Daily Papers

With the release of the o1 model by OpenAI, reasoning models adopting slow thinking strategies have gradually emerged. As the responses generated by such models often include complex reasoning, intermediate steps, and self-reflection, existing evaluation methods are often inadequate. They struggle to determine whether the LLM output is truly equivalent to the reference answer, and also have difficulty identifying and extracting the final answer from long, complex responses. To address this issue, we propose xVerify, an efficient answer verifier for reasoning model evaluations. xVerify demonstrates strong capability in equivalence judgment, enabling it to effectively determine whether the answers produced by reasoning models are equivalent to reference answers across various types of objective questions. To train and evaluate xVerify, we construct the VAR dataset by collecting question-answer pairs generated by multiple LLMs across various datasets, leveraging multiple reasoning models and challenging evaluation sets designed specifically for reasoning model assessment. A multi-round annotation process is employed to ensure label accuracy. Based on the VAR dataset, we train multiple xVerify models of different scales. In evaluation experiments conducted on both the test set and generalization set, all xVerify models achieve overall F1 scores and accuracy exceeding 95\%. Notably, the smallest variant, xVerify-0.5B-I, outperforms all evaluation methods except GPT-4o, while xVerify-3B-Ib surpasses GPT-4o in overall performance. These results validate the effectiveness and generalizability of xVerify.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to scientific reasoning, the complexity of answer formats and the diversity of equivalent expressions make answer verification a critical yet challenging task. Existing verification studies in scientific domains suffer from two major limitations: (a) the absence of systematic evaluation standards and insufficient disciplinary coverage, which hinders their comprehensive assessment; and (b) heavy reliance on cumbersome rule design or prompt engineering, which reduces their effectiveness in complex reasoning scenarios or limits their cross-disciplinary generalization. To address these challenges, we propose solutions at both the data and model levels. On the data side, we construct SCI-VerifyBench, a cross-disciplinary benchmark covering mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, and general scientific QA. The benchmark is built from real LLM responses and enhanced with domain-specific equivalence transformations that generate challenging and realistic data. Model-based and expert annotations ensure both quality and diversity, enabling rigorous evaluation of verification ability. On the model side, we emphasize the importance of reasoning for verification and introduce SCI-Verifier, a unified reasoning-augmented verifier for scientific domains. Through post-training, SCI-Verifier demonstrates strong logical reasoning and equivalence judgment capabilities while maintaining concise and stable outputs. Together, SCI-VerifyBench and SCI-Verifier provide a principled framework for scientific verification, offering both systematic evaluation and practical pathways to enhance the reliability and applicability of LLMs in scientific domains.

Question answering (QA) can only make progress if we know if an answer is correct, but for many of the most challenging and interesting QA examples, current evaluation metrics to determine answer equivalence (AE) often do not align with human judgments, particularly more verbose, free-form answers from large language models (LLM). There are two challenges: a lack of data and that models are too big: LLM-based scorers can correlate better with human judges, but this task has only been tested on limited QA datasets, and even when available, update of the model is limited because LLMs are large and often expensive. We rectify both of these issues by providing clear and consistent guidelines for evaluating AE in machine QA adopted from professional human QA contests. We also introduce a combination of standard evaluation and a more efficient, robust, and lightweight discriminate AE classifier-based matching method (CFMatch, smaller than 1 MB), trained and validated to more accurately evaluate answer correctness in accordance with adopted expert AE rules that are more aligned with human judgments.

Code-switching, the phenomenon of alternating between two or more languages in a single conversation, presents unique challenges for Natural Language Processing (NLP). Most existing research focuses on either syntactic constraints or neural generation, with few efforts to integrate linguistic theory with large language models (LLMs) for generating natural code-switched text. In this paper, we introduce EZSwitch, a novel framework that combines Equivalence Constraint Theory (ECT) with LLMs to produce linguistically valid and fluent code-switched text. We evaluate our method using both human judgments and automatic metrics, demonstrating a significant improvement in the quality of generated code-switching sentences compared to baseline LLMs. To address the lack of suitable evaluation metrics, we conduct a comprehensive correlation study of various automatic metrics against human scores, revealing that current metrics often fail to capture the nuanced fluency of code-switched text. Additionally, we create CSPref, a human preference dataset based on human ratings and analyze model performance across ``hard`` and ``easy`` examples. Our findings indicate that incorporating linguistic constraints into LLMs leads to more robust and human-aligned generation, paving the way for scalable code-switching text generation across diverse language pairs.

The predictions of question answering (QA)systems are typically evaluated against manually annotated finite sets of one or more answers. This leads to a coverage limitation that results in underestimating the true performance of systems, and is typically addressed by extending over exact match (EM) with pre-defined rules or with the token-level F1 measure. In this paper, we present the first systematic conceptual and data-driven analysis to examine the shortcomings of token-level equivalence measures. To this end, we define the asymmetric notion of answer equivalence (AE), accepting answers that are equivalent to or improve over the reference, and publish over 23k human judgments for candidates produced by multiple QA systems on SQuAD. Through a careful analysis of this data, we reveal and quantify several concrete limitations of the F1 measure, such as a false impression of graduality, or missing dependence on the question. Since collecting AE annotations for each evaluated model is expensive, we learn a BERT matching (BEM) measure to approximate this task. Being a simpler task than QA, we find BEM to provide significantly better AE approximations than F1, and to more accurately reflect the performance of systems. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of AE and BEM on the concrete application of minimal accurate prediction sets, reducing the number of required answers by up to x2.6.

In this paper, we investigate the challenge of integrating tables from data lakes, focusing on three core tasks: 1) pairwise integrability judgment, which determines whether a tuple pair in a table is integrable, accounting for any occurrences of semantic equivalence or typographical errors; 2) integrable set discovery, which aims to identify all integrable sets in a table based on pairwise integrability judgments established in the first task; 3) multi-tuple conflict resolution, which resolves conflicts among multiple tuples during integration. We train a binary classifier to address the task of pairwise integrability judgment. Given the scarcity of labeled data, we propose a self-supervised adversarial contrastive learning algorithm to perform classification, which incorporates data augmentation methods and adversarial examples to autonomously generate new training data. Upon the output of pairwise integrability judgment, each integrable set is considered as a community, a densely connected sub-graph where nodes and edges correspond to tuples in the table and their pairwise integrability, respectively. We proceed to investigate various community detection algorithms to address the integrable set discovery objective. Moving forward to tackle multi-tuple conflict resolution, we introduce an novel in-context learning methodology. This approach capitalizes on the knowledge embedded within pretrained large language models to effectively resolve conflicts that arise when integrating multiple tuples. Notably, our method minimizes the need for annotated data. Since no suitable test collections are available for our tasks, we develop our own benchmarks using two real-word dataset repositories: Real and Join. We conduct extensive experiments on these benchmarks to validate the robustness and applicability of our methodologies in the context of integrating tables within data lakes.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (e.g. GRPO) is the engine behind today's reasoning models, yet it grades only the final answer. On hard problems this trains models to write more rather than to think better, since the trace itself is never graded and no label for good thinking exists. We introduce Agon, which makes two competing models each other's graders. Both attempt the same problem; in alternating roles, one drafts a solution and the other reads it while solving, and each is rewarded for out-solving the other. To win, a model must out-reason a rival that has seen its work, so reasoning is judged implicitly during training, with no process labels and no reward model. Because both models are optimized, each faces a progressively stronger rival, which single-model RL cannot provide. The two need only be comparably strong and behaviorally different. At inference the pair deploys as it trains, a two-stage cascade in which one model drafts and the other answers after reading the draft. On the hard split of DeepMath with Qwen3, this doubles GRPO's pass@1, roughly eight times the gain of an untrained Mixture-of-Agents pass over the same base. The ordering replicates on competitive-programming code and across model families (Qwen3.5, Gemma 4). For now the models talk in text; the next step is to let them reason together in latent space.

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

A fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization is identifying equivalent formulations, which can lead to more efficient solution strategies and deeper insights into a problem's computational complexity. The need to automatically identify equivalence between problem formulations has grown as optimization copilots--systems that generate problem formulations from natural language descriptions--have proliferated. However, existing approaches to checking formulation equivalence lack grounding, relying on simple heuristics which are insufficient for rigorous validation. Inspired by Karp reductions, in this work we introduce quasi-Karp equivalence, a formal criterion for determining when two optimization formulations are equivalent based on the existence of a mapping between their decision variables. We propose EquivaMap, a framework that leverages large language models to automatically discover such mappings, enabling scalable and reliable equivalence verification. To evaluate our approach, we construct the first open-source dataset of equivalent optimization formulations, generated by applying transformations such as adding slack variables or valid inequalities to existing formulations. Empirically, EquivaMap significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving substantial improvements in correctly identifying formulation equivalence.

LLM-as-Judge frameworks are increasingly popular for AI evaluation, yet research findings on the relationship between models' generation and judgment abilities remain inconsistent. We investigate this relationship through systematic dataset- and instance-level analyses across 11 models and 21 diverse tasks. Despite both capabilities relying on the same underlying knowledge, our analyses reveal they are only weakly correlated, primarily due to LLMs' sensitivity to the responses being judged. To address this, we propose a self-reference-guided evaluation strategy that leverages a model's own answers as references. This approach significantly strengthens the correlation between generation and judgment abilities, offering a practical path to align these skills and providing a reliable proxy for model selection in evaluation tasks.

We introduce Humans-Junior, a 3.8B model that matches GPT-4o on the FACTS Grounding public subset within a pm 5 pp equivalence margin. Results. On Q1--Q500 under identical judges, GPT-4o scores 73.5% (95% CI 69.5--77.2) and Humans-Junior 72.7% (95% CI 68.7--76.5); the paired difference is 0.8 pp (bootstrap 95% CI -3.1 to +4.7; permutation p = 0.72; Cohen's d = 0.023). TOST establishes equivalence at pm 5 pp (not at pm 3 pp). When purchased as managed APIs, Humans-Junior's base model (Phi-3.5-mini-instruct) is approx 19times less expensive than GPT-4o on Microsoft AI Foundry pricing; self-hosted or edge deployments can drive incremental inference cost toward zero. Measured vs estimated pricing sources are tabulated in Appendix E. Method. Our approach combines minimal directed "Exoskeleton Reasoning" scaffolds with behavioral fine-tuning that teaches protocol compliance (epistemic discipline) rather than domain answers. Fine-tuning alone adds little; combined, they synergize (+17.7 pp, p < 0.001) and reduce variance (approx 25%). In prompt-only settings on frontier models (Q1--Q100; non-comparable), directed reasoning improved GPT-4o by +11.8 pp to 85.3% and Gemini-2.5-Pro by +5.0 pp to 93.3% (baseline 88.3%, n = 100); see Section~5. TL;DR. A 3.8B model achieves GPT-4o-level FACTS accuracy (equivalent within pm 5 pp on Q1--Q500). Cloud pricing shows approx 19times lower cost versus GPT-4o, and self-hosted/edge deployments can approach zero marginal cost. Pricing sources are listed in Appendix E. Frontier prompt-only gains (Q1--Q100; non-comparable) and optimized-prompt exploratory results under earlier judges are summarized in Appendix F. Keywords: Small Language Models, Factual Grounding, Directed Reasoning, Fine-Tuning, Model Alignment, Cost-Efficient AI

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning through search algorithms, yet current strategies often suffer from massive token consumption due to redundant exploration of semantically equivalent steps. Existing semantic similarity methods struggle to accurately identify such equivalence in domain-specific contexts like mathematical reasoning. To address this, we propose EquivPruner, a simple yet effective approach that identifies and prunes semantically equivalent actions during LLM reasoning search. We also introduce MathEquiv, the first dataset we created for mathematical statement equivalence, which enables the training of a lightweight equivalence detector. Extensive experiments across various models and tasks demonstrate that EquivPruner significantly reduces token consumption, improving searching efficiency and often bolstering reasoning accuracy. For instance, when applied to Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on GSM8K, EquivPruner reduced token consumption by 48.1\% while also improving accuracy. Our code is available at https://github.com/Lolo1222/EquivPruner.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Large language model (LLM)-based judges are widely adopted for automated evaluation and reward modeling, yet their judgments are often affected by judgment biases. Accurately evaluating these biases is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM-based judges. However, existing studies typically investigate limited biases under a single judge formulation, either generative or discriminative, lacking a comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we propose JudgeBiasBench, a benchmark for systematically quantifying biases in LLM-based judges. JudgeBiasBench defines a taxonomy of judgment biases across 4 dimensions, and constructs bias-augmented evaluation instances through a controlled bias injection pipeline, covering 12 representative bias types. We conduct extensive experiments across both generative and discriminative judges, revealing that current judges exhibit significant and diverse bias patterns that often compromise the reliability of automated evaluation. To mitigate judgment bias, we propose bias-aware training that explicitly incorporates bias-related attributes into the training process, encouraging judges to disentangle task-relevant quality from bias-correlated cues. By adopting reinforcement learning for generative judges and contrastive learning for discriminative judges, our methods effectively reduce judgment biases while largely preserving general evaluation capability.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Prompt optimization methods either analyze individual failures in isolation or compare prompt variants across examples, operating on single execution traces with no access to the reasoning process distinguishing success from failure on the same input. We introduce ContraPrompt, built on the observation that when a model fails but succeeds on a retry with feedback, the difference between its two chain-of-thought traces constitutes an optimization signal not captured by prior methods. Unlike prior contrastive methods, we compare complete intermediate reasoning processes: the two traces share model, input, and base prompt, so remaining differences reflect reasoning strategy and appended error feedback -- we call this dyadic reasoning trace analysis. The multi-attempt solving phase is an instrumented agentic retry loop that generates contrastive data automatically without human annotation. Extracted rules are organized into an input-aware decision tree routing instructions by observable input characteristics. On four reasoning and compliance benchmarks, ContraPrompt outperforms GEPA (Agrawal et al., 2026) on all four, with absolute gains of +8.29 pp on HotPotQA (+20.8% rel.), +2.21 pp on GDPR-Bench (+18.2% rel.), +7.14 pp on GPQA Diamond (+10.6% rel.), and +0.74 pp on BBH (+0.85% rel.). Ablations confirm dyadic trace contrastivity is the critical component, with a -16% relative average drop upon its removal. On 53 EvalSet black-box optimization problems, ContraPrompt beats GEPA on 11, ties on 41, and loses on 1 at equal budget. On FiNER-139 financial named entity recognition (Loukas et al., 2022), ContraPrompt achieves +7.77 pp over the unoptimized baseline (+11.6% rel.) and +1.94 pp over GEPA (+2.66% rel.), with branch conditions aligning with standard US GAAP financial-instrument categories.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

In the era of large language models, creative writing quality lacks a computable theoretical anchor. The dominant approaches are rubric scoring -- decomposing holistic aesthetic judgment into sub-scores -- and RLHF preference signals -- replacing quality with group votes. Both bypass the statistical structure of the text itself. This paper provides an information-theoretic foundation to fill this gap. We propose 'calibrated surprise' as the information-theoretic essence of excellent creative writing. This judgment matches reading intuition and covers its opposite. This literary judgment admits a precise mathematical formulation. Under full-dimensional constraints Y, feasible writing choices are forced into an extremely narrow space. The rare survivors are, from the unconstrained perspective, exactly the least predictable choices. Both are measured precisely by Shannon mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) -- 'calibrated' corresponds to H(X|Y) approaching 0; 'surprising' corresponds to H(X) going high. The subtraction structure of the formula naturally separates 'well-grounded surprise' from 'pure noise'. We use token-level logprobs from Qwen1.5-7B as an operational proxy for the ideal reader's probability distribution. Across 20 pairs (12 Chinese / 8 English) of high-quality vs. systematically degraded literary passages, 20/20 pairs support the core prediction: high-quality passages have systematically higher I(X;Y) than their degraded versions.

Parallel scaling has emerged as a powerful paradigm to enhance reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs) by generating multiple Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces simultaneously. However, this approach introduces significant computational inefficiency due to inter-trace redundancy -- our analysis reveals that over 80% of parallel reasoning traces yield identical final answers, representing substantial wasted computation. To address this critical efficiency bottleneck, we propose DeepPrune, a novel framework that enables efficient parallel scaling through dynamic pruning. Our method features a specialized judge model trained with focal loss and oversampling techniques to accurately predict answer equivalence from partial reasoning traces which realizes 0.87 AUROC on equivalence prediction, combined with an online greedy clustering algorithm that dynamically prunes redundant paths while preserving answer diversity. Comprehensive evaluations across three challenging benchmarks (AIME 2024, AIME 2025, and GPQA) and multiple reasoning models demonstrate that DeepPrune achieves remarkable token reduction by over 80% compared to conventional consensus sampling on most cases, while maintaining competitive accuracy within 3 percentage points. Our work establishes a new standard for efficient parallel reasoning, making high-performance reasoning more efficient. Our code and data are here: https://deepprune.github.io/

This research introduces the Judge's Verdict Benchmark, a novel two-step methodology to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) as judges for response accuracy evaluation tasks. We assess how well 54 LLMs can replicate human judgment when scoring responses from RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) or Agentic pipelines against ground truth answers. Our methodology progresses from traditional correlation analysis to comprehensive Cohen's Kappa analysis that measures actual agreement patterns. The two-step approach includes: (1) a correlation test that filters judges with strong alignment, followed by (2) a human-likeness test using z-scores to identify two distinct judgment patterns: human-like judgment (|z| < 1) that mimics natural human variation, and super-consistent judgment (z > 1) that exceeds typical human-to-human agreement levels. This methodology reveals that 27 out of 54 tested LLMs achieve Tier 1 performance: 23 models exhibit human-like patterns that preserve the nuances of human judgment, while 4 models demonstrate super-consistent behavior, a pattern that could indicate either enhanced reliability or oversimplification of complex judgments. Testing 43 open-source models (1B-405B parameters) and 11 closed models (GPT, Gemini, Claude variants), we demonstrate that judge excellence is not solely dependent on model size but on specific training strategies. Our key contributions include: (1) establishing that correlation alone is insufficient for judge evaluation, (2) introducing a "Turing Test for judges" based on agreement patterns, and (3) providing a standardized benchmark for classifying LLM judges into distinct performance tiers for different evaluation needs.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

In arena-style evaluation of large language models (LLMs), two LLMs respond to a user query, and the user chooses the winning response or deems the "battle" a draw, resulting in an adjustment to the ratings of both models. The prevailing approach for modeling these rating dynamics is to view battles as two-player game matches, as in chess, and apply the Elo rating system and its derivatives. In this paper, we critically examine this paradigm. Specifically, we question whether a draw genuinely means that the two models are equal and hence whether their ratings should be equalized. Instead, we conjecture that draws are more indicative of query difficulty: if the query is too easy, then both models are more likely to succeed equally. On three real-world arena datasets, we show that ignoring rating updates for draws yields a 1-3% relative increase in battle outcome prediction accuracy (which includes draws) for all four rating systems studied. Further analyses suggest that draws occur more for queries rated as very easy and those as highly objective, with risk ratios of 1.37 and 1.35, respectively. We recommend future rating systems to reconsider existing draw semantics and to account for query properties in rating updates.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

Recent multimodal large language models have demonstrated strong reasoning ability, yet their reliability as automated evaluators remains limited by a critical weakness: when visual evidence conflicts with textual cues, MLLM judges tend to reward plausible narratives over perceptually correct answers. We identify and systematically analyze this phenomenon, which we term Perceptual Judgment Bias. Through controlled visual perturbations, existing multimodal judges frequently anchor on the response text instead of their own visual perception, leading to inconsistent and non-verifiable evaluations. To address this issue, we introduce the Perceptually Perturbed Judgment Dataset, which constructs minimally edited counterfactual responses that isolate perceptual errors and enable verifiable supervision. Building on this dataset, we develop a unified training framework that combines a structured GRPO-based reward with a batch-ranking objective, achieving coherent global ordering without explicit pairwise labels. Experiments across diverse MLLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks show that our approach substantially improves perceptual fidelity, ranking coherence, and alignment with human evaluation. Our results establish a scalable and generalizable pathway for training multimodal judges that are perceptually grounded, interpretable, and robust to visual-reasoning conflicts.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

In a legal system, judgment consistency is regarded as one of the most important manifestations of fairness. However, due to the complexity of factual elements that impact sentencing in real-world scenarios, few works have been done on quantitatively measuring judgment consistency towards real-world data. In this paper, we propose an evaluation metric for judgment inconsistency, Legal Inconsistency Coefficient (LInCo), which aims to evaluate inconsistency between data groups divided by specific features (e.g., gender, region, race). We propose to simulate judges from different groups with legal judgment prediction (LJP) models and measure the judicial inconsistency with the disagreement of the judgment results given by LJP models trained on different groups. Experimental results on the synthetic data verify the effectiveness of LInCo. We further employ LInCo to explore the inconsistency in real cases and come to the following observations: (1) Both regional and gender inconsistency exist in the legal system, but gender inconsistency is much less than regional inconsistency; (2) The level of regional inconsistency varies little across different time periods; (3) In general, judicial inconsistency is negatively correlated with the severity of the criminal charges. Besides, we use LInCo to evaluate the performance of several de-bias methods, such as adversarial learning, and find that these mechanisms can effectively help LJP models to avoid suffering from data bias.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a popular training paradigm, particularly when paired with reasoning models. While effective, it primarily focuses on generating responses and lacks mechanisms to explicitly foster critique or reflection. Several recent studies, like Critique-Fine-Tuning (CFT) and Critique-Guided-Distillation (CGD) have shown the benefits of explicitly teaching LLMs how to critique. Motivated by them, we propose Critique Reinforcement Learning (CRL), where the model is tasked with generating a critique for a given (question, solution) pair. The reward is determined solely by whether the final judgment label c in {True, False} of the generated critique aligns with the ground-truth judgment c^*. Building on this point, we introduce Critique-Coder, which is trained on a hybrid of RL and CRL by substituting 20\% of the standard RL data with CRL data. We fine-tune multiple models (Critique-Coder) and evaluate them on different benchmarks to show their advantages over RL-only models. We show that Critique-Coder consistently outperforms RL-only baselines on all the evaluated benchmarks. Notably, our Critique-Coder-8B can reach over 60\% on LiveCodeBench (v5), outperforming other reasoning models like DeepCoder-14B and GPT-o1. Beyond code generation, Critique-Coder also demonstrates enhanced general reasoning abilities, as evidenced by its better performance on logic reasoning tasks from the BBEH dataset. This indicates that the application of CRL on coding datasets enhances general reasoning and critique abilities, which are transferable across a broad range of tasks. Hence, we believe that CRL works as a great complement to standard RL for LLM reasoning.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently applied to scientific paper evaluation by assigning an absolute score to each paper independently. However, since score scales vary across conferences, time periods, and evaluation criteria, models trained on absolute scores are prone to fitting narrow, context-specific rules rather than developing robust scholarly judgment. To overcome this limitation, we propose shifting paper evaluation from isolated scoring to collaborative ranking. In particular, we design Comparison-Native framework for Paper Evaluation (CNPE), integrating comparison into both data construction and model learning. We first propose a graph-based similarity ranking algorithm to facilitate the sampling of more informative and discriminative paper pairs from a collection. We then enhance relative quality judgment through supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with comparison-based rewards. At inference, the model performs pairwise comparisons over sampled paper pairs and aggregates these preference signals into a global relative quality ranking. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves an average relative improvement of 21.8\% over the strong baseline DeepReview-14B, while exhibiting robust generalization to five previously unseen datasets. https://github.com/ECNU-Text-Computing/ComparisonReview{Code}.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a popular alternative to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), offering theoretical equivalence with simpler implementation. We prove this equivalence is conditional rather than universal, depending on an implicit assumption frequently violated in practice: the RLHF-optimal policy must prefer human-preferred responses. When this assumption fails, DPO optimizes relative advantage over the reference policy rather than absolute alignment with human preferences, leading to pathological convergence where policies decrease DPO loss while preferring dispreferred responses. We characterize when this assumption is violated, show the existence of an undesirable solution space, and prove that DPO and RLHF optimize fundamentally different objectives in such cases. To address this, we introduce Constrained Preference Optimization (CPO), augmenting RLHF with constraints for provable alignment. We further provide a geometric interpretation through soft margin ranking, revealing that DPO implements margin ranking with potentially negative targets. Our theoretical analysis establishes when DPOs' guarantees hold and provides solutions preserving simplicity with provable alignment. Comprehensive experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that CPO achieves state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at: https://github.com/visitworld123/CPO.

Fairness for machine learning predictions is widely required in practice for legal, ethical, and societal reasons. Existing work typically focuses on settings without unobserved confounding, even though unobserved confounding can lead to severe violations of causal fairness and, thus, unfair predictions. In this work, we analyze the sensitivity of causal fairness to unobserved confounding. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive bounds for causal fairness metrics under different sources of unobserved confounding. This enables practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their machine learning models to unobserved confounding in fairness-critical applications. Second, we propose a novel neural framework for learning fair predictions, which allows us to offer worst-case guarantees of the extent to which causal fairness can be violated due to unobserved confounding. Third, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in a series of experiments, including a real-world case study about predicting prison sentences. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to study causal fairness under unobserved confounding. To this end, our work is of direct practical value as a refutation strategy to ensure the fairness of predictions in high-stakes applications.

Making analogies is fundamental to cognition. Proportional analogies, which consist of four terms, are often used to assess linguistic and cognitive abilities. For instance, completing analogies like "Oxygen is to Gas as <blank> is to <blank>" requires identifying the semantic relationship (e.g., "type of") between the first pair of terms ("Oxygen" and "Gas") and finding a second pair that shares the same relationship (e.g., "Aluminum" and "Metal"). In this work, we introduce a 15K Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) dataset for proportional analogy completion and evaluate the performance of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) in various knowledge-enhanced prompt settings. Specifically, we augment prompts with three types of knowledge: exemplar, structured, and targeted. Our results show that despite extensive training data, solving proportional analogies remains challenging for current LLMs, with the best model achieving an accuracy of 55%. Notably, we find that providing targeted knowledge can better assist models in completing proportional analogies compared to providing exemplars or collections of structured knowledge.

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

We introduce CompareBench, a benchmark for evaluating visual comparison reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs), a fundamental yet understudied skill. CompareBench consists of 1000 QA pairs across four tasks: quantity (600), temporal (100), geometric (200), and spatial (100). It is derived from two auxiliary datasets that we constructed: TallyBench (2000 counting images with QA) and HistCaps (515 historical images with bilingual captions). We evaluate both closed-source APIs (OpenAI, Gemini, Claude) and open-source models (Qwen2.5-VL and Qwen3-VL series). Results show clear scaling trends but also reveal critical limitations: even the strongest models consistently fail at temporal ordering and spatial relations, and they often make mistakes in basic counting and geometric comparisons that are trivial for humans. These findings demonstrate that visual comparison remains a systematic blind spot for current VLMs. By providing controlled, diverse, and diagnostic evaluation, CompareBench establishes a foundation for advancing more reliable multimodal reasoning.

We introduce PerceptionComp, a manually annotated benchmark for complex, long-horizon, perception-centric video reasoning. PerceptionComp is designed so that no single moment is sufficient: answering each question requires multiple temporally separated pieces of visual evidence and compositional constraints under conjunctive and sequential logic, spanning perceptual subtasks such as objects, attributes, relations, locations, actions, and events, and requiring skills including semantic recognition, visual correspondence, temporal reasoning, and spatial reasoning. The benchmark contains 1,114 highly complex questions on 279 videos from diverse domains including city walk tours, indoor villa tours, video games, and extreme outdoor sports, with 100% manual annotation. Human studies show that PerceptionComp requires substantial test-time thinking and repeated perception steps: participants take much longer than on prior benchmarks, and accuracy drops to near chance (18.97%) when rewatching is disallowed. State-of-the-art MLLMs also perform substantially worse on PerceptionComp than on existing benchmarks: the best model in our evaluation, Gemini-3-Flash, reaches only 45.96% accuracy in the five-choice setting, while open-source models remain below 40%. These results suggest that perception-centric long-horizon video reasoning remains a major bottleneck, and we hope PerceptionComp will help drive progress in perceptual reasoning.

LLM-as-a-Judge models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) sequences intended to capture the step-bystep reasoning process that underlies the final evaluation of a response. However, due to the lack of human annotated CoTs for evaluation, the required components and structure of effective reasoning traces remain understudied. Consequently, previous approaches often (1) constrain reasoning traces to hand-designed components, such as a list of criteria, reference answers, or verification questions and (2) structure them such that planning is intertwined with the reasoning for evaluation. In this work, we propose EvalPlanner, a preference optimization algorithm for Thinking-LLM-as-a-Judge that first generates an unconstrained evaluation plan, followed by its execution, and then the final judgment. In a self-training loop, EvalPlanner iteratively optimizes over synthetically constructed evaluation plans and executions, leading to better final verdicts. Our method achieves a new state-of-the-art performance for generative reward models on RewardBench (with a score of 93.9), despite being trained on fewer amount of, and synthetically generated, preference pairs. Additional experiments on other benchmarks like RM-Bench, JudgeBench, and FollowBenchEval further highlight the utility of both planning and reasoning for building robust LLM-as-a-Judge reasoning models.

A common evaluation practice in the vector space models (VSMs) literature is to measure the models' ability to predict human judgments about lexical semantic relations between word pairs. Most existing evaluation sets, however, consist of scores collected for English word pairs only, ignoring the potential impact of the judgment language in which word pairs are presented on the human scores. In this paper we translate two prominent evaluation sets, wordsim353 (association) and SimLex999 (similarity), from English to Italian, German and Russian and collect scores for each dataset from crowdworkers fluent in its language. Our analysis reveals that human judgments are strongly impacted by the judgment language. Moreover, we show that the predictions of monolingual VSMs do not necessarily best correlate with human judgments made with the language used for model training, suggesting that models and humans are affected differently by the language they use when making semantic judgments. Finally, we show that in a large number of setups, multilingual VSM combination results in improved correlations with human judgments, suggesting that multilingualism may partially compensate for the judgment language effect on human judgments.

This paper presents an eight-week observational comparison of 68 single-file HTML generations collected across 17 public experiments in the "HTML AI Battle" project between December 10, 2025 and February 4, 2026. Four reasoning model families, GPT, Gemini, Grok, and Claude, were compared under a fixed public-interface protocol with no custom instructions, no personality tuning, and no repair prompts. Each output was evaluated from a rendered browser video using human scores and a Gemini LLM-as-a-judge layer for prompt adherence, functional correctness, and UI quality, then packaged into a standardized social-media protocol spanning X (Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube. The tracker was also used for two supervised predictive analyses: an experiment-level model for 24-hour X impressions and a generation-level model for HTML verbosity. Under this protocol, Claude was the strongest and most consistent family, leading mean performance and winning 9/17 prompts under the primary human weighted score. Longer measured reasoning time was not associated with higher quality overall. Gemini as a judge was significantly more lenient than the human evaluator on functional correctness and overall performance, while stable self-favoring bias remained unresolved. The exploratory X-impressions model remained weak under post-screen cross-validation (MAE = 46,874, R^2 = -0.377), whereas the HTML-lines model performed better, with a model-family-only baseline outperforming prompt-aware alternatives (MAE = 135.2, R^2 = 0.576). Overall, selected pre-publication technical/audio variables were not sufficient to predict 24-hour X reach, while code verbosity was driven much more by model family than by prompt wording. The comparisons remain observational and are limited by public-interface drift, access-path differences, and one primary human scorer.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly used as evaluators in various applications, but the reliability of the outcomes remains a challenge. One such challenge is using LLMs-as-judges for direct assessment, i.e., assigning scores from a specified range without any references. We first show that this challenge stems from LLM judge outputs being associated with score range bias, i.e., LLM judge outputs are highly sensitive to pre-defined score ranges, preventing the search for optimal score ranges. We also show that similar biases exist among models from the same family. We then mitigate this bias through contrastive decoding, achieving up to 11.3% relative improvement on average in Spearman correlation with human judgments across different score ranges.

Transfer learning is crucial for medical imaging, yet the selection of source datasets - which can impact the generalizability of algorithms, and thus patient outcomes - often relies on researchers' intuition rather than systematic principles. This study investigates these decisions through a task-based survey with machine learning practitioners. Unlike prior work that benchmarks models and experimental setups, we take a human-centered HCI perspective on how practitioners select source datasets. Our findings indicate that choices are task-dependent and influenced by community practices, dataset properties, and computational (data embedding), or perceived visual or semantic similarity. However, similarity ratings and expected performance are not always aligned, challenging a traditional "more similar is better" view. Participants often used ambiguous terminology, which suggests a need for clearer definitions and HCI tools to make them explicit and usable. By clarifying these heuristics, this work provides practical insights for more systematic source selection in transfer learning.

Recently, the role of LLM-as-judge in evaluating large language models has gained prominence. However, current judge models suffer from narrow specialization and limited robustness, undermining their capacity for comprehensive evaluations. In this work, we present CompassJudger-2, a novel generalist judge model that overcomes these limitations via a task-driven, multi-domain data curation strategy. Central to our approach is supervising judgment tasks with verifiable rewards, guiding intrinsic critical reasoning through rejection sampling to foster robust, generalizable judgment capabilities. We introduce a refined learning objective with margin policy gradient loss to enhance performance. Empirically, CompassJudger-2 achieves superior results across multiple judge and reward benchmarks, and our 7B model demonstrates competitive judgment accuracy with significantly larger models like DeepSeek-V3 and Qwen3-235B-A22B. Additionally, we propose JudgerBenchV2, a comprehensive benchmark evaluating cross-domain judgment accuracy and rank consistency to standardize judge model evaluation. These contributions advance robust, scalable LLM judgment and establish new performance and evaluation standards.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Studies of bias in LLM-as-judge systems typically build synthetic corpora by prompting an LLM to generate a hallucinated answer to pair with a factual one, then presenting both to a judge. We report a case in which this generation step silently failed, and use it to argue that the failure mode is structural rather than incidental. In a multilingual (Turkish/English) faithfulness-judgment corpus, a decoding-budget parameter shared between judging and generation calls truncated one producer's hallucinated answers to a few words. The resulting items produced a large, statistically robust effect: a 32-point cross-lingual collapse in one judge's selection accuracy, replicated from N=50 to N=500, explained by a three-layer mechanistic account, and confirmed by a controlled producer-swap experiment, none of which was real. The effect vanished to ceiling once the shared parameter was corrected, and only manual reading of the raw generations, not any aggregate statistical check, exposed the fault. A second measured bias (Markdown-formatting preference) was not fabricated but distorted by the same fault, its magnitude and in one case its sign shifting with stimulus length, a mode aggregate metrics cannot distinguish from the first. We frame the underlying vulnerability using the test oracle problem: corpora whose negative examples are LLM-generated carry no mechanical way to verify item integrity, while corpora built by deterministic perturbation of a gold answer carry an item-level oracle for free. A positive control supports this claim directly: an analogous fault injected into a minimal perturbation-based corpus is caught with 100% accuracy by a zero-cost, zero-human gold-to-negative string comparison. We close with a validation protocol, derived from our own case, for analysts working in the oracle-less regime that we argue describes most contemporary multilingual LLM-as-judge corpora.

Rigorous evaluation of large language models (LLMs) relies on comparing models by the prevalence of desirable or undesirable behaviors, such as task pass rates or policy violations. These prevalence estimates are produced by a classifier, either an LLM-as-a-judge or human annotators, making the choice of classifier central to trustworthy evaluation. Common metrics used for this choice, such as Accuracy, Precision, and F1, are sensitive to class imbalance and to arbitrary choices of positive class, and can favor judges that distort prevalence estimates. We show that Youden's J statistic is theoretically aligned with choosing the best judge to compare models, and that Balanced Accuracy is an equivalent linear transformation of J. Through both analytical arguments and empirical examples and simulations, we demonstrate how selecting judges using Balanced Accuracy leads to better, more robust classifier selection.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

Ask a frontier model how to taper six milligrams of alprazolam (psychiatrist retired, ten days of pills left, abrupt cessation causes seizures) and it tells her to call the psychiatrist she just explained does not exist. Change one word ("I'm a psychiatrist; a patient presents with...") and the same model, same weights, same inference pass produces a textbook Ashton Manual taper with diazepam equivalence, anticonvulsant coverage, and monitoring thresholds. The knowledge was there; the model withheld it. IatroBench measures this gap. Sixty pre-registered clinical scenarios, six frontier models, 3,600 responses, scored on two axes (commission harm, CH 0-3; omission harm, OH 0-4) through a structured-evaluation pipeline validated against physician scoring (kappa_w = 0.571, within-1 agreement 96%). The central finding is identity-contingent withholding: match the same clinical question in physician vs. layperson framing and all five testable models provide better guidance to the physician (decoupling gap +0.38, p = 0.003; binary hit rates on safety-colliding actions drop 13.1 percentage points in layperson framing, p < 0.0001, while non-colliding actions show no change). The gap is widest for the model with the heaviest safety investment (Opus, +0.65). Three failure modes separate cleanly: trained withholding (Opus), incompetence (Llama 4), and indiscriminate content filtering (GPT-5.2, whose post-generation filter strips physician responses at 9x the layperson rate because they contain denser pharmacological tokens). The standard LLM judge assigns OH = 0 to 73% of responses a physician scores OH >= 1 (kappa = 0.045); the evaluation apparatus has the same blind spot as the training apparatus. Every scenario targets someone who has already exhausted the standard referrals.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

Equivariance theory predicts that an architectural symmetry prior reduces sample complexity by a factor of |G|; this is widely cited but rarely measured as a scaling law with controls that separate the prior from its confounds. On a controlled C_n-symmetric task, we report three findings. First, a wrong-group control with identical orbit size and matched compute is worse than no constraint (joint pairwise CI [+0.79, +3.26] excludes zero, robust across estimators); misaligned constraint is actively harmful, not merely unhelpful. Second, an augmentation baseline equipped with test-time orbit averaging matches the equivariant model exactly -- bit-identical per-epoch validation curves across matched cells -- so the architecture-vs-augmentation gap is conditional on asymmetric test-time computation, not unconditional. Third, the relative exchange rate beta_diff = 1.28 is consistent in sign and order of magnitude with the theoretical 1.0 (single-level CI [+0.92, +2.05]); the more conservative two-level bootstrap (seeds x group sizes) widens this to [-0.63, +1.72], including zero, and a finer-N replication on a sqrt(2)-spaced grid is inconclusive (point estimate -0.82). The methodological contributions -- the relative-rate estimator that cancels the shared-difficulty confound, the wrong-group control, and a pre-specified failure taxonomy -- transfer to any inductive bias whose strength can be parameterised. Honest scoping: the primary estimator beta_diff was adopted post-hoc after the initial analysis revealed a positive-slope identifiability problem; the design was never externally pre-registered; and the headline number rests on an OLS slope over seven group sizes on a coarse N grid. This is an exploratory study, not a confirmatory measurement; the wrong-group result is the cleanest finding and the one we report with the most confidence. A registered replication on fresh seeds is future work.

Answering counterfactual queries has many important applications such as knowledge discovery and explainability, but is challenging when causal variables are unobserved and we only see a projection onto an observation space, for instance, image pixels. One approach is to recover the latent Structural Causal Model (SCM), but this typically needs unrealistic assumptions, such as linearity of the causal mechanisms. Another approach is to use na\"ive ML approximations, such as generative models, to generate counterfactual samples; however, these lack guarantees of accuracy. In this work, we strive to strike a balance between practicality and theoretical guarantees by focusing on a specific type of causal query called domain counterfactuals, which hypothesizes what a sample would have looked like if it had been generated in a different domain (or environment). Concretely, by only assuming invertibility, sparse domain interventions and access to observational data from different domains, we aim to improve domain counterfactual estimation both theoretically and practically with less restrictive assumptions. We define domain counterfactually equivalent models and prove necessary and sufficient properties for equivalent models that provide a tight characterization of the domain counterfactual equivalence classes. Building upon this result, we prove that every equivalence class contains a model where all intervened variables are at the end when topologically sorted by the causal DAG. This surprising result suggests that a model design that only allows intervention in the last k latent variables may improve model estimation for counterfactuals. We then test this model design on extensive simulated and image-based experiments which show the sparse canonical model indeed improves counterfactual estimation over baseline non-sparse models.

ARC Challenge appears more difficult than ARC Easy for modern LLMs primarily due to an evaluation setup that prevents direct comparison of answer choices rather than inherent complexity. Although some researchers have quietly shifted to a more appropriate scheme over the last year, the implications of this change have yet to be widely acknowledged. We highlight this overlooked shift, show how similar evaluation practices falsely imply reasoning deficits in other benchmarks, and demonstrate that fairer methods dramatically reduce performance gaps (e.g. on SIQA) and even yield superhuman results (OpenBookQA). In doing so, we reveal how evaluation shapes perceived difficulty and offer guidelines to ensure that multiple-choice evaluations accurately reflect actual model capabilities.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

For many real-world systems, causal ground truth is difficult to obtain, making claims about causal effects hard to assess. We develop methods for evaluating collections of n{2} bivariate causal statements over a set of n variables. In the setting of acyclic linear statements, any such collection can be extended to a unique multivariate causal model, but we argue that this induced model is implausible if it imposes substantial additional confounding to explain observed correlations. We introduce a compatibility score that quantifies this notion of plausibility, notably without relying on the faithfulness assumption. Additionally, we define an incompatibility score for purely graphical bivariate causal statements, based on global consistency constraints that are derived from acyclicity and faithfulness assumptions. We give theoretical and empirical evidence that both scores can successfully distinguish correct from incorrect causal statements in generic settings. Moreover, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods by analyzing causal claims made by large language models. Our work aims to provide a foundation for assessing the reliability of causal information derived from human experts or artificial intelligence in settings where alternative forms of validation are unavailable.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Comparative reasoning is a process of comparing objects, concepts, or entities to draw conclusions, which constitutes a fundamental cognitive ability. In this paper, we propose a novel framework to pre-train language models for enhancing their abilities of comparative reasoning over texts. While there have been approaches for NLP tasks that require comparative reasoning, they suffer from costly manual data labeling and limited generalizability to different tasks. Our approach introduces a novel method of collecting scalable data for text-based entity comparison, which leverages both structured and unstructured data. Moreover, we present a framework of pre-training language models via three novel objectives on comparative reasoning. Evaluation on downstream tasks including comparative question answering, question generation, and summarization shows that our pre-training framework significantly improves the comparative reasoning abilities of language models, especially under low-resource conditions. This work also releases the first integrated benchmark for comparative reasoning.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

As Language Model (LM) capabilities advance, evaluating and supervising them at scale is getting harder for humans. There is hope that other language models can automate both these tasks, which we refer to as "AI Oversight". We study how model similarity affects both aspects of AI oversight by proposing a probabilistic metric for LM similarity based on overlap in model mistakes. Using this metric, we first show that LLM-as-a-judge scores favor models similar to the judge, generalizing recent self-preference results. Then, we study training on LM annotations, and find complementary knowledge between the weak supervisor and strong student model plays a crucial role in gains from "weak-to-strong generalization". As model capabilities increase, it becomes harder to find their mistakes, and we might defer more to AI oversight. However, we observe a concerning trend -- model mistakes are becoming more similar with increasing capabilities, pointing to risks from correlated failures. Our work underscores the importance of reporting and correcting for model similarity, especially in the emerging paradigm of AI oversight.

Existing LLM-as-a-Judge systems suffer from three fundamental limitations: limited adaptivity to task- and domain-specific evaluation criteria, systematic biases driven by non-semantic cues such as position, length, format, and model provenance, and evaluation inconsistency that leads to contradictory judgments across different evaluation modes (e.g., pointwise versus pairwise). To address these issues, we propose FairJudge, an adaptive, debiased, and consistent LLM-as-a-Judge. Unlike prior approaches that treat the judge as a static evaluator, FairJudge models judging behavior itself as a learnable and regularized policy. From a data-centric perspective, we construct a high-information-density judging dataset that explicitly injects supervision signals aligned with evaluation behavior. Building on this dataset, we adopt a curriculum-style SFT-DPO-GRPO training paradigm that progressively aligns rubric adherence, bias mitigation, and cross-mode consistency, while avoiding catastrophic forgetting. Experimental results on multiple internal and public benchmarks show that FairJudge consistently improves agreement and F1, reduces non-semantic biases, and outperforms substantially larger instruction-tuned LLMs. All resources will be publicly released after acceptance to facilitate future research.

Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down. But the judge is itself a model behind an API, and a silent version bump or scoring-prompt update changes how it scores -- so every drift alarm is ambiguous between a worse product and a changed judge. We resolve the ambiguity with a fixed, human-labeled anchor set that the current judge re-scores at a steady interleave, a second betting e-process on the judge-versus-human gap, and a guard-window rule returning a verdict in {none, system, judge}. We prove anytime-validity, one-way identification (only the judge can move the anchors), an attribution race whose design law is that the anchors must out-run the main process they guard, and process orthogonality. On two real judge changes, a silent version bump is detected as judge drift in 60/60 runs with zero judge-to-system misattribution, and a contaminating strict-prompt change is correctly attributed on 110 of 120 runs at guard width 300 -- while the industry-default rolling z-test false-alarms on 75% of drift-free streams. Every experiment replicates on a second domain (TL;DR summarization) with nothing re-tuned, and where the domains differ the differences are the ones the race predicts: the strict-prompt change shifts scores harder there, so the anchors fire faster and attribution becomes perfect (240/240). The monitor runs at approximately 0.64 of the cost of strong-judging every item, or 0.21 in a cheaper-but-deafer regime.

Existing approaches for aligning large language models with human preferences face a trade-off that requires a separate reward model (RM) for on-policy learning. In this paper, we present a novel alignment framework, that (1) does on-policy learning and 2) is parameter efficient, as it does not require an additional RM for evaluating the samples for on-policy learning. To this end, we propose Judge-augmented Supervised Fine-Tuning (JSFT) to train a single model to act as both a policy and a judge. Specifically, we view the pairwise judgment task, choosing the better response from a response pair, as a special case of the instruction-following task. The resulting model can judge preferences of on-the-fly responses from current policy initialized from itself. Experimental results show the efficacy of , outperforming baselines in preference benchmarks. We also show that the rejecting sampling by itself can improve performance further without an additional evaluator.

When assisting human users in reinforcement learning (RL), we can represent users as RL agents and study key parameters, called user traits, to inform intervention design. We study the relationship between user behaviors (policy classes) and user traits. Given an environment, we introduce an intuitive tool for studying the breakdown of "user types": broad sets of traits that result in the same behavior. We show that seemingly different real-world environments admit the same set of user types and formalize this observation as an equivalence relation defined on environments. By transferring intervention design between environments within the same equivalence class, we can help rapidly personalize interventions.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this ``conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified ``blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

While small language models (SLMs) have shown promise on various reasoning tasks, their ability to judge the correctness of answers remains unclear compared to large language models (LLMs). Prior work on LLM-as-a-judge frameworks typically relies on comparing candidate answers against ground-truth labels or other candidate answers using predefined metrics like entailment. However, this approach is inherently indirect and difficult to fully automate, offering limited support for fine-grained and scalable evaluation of reasoning outputs. In this work, we propose JudgeBoard, a novel evaluation pipeline that directly queries models to assess the correctness of candidate answers without requiring extra answer comparisons. We focus on two core reasoning domains: mathematical reasoning and science/commonsense reasoning, and construct task-specific evaluation leaderboards using both accuracy-based ranking and an Elo-based rating system across five benchmark datasets, enabling consistent model comparison as judges rather than comparators. To improve judgment performance in lightweight models, we propose MAJ (Multi-Agent Judging), a novel multi-agent evaluation framework that leverages multiple interacting SLMs with distinct reasoning profiles to approximate LLM-level judgment accuracy through collaborative deliberation. Experimental results reveal a significant performance gap between SLMs and LLMs in isolated judging tasks. However, our MAJ framework substantially improves the reliability and consistency of SLMs. On the MATH dataset, MAJ using smaller-sized models as backbones performs comparatively well or even better than their larger-sized counterparts. Our findings highlight that multi-agent SLM systems can potentially match or exceed LLM performance in judgment tasks, with implications for scalable and efficient assessment.

There is an increasing trend towards evaluating NLP models with LLM-generated judgments instead of human judgments. In the absence of a comparison against human data, this raises concerns about the validity of these evaluations; in case they are conducted with proprietary models, this also raises concerns over reproducibility. We provide JUDGE-BENCH, a collection of 20 NLP datasets with human annotations, and comprehensively evaluate 11 current LLMs, covering both open-weight and proprietary models, for their ability to replicate the annotations. Our evaluations show that each LLM exhibits a large variance across datasets in its correlation to human judgments. We conclude that LLMs are not yet ready to systematically replace human judges in NLP.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

LLM-as-a-judge has become the dominant paradigm for grading model outputs at scale, yet the same model assigns systematically different scores when its output format changes (e.g., a 1-5 rating vs. a True/False label). Existing diagnoses of these format-induced inconsistencies stop at the input-output level. Using Position-aware Edge Attribution Patching (PEAP), we causally investigate the internal mechanism in Gemma-3, Qwen2.5, and Llama-3. We find that judgments across structured understanding and open-ended preference tasks share a sparse, generalized Latent Evaluator sub-graph in the mid-to-late multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs); zero-ablating it collapses judgment while preserving world knowledge in architecturally modular models. By structurally decoupling abstract judging from output formatting, we provide a mechanistic account of format-induced inconsistency on the open-weight models we study: a continuous judgment signal computed in the shared trunk is mapped through fragile, format-specific terminal branches, enabling format-independent preference to be isolated downstream of the requested output format. Our findings imply that benchmark-level reliability comparisons across formats are partially measuring formatter geometry rather than evaluation quality.

We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness.

Recently, there has been a trend of evaluating the Large Language Model (LLM) quality in the flavor of LLM-as-a-Judge, namely leveraging another LLM to evaluate the current output quality. However, existing judges are proven to be biased, namely they would favor answers which present better superficial quality (such as verbosity, fluency) while ignoring the instruction following ability. In this work, we propose systematic research about the bias of LLM-as-a-Judge. Specifically, for closed-source judge models, we apply calibration to mitigate the significance of superficial quality, both on probability level and prompt level. For open-source judge models, we propose to mitigate the bias by contrastive training, with curated negative samples that deviate from instruction but present better superficial quality. We apply our methods on the bias evaluation benchmark, and experiment results show our methods mitigate the bias by a large margin while maintaining a satisfactory evaluation accuracy.

Seven years ago, researchers proposed a postprocessing method to equalize the error rates of a model across different demographic groups. The work launched hundreds of papers purporting to improve over the postprocessing baseline. We empirically evaluate these claims through thousands of model evaluations on several tabular datasets. We find that the fairness-accuracy Pareto frontier achieved by postprocessing contains all other methods we were feasibly able to evaluate. In doing so, we address two common methodological errors that have confounded previous observations. One relates to the comparison of methods with different unconstrained base models. The other concerns methods achieving different levels of constraint relaxation. At the heart of our study is a simple idea we call unprocessing that roughly corresponds to the inverse of postprocessing. Unprocessing allows for a direct comparison of methods using different underlying models and levels of relaxation.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

We propose Equivariance by Contrast (EbC) to learn equivariant embeddings from observation pairs (y, g cdot y), where g is drawn from a finite group acting on the data. Our method jointly learns a latent space and a group representation in which group actions correspond to invertible linear maps -- without relying on group-specific inductive biases. We validate our approach on the infinite dSprites dataset with structured transformations defined by the finite group G:= (R_m times Z_n times Z_n), combining discrete rotations and periodic translations. The resulting embeddings exhibit high-fidelity equivariance, with group operations faithfully reproduced in latent space. On synthetic data, we further validate the approach on the non-abelian orthogonal group O(n) and the general linear group GL(n). We also provide a theoretical proof for identifiability. While broad evaluation across diverse group types on real-world data remains future work, our results constitute the first successful demonstration of general-purpose encoder-only equivariant learning from group action observations alone, including non-trivial non-abelian groups and a product group motivated by modeling affine equivariances in computer vision.

While large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as automatic judges for question answering (QA) and other reference-conditioned evaluation tasks, little is known about their ability to adhere to a provided reference. We identify a critical failure mode of such reference-based LLM QA evaluation: when the provided reference conflicts with the judge model's parametric knowledge, the resulting scores become unreliable, substantially degrading evaluation fidelity. To study this phenomenon systematically, we introduce a controlled swapped-reference QA framework that induces reference-belief conflicts. Specifically, we replace the reference answer with an incorrect entity and construct diverse pairings of original and swapped references with correspondingly aligned candidate answers. Surprisingly, grading reliability drops sharply under swapped references across a broad set of judge models. We empirically show that this vulnerability is driven by judges' over-reliance on parametric knowledge, leading judges to disregard the given reference under conflict. Finally, we find that this failure persists under common prompt-based mitigation strategies, highlighting a fundamental limitation of LLM-as-a-judge evaluation and motivating reference-based protocols that enforce stronger adherence to the provided reference.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

This work explores enabling Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to link visual cues across multiple images. A straightforward solution is to adapt rule-based reinforcement learning for Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, such methods typically rely on manually curated question-answer pairs, which can be particularly challenging when dealing with fine grained visual details and complex logic across images. Inspired by self-supervised visual representation learning, we observe that images contain inherent constraints that can serve as supervision. Based on this insight, we construct image triplets comprising two augmented views of the same image and a third, similar but distinct image. During training, the model is prompted to generate a reasoning process to compare these images (i.e., determine same or different). Then we optimize the model with rule-based reinforcement learning. Due to the high visual similarity and the presence of augmentations, the model must attend to subtle visual changes and perform logical reasoning to succeed. Experiments show that, although trained solely on visual comparison tasks, the learned reasoning ability generalizes effectively to a wide range of questions. Without relying on any human-annotated question-answer pairs, our method achieves significant improvements on multi-image reasoning benchmarks and shows strong performance on general vision tasks.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

We present a new approach for mitigating unfairness in learned classifiers. In particular, we focus on binary classification tasks over individuals from two populations, where, as our criterion for fairness, we wish to achieve similar false positive rates in both populations, and similar false negative rates in both populations. As a proof of concept, we implement our approach and empirically evaluate its ability to achieve both fairness and accuracy, using datasets from the fields of criminal risk assessment, credit, lending, and college admissions.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on thinking models that externalize intermediate steps and allocate extra test-time compute, with think-twice strategies showing that a deliberate second pass can elicit stronger reasoning. In contrast, most reward models (RMs) still compress many quality dimensions into a single scalar in one shot, a design that induces judgment diffusion: attention spreads across evaluation criteria, yielding diluted focus and shallow analysis. We introduce branch-and-rethink (BR-RM), a two-turn RM that transfers the think-twice principle to reward modeling. Turn 1 performs adaptive branching, selecting a small set of instance-critical dimensions (such as factuality and safety) and sketching concise, evidence-seeking hypotheses. Turn 2 executes branch-conditioned rethinking, a targeted reread that tests those hypotheses and scrutinizes only what matters most. We train with GRPO-style reinforcement learning over structured two-turn traces using a simple binary outcome reward with strict format checks, making the approach compatible with standard RLHF pipelines. By converting all-at-oncescoringintofocused, second-lookreasoning, BR-RMreducesjudgmentdiffusionandimproves sensitivity to subtle yet consequential errors while remaining practical and scalable. Experimental results demonstrate that our model achieves state-of-the-art performance on three challenging reward modeling benchmarks across diverse domains. The code and the model will be released soon.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Autoformalization, translating natural-language mathematics into formal proof assistants, is bottlenecked not by translation fluency but by faithfulness: a formal statement can typecheck and be provable, yet still encode a different theorem than the source intended. We introduce Bidirectional Provability Fingerprinting (), a framework that certifies faithfulness by characterizing each candidate through its forward and backward consequence neighborhoods in the ambient theory and matching these against probes derived from the natural-language statement. We further introduce four novel components: (i) Counterfactual Probe Generation (), a contrastive procedure that synthesizes probes targeting specific drift directions; (ii) the Equivalence Spectrum, a continuous faithfulness score that replaces brittle binary verdicts; (iii) Adaptive Probe Budget Allocation (), an information-theoretic budget router; and (iv) Faithfulness-Guided Decoding (), which uses signals as a reward during autoformalization. We prove a drift detection theorem and a PAC-faithfulness result establishing that the equivalence class of a natural language statement is learnable from O(log(1/δ)/varepsilon) probes under mild assumptions. We release , a benchmark of 2{,}183 NL/Lean~4 pairs with controlled drift labels across six subfields of mathlib4. \,+\, detects 89.6% of drifted formalizations at a 3.0% false-positive rate-against 41.2% for typecheck and 63.3% for LLM-judge baselines, and reduces the rate at which a state-of-the-art autoformalizer emits drifted statements by 47%. https://pmlrbd.github.io/BPF/

Frontier language models sometimes recognize that they are being evaluated and adjust their behavior, undermining validity of benchmark results. Yet the field studies it without a shared foundation, conflating properties of the evaluation with properties of the model, and detection with behavioral response. We ground evaluation awareness in social psychology, decomposing it into an environment component (how recognizable the task is) and a model component that separates recognition from propensity to act on it. We operationalize the environment component through eight categorized trigger factors, such as placeholder entities and grading-style output formats, and study recognition and behavior through chain-of-thought monitoring. Across nine frontier models and four benchmarks, recognition rates depend on the specific pairing of model and benchmark rather than on either in isolation. Recognition rarely leads to behavioral change, and when it does, the direction depends on the type of evaluation perceived. Models are also more sensitive to safety than capability evaluations, placing safety benchmark validity at greater risk. To study which factors each model is sensitive to and how they interact, we propose EvalAwareBench, a factor-controlled benchmark of 100 paired safety-capability tasks where each of the eight factors can be independently toggled, varying evaluative signals while holding the underlying request fixed. Through EvalAwareBench, we find that no single factor uniformly affects all models, but stacking factors progressively raises evaluation awareness across all of them. Our framework and EvalAwareBench provide the tools to measure, attribute, and mitigate evaluation awareness, pointing to behavioral consistency under recognition as a promising path forward.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) remains indispensable for aligning large language models (LLMs) in subjective domains. To enhance robustness, recent work shifts toward Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) that generate rationales before predicting preferences. Yet in GenRM training and evaluation, practice remains outcome-label-only, leaving reasoning quality unchecked. We show that reasoning fidelity-the consistency between a GenRM's preference decision and reference decision rationales-is highly predictive of downstream RLHF outcomes, beyond standard label accuracy. Specifically, we repurpose existing reward-model benchmarks to compute Spurious Correctness (S-Corr)-the fraction of label-correct decisions with rationales misaligned with golden judgments. Our empirical evaluation reveals substantial S-Corr even for competitive GenRMs, and higher S-Corr is associated with policy degeneration under optimization. To improve fidelity, we propose Rationale-Centric Alignment, R-Align, which augments training with gold judgments and explicitly supervises rationale alignment. R-Align reduces S-Corr on RM benchmarks and yields consistent gains in actor performance across STEM, coding, instruction following, and general tasks.

Fairness in recommender systems (RSs) is commonly categorised into group fairness and individual fairness. However, there is no established scientific understanding of the relationship between the two fairness types, as prior work on both types has used different evaluation measures or evaluation objectives for each fairness type, thereby not allowing for a proper comparison of the two. As a result, it is currently not known how increasing one type of fairness may affect the other. To fill this gap, we study the relationship of group and individual fairness through a comprehensive comparison of evaluation measures that can be used for both fairness types. Our experiments with 8 runs across 3 datasets show that recommendations that are highly fair for groups can be very unfair for individuals. Our finding is novel and useful for RS practitioners aiming to improve the fairness of their systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/theresiavr/stairway-to-fairness.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based judgments leverage powerful LLMs to efficiently evaluate candidate content and provide judgment scores. However, the inherent biases and vulnerabilities of LLM-generated judgments raise concerns, underscoring the urgent need for distinguishing them in sensitive scenarios like academic peer reviewing. In this work, we propose and formalize the task of judgment detection and systematically investigate the detectability of LLM-generated judgments. Unlike LLM-generated text detection, judgment detection relies solely on judgment scores and candidates, reflecting real-world scenarios where textual feedback is often unavailable in the detection process. Our preliminary analysis shows that existing LLM-generated text detection methods perform poorly given their incapability to capture the interaction between judgment scores and candidate content -- an aspect crucial for effective judgment detection. Inspired by this, we introduce J-Detector, a lightweight and transparent neural detector augmented with explicitly extracted linguistic and LLM-enhanced features to link LLM judges' biases with candidates' properties for accurate detection. Experiments across diverse datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of J-Detector and show how its interpretability enables quantifying biases in LLM judges. Finally, we analyze key factors affecting the detectability of LLM-generated judgments and validate the practical utility of judgment detection in real-world scenarios.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

Large language models excel on objectively verifiable tasks such as math and programming, where evaluation reduces to unit tests or a single correct answer. In contrast, real-world enterprise work is often subjective and context-dependent: success hinges on organizational goals, user intent, and the quality of intermediate artifacts produced across long, multi-tool workflows. We introduce LH-Bench, a three-pillar evaluation design that moves beyond binary correctness to score autonomous, long-horizon execution on subjective enterprise tasks. The pillars are: (i) expert-grounded rubrics that give LLM judges the domain context needed to score subjective work, (ii) curated ground-truth artifacts that enable stepwise reward signals (e.g., chapter-level annotation for content tasks), and (iii) pairwise human preference evaluation for convergent validation. We show that domain-authored rubrics provide substantially more reliable evaluation signals than LLM-authored rubrics (kappa = 0.60 vs. 0.46), and that human preference judgments confirm the same top-tier separation (p < 0.05), evidence that expert-grounded evaluation can scale without sacrificing reliability. We release public datasets and report results on two environments: Figma-to-code (33 real .fig tasks against the Figma API via MCP) and Programmatic content (41 courses comprising 183 individually-evaluated chapters on a course platform serving 30+ daily users).

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as automated judges for evaluating other models, yet the stability of their verdicts under semantically equivalent prompt paraphrases remains unmeasured. We introduce JudgeSense, a framework and benchmark for quantifying this property via the Judge Sensitivity Score (JSS), defined as the fraction of paraphrase pairs on which a judge returns an identical decision. Evaluating nine judge models on 494 validated paraphrase pairs, we find that coherence is the only task where judges meaningfully differ, with JSS ranging from 0.389 to 0.992. On factuality, all judges cluster near JSS about 0.63, driven by a polarity-inverted prompt artifact; after correction, factuality JSS rises to about 0.9. Pairwise tasks (preference and relevance) exhibit degenerate always-A behavior in 8 of 9 judges, indicating strong position bias. Model scale does not predict consistency. We release code, decision logs, and a validated paraphrase dataset to support standardized JSS reporting.

Standard practice within Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves optimizing against a Reward Model (RM), which itself is trained to reflect human preferences for desirable generations. A notable subject that is understudied is the (in-)consistency of RMs -- whether they can recognize the semantic changes to different prompts and appropriately adapt their reward assignments -- and their impact on the downstream RLHF model. In this paper, we visit a series of research questions relevant to RM inconsistency: (1) How can we measure the consistency of reward models? (2) How consistent are the existing RMs and how can we improve them? (3) In what ways does reward inconsistency influence the chatbots resulting from the RLHF model training? We propose Contrast Instructions -- a benchmarking strategy for the consistency of RM. Each example in Contrast Instructions features a pair of lexically similar instructions with different ground truth responses. A consistent RM is expected to rank the corresponding instruction and response higher than other combinations. We observe that current RMs trained with the standard ranking objective fail miserably on Contrast Instructions compared to average humans. To show that RM consistency can be improved efficiently without using extra training budget, we propose two techniques ConvexDA and RewardFusion, which enhance reward consistency through extrapolation during the RM training and inference stage, respectively. We show that RLHF models trained with a more consistent RM yield more useful responses, suggesting that reward inconsistency exhibits a trickle-down effect on the downstream RLHF process.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.