigate this, we propose the Consistency Noise Injection, dubbed CoNo, which introduces the "look-back" mechanism to enhance the fine-grained scene transition between different video clips, and designs the long-term consistency regularization to eliminate the content shifts when extending video contents through noise prediction. In particular, the "look-back" mechanism breaks the noise scheduling process into three essential parts, where one internal noise prediction part is injected into two video-extending parts, intending to achieve a fine-grained transition between two video clips. The long-term consistency regularization focuses on explicitly minimizing the pixel-wise distance between the predicted noises of the extended video clip and the original one, thereby preventing abrupt scene transitions. Extensive experiments have shown the effectiveness of the above strategies by performing long-video generation under both single- and multi-text prompt conditions. The project has been available in https://wxrui182.github.io/CoNo.github.io/.

Tuning-free diffusion-based models have demonstrated significant potential in the realm of image personalization and customization. However, despite this notable progress, current models continue to grapple with several complex challenges in producing style-consistent image generation. Firstly, the concept of style is inherently underdetermined, encompassing a multitude of elements such as color, material, atmosphere, design, and structure, among others. Secondly, inversion-based methods are prone to style degradation, often resulting in the loss of fine-grained details. Lastly, adapter-based approaches frequently require meticulous weight tuning for each reference image to achieve a balance between style intensity and text controllability. In this paper, we commence by examining several compelling yet frequently overlooked observations. We then proceed to introduce InstantStyle, a framework designed to address these issues through the implementation of two key strategies: 1) A straightforward mechanism that decouples style and content from reference images within the feature space, predicated on the assumption that features within the same space can be either added to or subtracted from one another. 2) The injection of reference image features exclusively into style-specific blocks, thereby preventing style leaks and eschewing the need for cumbersome weight tuning, which often characterizes more parameter-heavy designs.Our work demonstrates superior visual stylization outcomes, striking an optimal balance between the intensity of style and the controllability of textual elements. Our codes will be available at https://github.com/InstantStyle/InstantStyle.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CodeBreaker, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CodeBreaker leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CodeBreaker stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CodeBreaker across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CodeBreaker challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.

Large Language Models are being increasingly deployed as the decision-making core of autonomous agents capable of effecting change in external environments. Yet, in conversational benchmarks, which simulate real-world customer-centric issue resolution scenarios, these agents frequently fail due to the cascading effects of incorrect decision-making. These challenges are particularly pronounced for open-source LLMs with smaller parameter sizes, limited context windows, and constrained inference budgets, which contribute to increased error accumulation in agentic settings. To tackle these challenges, we present the Failure-Aware Meta-Agentic (FAMA) framework. FAMA operates in two stages: first, it analyzes failure trajectories from baseline agents to identify the most prevalent errors; second, it employs an orchestration mechanism that activates a minimal subset of specialized agents tailored to address these failures by injecting a targeted context for the tool-use agent before the decision-making step. Experiments across open-source LLMs demonstrate performance gains up to 27% across evaluation modes over standard baselines. These results highlight that targeted curation of context through specialized agents to address common failures is a valuable design principle for building reliable, multi-turn tool-use LLM agents that simulate real-world conversational scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.