Daily Papers

Cognitive research indicates that abstraction ability is essential in human intelligence, which remains under-explored in language models. In this paper, we present AbsPyramid, a unified entailment graph of 221K textual descriptions of abstraction knowledge. While existing resources only touch nouns or verbs within simplified events or specific domains, AbsPyramid collects abstract knowledge for three components of diverse events to comprehensively evaluate the abstraction ability of language models in the open domain. Experimental results demonstrate that current LLMs face challenges comprehending abstraction knowledge in zero-shot and few-shot settings. By training on our rich abstraction knowledge, we find LLMs can acquire basic abstraction abilities and generalize to unseen events. In the meantime, we empirically show that our benchmark is comprehensive to enhance LLMs across two previous abstraction tasks.

While multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have shown significant progress on many popular visual reasoning benchmarks, whether they possess abstract visual reasoning abilities remains an open question. Similar to the Sudoku puzzles, abstract visual reasoning (AVR) problems require finding high-level patterns (e.g., repetition constraints) that control the input shapes (e.g., digits) in a specific task configuration (e.g., matrix). However, existing AVR benchmarks only considered a limited set of patterns (addition, conjunction), input shapes (rectangle, square), and task configurations (3 by 3 matrices). To evaluate MLLMs' reasoning abilities comprehensively, we introduce MARVEL, a multidimensional AVR benchmark with 770 puzzles composed of six core knowledge patterns, geometric and abstract shapes, and five different task configurations. To inspect whether the model accuracy is grounded in perception and reasoning, MARVEL complements the general AVR question with perception questions in a hierarchical evaluation framework. We conduct comprehensive experiments on MARVEL with nine representative MLLMs in zero-shot and few-shot settings. Our experiments reveal that all models show near-random performance on the AVR question, with significant performance gaps (40%) compared to humans across all patterns and task configurations. Further analysis of perception questions reveals that MLLMs struggle to comprehend the visual features (near-random performance) and even count the panels in the puzzle ( <45%), hindering their ability for abstract reasoning. We release our entire code and dataset.

We present Step-Back Prompting, a simple prompting technique that enables LLMs to do abstractions to derive high-level concepts and first principles from instances containing specific details. Using the concepts and principles to guide the reasoning steps, LLMs significantly improve their abilities in following a correct reasoning path towards the solution. We conduct experiments of Step-Back Prompting with PaLM-2L models and observe substantial performance gains on a wide range of challenging reasoning-intensive tasks including STEM, Knowledge QA, and Multi-Hop Reasoning. For instance, Step-Back Prompting improves PaLM-2L performance on MMLU Physics and Chemistry by 7% and 11%, TimeQA by 27%, and MuSiQue by 7%.

In this paper, we aim to establish a simple, effective, and theoretically grounded benchmark for rigorously probing abstract reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). To achieve this, we first develop a mathematic framework that defines abstract reasoning as the ability to: (i) extract essential patterns independent of surface representations, and (ii) apply consistent rules to these abstract patterns. Based on this framework, we introduce two novel complementary metrics: \(\scoreGamma\) measures basic reasoning accuracy, while \(\scoreDelta\) quantifies a model's reliance on specific symbols rather than underlying patterns - a key indicator of true abstraction versus mere memorization. To implement this measurement, we design a benchmark: systematic symbol remapping in rule-based tasks, which forces models to demonstrate genuine pattern recognition beyond superficial token matching. Extensive LLM evaluations using this benchmark (commercial API models, 7B-70B, multi-agent) reveal:1) critical limitations in non-decimal arithmetic and symbolic reasoning; 2) persistent abstraction gaps despite chain-of-thought prompting; and 3) \(\scoreDelta\)'s effectiveness in robustly measuring memory dependence by quantifying performance degradation under symbol remapping, particularly highlighting operand-specific memorization. These findings underscore that current LLMs, despite domain-specific strengths, still lack robust abstract reasoning, highlighting key areas for future improvement.

Abstraction ability is crucial in human intelligence, which can also benefit various tasks in NLP study. Existing work shows that LLMs are deficient in abstract ability, and how to improve it remains unexplored. In this work, we design the framework AbsInstruct to enhance LLMs' abstraction ability through instruction tuning. The framework builds instructions with in-depth explanations to assist LLMs in capturing the underlying rationale of abstraction. Meanwhile, we introduce a plausibility estimator to select instructions that are more consistent with the abstraction knowledge of LLMs to be aligned. Then, our framework combines abstraction instructions with general-purpose ones to build a hybrid dataset. Extensive experiments and analyses demonstrate that our framework can considerably enhance LLMs' abstraction ability with strong generalization performance while maintaining their general instruction-following abilities.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC-AGI) poses a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs), exposing limitations in their abstract reasoning abilities. In this work, we leverage task-specific data augmentations throughout the training, generation, and scoring phases, and employ a depth-first search algorithm to generate diverse, high-probability candidate solutions. Furthermore, we utilize the LLM not only as a generator but also as a scorer, using its output probabilities to select the most promising solutions. Our method achieves a score of 71.6% (286.5/400 solved tasks) on the public ARC-AGI evaluation set, demonstrating state-of-the-art performance among publicly available approaches. While concurrent closed-source work has reported higher scores, our method distinguishes itself through its transparency, reproducibility, and remarkably low inference cost, averaging only around 2ct per task on readily available hardware (we assume a price of 36ct/hour for a Nvidia 4090 GPU).

When trying to gain better visibility into a machine learning model in order to understand and mitigate the associated risks, a potentially valuable source of evidence is: which training examples most contribute to a given behavior? Influence functions aim to answer a counterfactual: how would the model's parameters (and hence its outputs) change if a given sequence were added to the training set? While influence functions have produced insights for small models, they are difficult to scale to large language models (LLMs) due to the difficulty of computing an inverse-Hessian-vector product (IHVP). We use the Eigenvalue-corrected Kronecker-Factored Approximate Curvature (EK-FAC) approximation to scale influence functions up to LLMs with up to 52 billion parameters. In our experiments, EK-FAC achieves similar accuracy to traditional influence function estimators despite the IHVP computation being orders of magnitude faster. We investigate two algorithmic techniques to reduce the cost of computing gradients of candidate training sequences: TF-IDF filtering and query batching. We use influence functions to investigate the generalization patterns of LLMs, including the sparsity of the influence patterns, increasing abstraction with scale, math and programming abilities, cross-lingual generalization, and role-playing behavior. Despite many apparently sophisticated forms of generalization, we identify a surprising limitation: influences decay to near-zero when the order of key phrases is flipped. Overall, influence functions give us a powerful new tool for studying the generalization properties of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong performance on mathematical reasoning under well-posed conditions. However, real-world engineering problems require more than mathematical symbolic computation -- they need to deal with uncertainty, context, and open-ended scenarios. Existing benchmarks fail to capture these complexities. We introduce EngiBench, a hierarchical benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs on solving engineering problems. It spans three levels of increasing difficulty (foundational knowledge retrieval, multi-step contextual reasoning, and open-ended modeling) and covers diverse engineering subfields. To facilitate a deeper understanding of model performance, we systematically rewrite each problem into three controlled variants (perturbed, knowledge-enhanced, and math abstraction), enabling us to separately evaluate the model's robustness, domain-specific knowledge, and mathematical reasoning abilities. Experiment results reveal a clear performance gap across levels: models struggle more as tasks get harder, perform worse when problems are slightly changed, and fall far behind human experts on the high-level engineering tasks. These findings reveal that current LLMs still lack the high-level reasoning needed for real-world engineering, highlighting the need for future models with deeper and more reliable problem-solving capabilities. Our source code and data are available at https://github.com/EngiBench/EngiBench.

Abstraction is a core tenet of human cognition and communication. When composing natural language instructions, humans naturally evoke abstraction to convey complex procedures in an efficient and concise way. Yet, interpreting and grounding abstraction expressed in NL has not yet been systematically studied in NLP, with no accepted benchmarks specifically eliciting abstraction in NL. In this work, we set the foundation for a systematic study of processing and grounding abstraction in NLP. First, we deliver a novel abstraction elicitation method and present Hexagons, a 2D instruction-following game. Using Hexagons we collected over 4k naturally-occurring visually-grounded instructions rich with diverse types of abstractions. From these data, we derive an instruction-to-execution task and assess different types of neural models. Our results show that contemporary models and modeling practices are substantially inferior to human performance, and that models' performance is inversely correlated with the level of abstraction, showing less satisfying performance on higher levels of abstraction. These findings are consistent across models and setups, confirming that abstraction is a challenging phenomenon deserving further attention and study in NLP/AI research.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

Abstraction is at the heart of sketching due to the simple and minimal nature of line drawings. Abstraction entails identifying the essential visual properties of an object or scene, which requires semantic understanding and prior knowledge of high-level concepts. Abstract depictions are therefore challenging for artists, and even more so for machines. We present CLIPasso, an object sketching method that can achieve different levels of abstraction, guided by geometric and semantic simplifications. While sketch generation methods often rely on explicit sketch datasets for training, we utilize the remarkable ability of CLIP (Contrastive-Language-Image-Pretraining) to distill semantic concepts from sketches and images alike. We define a sketch as a set of B\'ezier curves and use a differentiable rasterizer to optimize the parameters of the curves directly with respect to a CLIP-based perceptual loss. The abstraction degree is controlled by varying the number of strokes. The generated sketches demonstrate multiple levels of abstraction while maintaining recognizability, underlying structure, and essential visual components of the subject drawn.

Humans can ground natural language commands to tasks at both abstract and fine-grained levels of specificity. For instance, a human forklift operator can be instructed to perform a high-level action, like "grab a pallet" or a low-level action like "tilt back a little bit." While robots are also capable of grounding language commands to tasks, previous methods implicitly assume that all commands and tasks reside at a single, fixed level of abstraction. Additionally, methods that do not use multiple levels of abstraction encounter inefficient planning and execution times as they solve tasks at a single level of abstraction with large, intractable state-action spaces closely resembling real world complexity. In this work, by grounding commands to all the tasks or subtasks available in a hierarchical planning framework, we arrive at a model capable of interpreting language at multiple levels of specificity ranging from coarse to more granular. We show that the accuracy of the grounding procedure is improved when simultaneously inferring the degree of abstraction in language used to communicate the task. Leveraging hierarchy also improves efficiency: our proposed approach enables a robot to respond to a command within one second on 90% of our tasks, while baselines take over twenty seconds on half the tasks. Finally, we demonstrate that a real, physical robot can ground commands at multiple levels of abstraction allowing it to efficiently plan different subtasks within the same planning hierarchy.

Abstract reasoning ability reflects the intelligence and generalization capacity of LLMs to extract and apply abstract rules. However, accurately measuring this ability remains challenging: existing benchmarks either rely on expensive manual annotation, limiting their scale, or risk measuring memorization rather than genuine reasoning. To address this, we introduce an automated pipeline named A2RBench, encompassing generation, expansion, evaluation, and analysis. Specifically, in the generation stage, LLMs create diverse tasks demanding genuine reasoning; in the expansion stage, LLMs reuse validated rules and expand new input spaces to generate task variations, achieving scaling. However, such a process may cause hallucinations. To eliminate it, we further establish a theoretical framework and prove that programmatic verification--testing whether the inverse operation perfectly reverses the forward operation (cycle consistency)--guarantees a unique solution. Through extensive evaluations on mainstream LLMs, we find: (1) Current LLMs exhibit fundamental deficiencies in abstract reasoning, with top models significantly underperforming humans on a representative subset (39.8% vs. 68.5%). (2) Current LLMs fall far short of 2D and 1D in the complexity of generated 3D tasks, revealing their lack of understanding of high-dimensional tasks. (3) Counterintuitively, inputs with higher information complexity can simplify the reasoning process.

Generalizing from individual skill executions to solving long-horizon tasks remains a core challenge in building autonomous agents. A promising direction is learning high-level, symbolic abstractions of the low-level skills of the agents, enabling reasoning and planning independent of the low-level state space. Among possible high-level representations, object-centric skill abstraction with symbolic predicates has been proven to be efficient because of its compatibility with domain-independent planners. Recent advances in foundation models have made it possible to generate symbolic predicates that operate on raw sensory inputs, a process we call generative predicate invention, to facilitate downstream abstraction learning. However, it remains unclear which formal properties the learned representations must satisfy, and how they can be learned to guarantee these properties. In this paper, we address both questions by presenting a formal theory of generative predicate invention for skill abstraction, resulting in symbolic operators that can be used for provably sound and complete planning. Within this framework, we propose SkillWrapper, a method that leverages foundation models to actively collect robot data and learn human-interpretable, plannable representations of black-box skills, using only RGB image observations. Our extensive empirical evaluation in simulation and on real robots shows that SkillWrapper learns abstract representations that enable solving unseen, long-horizon tasks in the real world with black-box skills.

Given a simple request like Put a washed apple in the kitchen fridge, humans can reason in purely abstract terms by imagining action sequences and scoring their likelihood of success, prototypicality, and efficiency, all without moving a muscle. Once we see the kitchen in question, we can update our abstract plans to fit the scene. Embodied agents require the same abilities, but existing work does not yet provide the infrastructure necessary for both reasoning abstractly and executing concretely. We address this limitation by introducing ALFWorld, a simulator that enables agents to learn abstract, text based policies in TextWorld (C\^ot\'e et al., 2018) and then execute goals from the ALFRED benchmark (Shridhar et al., 2020) in a rich visual environment. ALFWorld enables the creation of a new BUTLER agent whose abstract knowledge, learned in TextWorld, corresponds directly to concrete, visually grounded actions. In turn, as we demonstrate empirically, this fosters better agent generalization than training only in the visually grounded environment. BUTLER's simple, modular design factors the problem to allow researchers to focus on models for improving every piece of the pipeline (language understanding, planning, navigation, and visual scene understanding).

In this paper, we present a method for converting a given scene image into a sketch using different types and multiple levels of abstraction. We distinguish between two types of abstraction. The first considers the fidelity of the sketch, varying its representation from a more precise portrayal of the input to a looser depiction. The second is defined by the visual simplicity of the sketch, moving from a detailed depiction to a sparse sketch. Using an explicit disentanglement into two abstraction axes -- and multiple levels for each one -- provides users additional control over selecting the desired sketch based on their personal goals and preferences. To form a sketch at a given level of fidelity and simplification, we train two MLP networks. The first network learns the desired placement of strokes, while the second network learns to gradually remove strokes from the sketch without harming its recognizability and semantics. Our approach is able to generate sketches of complex scenes including those with complex backgrounds (e.g., natural and urban settings) and subjects (e.g., animals and people) while depicting gradual abstractions of the input scene in terms of fidelity and simplicity.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus remains one of the most compelling and challenging benchmarks for tracking progress toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence. In contrast to other evaluation datasets designed to assess an agent's task-specific skills or accumulated knowledge, the ARC-AGI suite is specifically targeted at measuring skill acquisition efficiency, a trait that has (so far) been lacking in even the most sophisticated machine learning systems. For algorithms that require extensive intra-task exemplars, a significant constraint imposed by ARC-AGI is the modest cardinality of its demonstration set, comprising a small number of langle input, output rangle grids per task specifying the corresponding transformation. To embellish the space of viable sample pairs, this paper introduces ARC-GEN, an open-source procedural generator aimed at extending the original ARC-AGI training dataset as faithfully as possible. Unlike prior efforts, our generator is both exhaustive (covering all four-hundred tasks) and mimetic (more closely honoring the distributional properties and characteristics embodied in the initial ARC-AGI-1 release). We also discuss the use of this generator in establishing a static benchmark suite to verify the correctness of programs submitted to the 2025 Google Code Golf Championship.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Large-scale generative language and vision-language models (LLMs and VLMs) excel in few-shot in-context learning for decision making and instruction following. However, they require high-quality exemplar demonstrations to be included in their context window. In this work, we ask: Can LLMs and VLMs generate their own prompt examples from generic, sub-optimal demonstrations? We propose In-Context Abstraction Learning (ICAL), a method that builds a memory of multimodal experience insights from sub-optimal demonstrations and human feedback. Given a noisy demonstration in a new domain, VLMs abstract the trajectory into a general program by fixing inefficient actions and annotating cognitive abstractions: task relationships, object state changes, temporal subgoals, and task construals. These abstractions are refined and adapted interactively through human feedback while the agent attempts to execute the trajectory in a similar environment. The resulting abstractions, when used as exemplars in the prompt, significantly improve decision-making in retrieval-augmented LLM and VLM agents. Our ICAL agent surpasses the state-of-the-art in dialogue-based instruction following in TEACh, multimodal web agents in VisualWebArena, and action anticipation in Ego4D. In TEACh, we achieve a 12.6% improvement in goal-condition success. In VisualWebArena, our task success rate improves over the SOTA from 14.3% to 22.7%. In Ego4D action forecasting, we improve over few-shot GPT-4V and remain competitive with supervised models. We show finetuning our retrieval-augmented in-context agent yields additional improvements. Our approach significantly reduces reliance on expert-crafted examples and consistently outperforms in-context learning from action plans that lack such insights.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present FORTIS, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

Causal abstraction is a promising theoretical framework for explainable artificial intelligence that defines when an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful simplification of a low-level deep learning system. However, existing causal abstraction methods have two major limitations: they require a brute-force search over alignments between the high-level model and the low-level one, and they presuppose that variables in the high-level model will align with disjoint sets of neurons in the low-level one. In this paper, we present distributed alignment search (DAS), which overcomes these limitations. In DAS, we find the alignment between high-level and low-level models using gradient descent rather than conducting a brute-force search, and we allow individual neurons to play multiple distinct roles by analyzing representations in non-standard bases-distributed representations. Our experiments show that DAS can discover internal structure that prior approaches miss. Overall, DAS removes previous obstacles to conducting causal abstraction analyses and allows us to find conceptual structure in trained neural nets.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

The ability to plan actions on multiple levels of abstraction enables intelligent agents to solve complex tasks effectively. However, learning the models for both low and high-level planning from demonstrations has proven challenging, especially with higher-dimensional inputs. To address this issue, we propose to use reinforcement learning to identify subgoals in expert trajectories by associating the magnitude of the rewards with the predictability of low-level actions given the state and the chosen subgoal. We build a vector-quantized generative model for the identified subgoals to perform subgoal-level planning. In experiments, the algorithm excels at solving complex, long-horizon decision-making problems outperforming state-of-the-art. Because of its ability to plan, our algorithm can find better trajectories than the ones in the training set

As robots are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios, a key question is how to best transfer knowledge learned in one environment to another, where shifting constraints and human preferences render adaptation challenging. A central challenge remains that often, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to capture the full complexity of the deployment environment, and therefore the desired tasks, at training time. Consequently, the representation, or abstraction, of the tasks the human hopes for the robot to perform in one environment may be misaligned with the representation of the tasks that the robot has learned in another. We postulate that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of system success in the world, they are best suited to communicating the aspects of the tasks that matter to the robot. Our key insight is that effective learning from human input requires first explicitly learning good intermediate representations and then using those representations for solving downstream tasks. We highlight three areas where we can use this approach to build interactive systems and offer future directions of work to better create advanced collaborative robots.

We consider the problem of eliciting compositional generalization capabilities in large language models (LLMs) with a novel type of prompting strategy. Compositional generalization empowers the LLMs to solve problems that are harder than the ones they have seen (i.e., easy-to-hard generalization), which is a critical reasoning capability of human-like intelligence. However, even the current state-of-the-art LLMs still struggle with this form of reasoning. To bridge this gap, we propose skills-in-context (SKiC) prompting, which instructs LLMs how to compose basic skills to resolve more complex problems. We find that it is crucial to demonstrate both the skills and the compositional examples within the same prompting context. With as few as two examplars, our SKiC prompting initiates strong synergies between skills and their composition capabilities. Notably, it empowers LLMs to solve unseen problems that require innovative skill compositions, achieving near-perfect generalization on a broad range of challenging compositionality tasks. Intriguingly, SKiC prompting unlocks the latent potential of LLMs, enabling them to leverage pre-existing internal skills acquired during earlier pre-training stages, even when these skills are not explicitly presented in the prompting context. This results in the capability of LLMs to solve unseen complex problems by activating and composing internal competencies. With such prominent features, SKiC prompting is able to achieve state-of-the-art performance on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks (e.g., MATH).

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

Control systems are ubiquitous in modern technology, comprising an engineered plant to be kept within specific, often fine-tuned, limits, and a separate controller that ensures this is the case. While modern controllers often employ digital computers, other examples are purely mechanical, or even biological. It is an open question whether computation is happening within all controllers by virtue of them being part of a control system. Abstraction/ Representation theory (ART) has been developed to tackle just this question of whether a physical system is computing. Here, we demonstrate how to use ART to model control systems, and analyse them for computational properties. We determine that the plant of a control system is (a proxy for) the representational entity necessary in ART for the existence of any computation: the plant is the user of the controller. We consider specific systems: a digital thermostat, an electro-mechanical thermostat, the purely mechanical centrifugal governor, and an open-loop human-controlled heating system. We show that all these systems, and control systems in general, are performing some degree of computation. As an initial use of these results, we apply them to computationalism within cognitive theory: we show the governor is computing, so it cannot play its role of counter-example in the question of whether the brain is too.

While Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have made significant progress, they remain largely text-centric, relying on language as their core reasoning modality. As a result, they are limited in their ability to handle reasoning tasks that are predominantly visual. Recent approaches have sought to address this by supervising intermediate visual steps with helper images, depth maps, or image crops. However, these strategies impose restrictive priors on what "useful" visual abstractions look like, add heavy annotation costs, and struggle to generalize across tasks. To address this critical limitation, we propose a task-agnostic mechanism that trains LMMs to discover and use visual reasoning tokens without explicit supervision. These tokens attend globally and re-encode the image in a task-adaptive way, enabling the model to extract relevant visual information without hand-crafted supervision. Our approach outperforms direct fine-tuning and achieves state-of-the-art results on a diverse range of vision-centric tasks -- including those where intermediate abstractions are hard to specify -- while also generalizing to multi-task instruction tuning.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) have shown remarkable progress in visual generation. Yet, existing benchmarks predominantly assess Crystallized Intelligence, which relies on recalling accumulated knowledge and learned schemas. This focus overlooks Generative Fluid Intelligence (GFI): the capacity to induce patterns, reason through constraints, and adapt to novel scenarios on the fly. To rigorously assess this capability, we introduce GENIUS (GEN Fluid Intelligence EvalUation Suite). We formalize GFI as a synthesis of three primitives. These include Inducing Implicit Patterns (e.g., inferring personalized visual preferences), Executing Ad-hoc Constraints (e.g., visualizing abstract metaphors), and Adapting to Contextual Knowledge (e.g., simulating counter-intuitive physics). Collectively, these primitives challenge models to solve problems grounded entirely in the immediate context. Our systematic evaluation of 12 representative models reveals significant performance deficits in these tasks. Crucially, our diagnostic analysis disentangles these failure modes. It demonstrates that deficits stem from limited context comprehension rather than insufficient intrinsic generative capability. To bridge this gap, we propose a training-free attention intervention strategy. Ultimately, GENIUS establishes a rigorous standard for GFI, guiding the field beyond knowledge utilization toward dynamic, general-purpose reasoning. Our dataset and code will be released at: https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS{https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS}.

We describe a framework for using natural language to design state abstractions for imitation learning. Generalizable policy learning in high-dimensional observation spaces is facilitated by well-designed state representations, which can surface important features of an environment and hide irrelevant ones. These state representations are typically manually specified, or derived from other labor-intensive labeling procedures. Our method, LGA (language-guided abstraction), uses a combination of natural language supervision and background knowledge from language models (LMs) to automatically build state representations tailored to unseen tasks. In LGA, a user first provides a (possibly incomplete) description of a target task in natural language; next, a pre-trained LM translates this task description into a state abstraction function that masks out irrelevant features; finally, an imitation policy is trained using a small number of demonstrations and LGA-generated abstract states. Experiments on simulated robotic tasks show that LGA yields state abstractions similar to those designed by humans, but in a fraction of the time, and that these abstractions improve generalization and robustness in the presence of spurious correlations and ambiguous specifications. We illustrate the utility of the learned abstractions on mobile manipulation tasks with a Spot robot.

Large Language Models have shown tremendous performance on a large variety of natural language processing tasks, ranging from text comprehension to common sense reasoning. However, the mechanisms responsible for this success remain opaque, and it is unclear whether LLMs can achieve human-like cognitive capabilities or whether these models are still fundamentally circumscribed. Abstract reasoning is a fundamental task for cognition, consisting of finding and applying a general pattern from few data. Evaluating deep neural architectures on this task could give insight into their potential limitations regarding reasoning and their broad generalisation abilities, yet this is currently an under-explored area. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark for evaluating language models beyond memorization on abstract reasoning tasks. We perform extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, showing that they currently achieve very limited performance in contrast with other natural language tasks, and we examine the reasons for this difference. We apply techniques that have been shown to improve performance on other NLP tasks and show that their impact on abstract reasoning is limited.

Abstract reasoning from minimal examples remains a core unsolved problem for frontier foundation models such as GPT-5 and Grok 4. These models still fail to infer structured transformation rules from a handful of examples, which is a key hallmark of human intelligence. The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus for Artificial General Intelligence (ARC-AGI) provides a rigorous testbed for this capability, demanding conceptual rule induction and transfer to novel tasks. Most existing methods treat ARC-AGI as a purely textual reasoning task, overlooking the fact that humans rely heavily on visual abstraction when solving such puzzles. However, our pilot experiments reveal a paradox: naively rendering ARC-AGI grids as images degrades performance due to imprecise rule execution. This leads to our central hypothesis that vision and language possess complementary strengths across distinct reasoning stages: vision supports global pattern abstraction and verification, whereas language specializes in symbolic rule formulation and precise execution. Building on this insight, we introduce two synergistic strategies: (1) Vision-Language Synergy Reasoning (VLSR), which decomposes ARC-AGI into modality-aligned subtasks; and (2) Modality-Switch Self-Correction (MSSC), which leverages vision to verify text-based reasoning for intrinsic error correction. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach yields up to a 4.33% improvement over text-only baselines across diverse flagship models and multiple ARC-AGI tasks. Our findings suggest that unifying visual abstraction with linguistic reasoning is a crucial step toward achieving generalizable, human-like intelligence in future foundation models. Source code will be released soon.

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios. While MuZero enables effective model learning for search in perfect information games, extending this paradigm to imperfect information games presents substantial challenges due to more nuanced look-ahead reasoning techniques and large number of states relevant for individual decisions. This paper introduces an algorithm LAMIR that learns an abstracted model of an imperfect information game directly from the agent-environment interaction. During test time, this trained model is used to perform look-ahead reasoning. The learned abstraction limits the size of each subgame to a manageable size, making theoretically principled look-ahead reasoning tractable even in games where previous methods could not scale. We empirically demonstrate that with sufficient capacity, LAMIR learns the exact underlying game structure, and with limited capacity, it still learns a valuable abstraction, which improves game playing performance of the pre-trained agents even in large games.

Representations are at the core of all deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods for both Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Many representation learning methods and theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand what constitutes an effective representation. However, the relationships between these methods and the shared properties among them remain unclear. In this paper, we show that many of these seemingly distinct methods and frameworks for state and history abstractions are, in fact, based on a common idea of self-predictive abstraction. Furthermore, we provide theoretical insights into the widely adopted objectives and optimization, such as the stop-gradient technique, in learning self-predictive representations. These findings together yield a minimalist algorithm to learn self-predictive representations for states and histories. We validate our theories by applying our algorithm to standard MDPs, MDPs with distractors, and POMDPs with sparse rewards. These findings culminate in a set of preliminary guidelines for RL practitioners.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

We study implicit reasoning, i.e. the ability to combine knowledge or rules within a single forward pass. While transformer-based large language models store substantial factual knowledge and rules, they often fail to compose this knowledge for implicit multi-hop reasoning, suggesting a lack of compositional generalization over their parametric knowledge. To address this limitation, we study recurrent-depth transformers, which enables iterative computation over the same transformer layers. We investigate two compositional generalization challenges under the implicit reasoning scenario: systematic generalization, i.e. combining knowledge that is never used for compositions during training, and depth extrapolation, i.e. generalizing from limited reasoning depth (e.g. training on up to 5-hop) to deeper compositions (e.g. 10-hop). Through controlled studies with models trained from scratch, we show that while vanilla transformers struggle with both generalization challenges, recurrent-depth transformers can effectively make such generalization. For systematic generalization, we find that this ability emerges through a three-stage grokking process, transitioning from memorization to in-distribution generalization and finally to systematic generalization, supported by mechanistic analysis. For depth extrapolation, we show that generalization beyond training depth can be unlocked by scaling inference-time recurrence, with more iterations enabling deeper reasoning. We further study how training strategies affect extrapolation, providing guidance on training recurrent-depth transformers, and identify a key limitation, overthinking, where excessive recurrence degrades predictions and limits generalization to very deep compositions.

Does RL teach LLMs genuinely new skills, or does it merely activate existing ones? This question lies at the core of ongoing debates about the role of RL in LLM post-training. On one side, strong empirical results can be achieved with RL even without preceding supervised finetuning; on the other, critics argue that RL contributes little beyond reweighting existing reasoning strategies. This work provides concrete evidence that LLMs can acquire genuinely new skills during RL by composing existing ones, mirroring one of the central mechanisms by which humans acquire new cognitive skills. To mitigate data contamination and other confounding factors, and to allow precise control over task complexity, we develop a synthetic framework for our investigation. Specifically, we define a skill as the ability to infer the output of a string transformation function f(x) given x. When an LLM has already learned f and g prior to RL, our experiments reveal that RL enables it to learn unseen compositions of them h(x)=g(f(x)). Further, this compositional ability generalizes to more difficult problems such as compositions of >2 functions unseen during RL training. Surprisingly, our experiments show that compositional skill acquired on a source task transfers to a different target task. This transfer happens even without compositional training on the target, requiring only prior knowledge of the target's atomic skills. Our qualitative analysis shows that RL fundamentally changes the reasoning behaviors of the models. In contrast, next-token training with the same data yields none of these findings. Our systematic experiments provide fresh insights into LLM learning, suggesting the value of first building base models with basic skills, then using RL to incentivize advanced, generalizable skills for complex problems.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Abstract reasoning, the ability to reason from the abstract essence of a problem, serves as a key to generalization in human reasoning. However, eliciting language models to perform reasoning with abstraction remains unexplored. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by introducing a novel structured reasoning format called Abstraction-of-Thought (AoT). The uniqueness of AoT lies in its explicit requirement for varying levels of abstraction within the reasoning process. This approach could elicit language models to first contemplate on the abstract level before incorporating concrete details, which is overlooked by the prevailing step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) method. To align models with the AoT format, we present AoT Collection, a generic finetuning dataset consisting of 348k high-quality samples with AoT reasoning processes, collected via an automated and scalable pipeline. We finetune a wide range of language models with AoT Collection and conduct extensive evaluations on 23 unseen tasks from the challenging benchmark Big-Bench Hard. Experimental results indicate that models aligned to AoT reasoning format substantially outperform those aligned to CoT in many reasoning tasks.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

The Theory of Multiple Intelligences underscores the hierarchical nature of cognitive capabilities. To advance Spatial Artificial Intelligence, we pioneer a psychometric framework defining five Basic Spatial Abilities (BSAs) in Visual Language Models (VLMs): Spatial Perception, Spatial Relation, Spatial Orientation, Mental Rotation, and Spatial Visualization. Benchmarking 13 mainstream VLMs through nine validated psychometric experiments reveals significant gaps versus humans (average score 24.95 vs. 68.38), with three key findings: 1) VLMs mirror human hierarchies (strongest in 2D orientation, weakest in 3D rotation) with independent BSAs (Pearson's r<0.4); 2) Smaller models such as Qwen2-VL-7B surpass larger counterparts, with Qwen leading (30.82) and InternVL2 lagging (19.6); 3) Interventions like chain-of-thought (0.100 accuracy gain) and 5-shot training (0.259 improvement) show limits from architectural constraints. Identified barriers include weak geometry encoding and missing dynamic simulation. By linking psychometric BSAs to VLM capabilities, we provide a diagnostic toolkit for spatial intelligence evaluation, methodological foundations for embodied AI development, and a cognitive science-informed roadmap for achieving human-like spatial intelligence.

For half a century, artificial intelligence research has attempted to reproduce the human qualities of abstraction and reasoning - creating computer systems that can learn new concepts from a minimal set of examples, in settings where humans find this easy. While specific neural networks are able to solve an impressive range of problems, broad generalisation to situations outside their training data has proved elusive.In this work, we look at several novel approaches for solving the Abstraction & Reasoning Corpus (ARC), a dataset of abstract visual reasoning tasks introduced to test algorithms on broad generalization. Despite three international competitions with $100,000 in prizes, the best algorithms still fail to solve a majority of ARC tasks and rely on complex hand-crafted rules, without using machine learning at all. We revisit whether recent advances in neural networks allow progress on this task. First, we adapt the DreamCoder neurosymbolic reasoning solver to ARC. DreamCoder automatically writes programs in a bespoke domain-specific language to perform reasoning, using a neural network to mimic human intuition. We present the Perceptual Abstraction and Reasoning Language (PeARL) language, which allows DreamCoder to solve ARC tasks, and propose a new recognition model that allows us to significantly improve on the previous best implementation.We also propose a new encoding and augmentation scheme that allows large language models (LLMs) to solve ARC tasks, and find that the largest models can solve some ARC tasks. LLMs are able to solve a different group of problems to state-of-the-art solvers, and provide an interesting way to complement other approaches. We perform an ensemble analysis, combining models to achieve better results than any system alone. Finally, we publish the arckit Python library to make future research on ARC easier.

The releases of OpenAI's o1 and o3 mark a significant paradigm shift in Large Language Models towards advanced reasoning capabilities. Notably, o3 outperformed humans in novel problem-solving and skill acquisition on the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus for Artificial General Intelligence (ARC-AGI). However, this benchmark is limited to symbolic patterns, whereas humans often perceive and reason about multimodal scenarios involving both vision and language data. Thus, there is an urgent need to investigate advanced reasoning capabilities in multimodal tasks. To this end, we track the evolution of the GPT-[n] and o-[n] series models on challenging multimodal puzzles, requiring fine-grained visual perception with abstract or algorithmic reasoning. The superior performance of o1 comes at nearly 750 times the computational cost of GPT-4o, raising concerns about its efficiency. Our results reveal a clear upward trend in reasoning capabilities across model iterations, with notable performance jumps across GPT-series models and subsequently to o1. Nonetheless, we observe that the o1 model still struggles with simple multimodal puzzles requiring abstract reasoning. Furthermore, its performance in algorithmic puzzles remains poor. We plan to continuously track new models in the series and update our results in this paper accordingly. All resources used in this evaluation are openly available https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest.

A sketch is a distilled form of visual abstraction that conveys core concepts through simplified yet purposeful strokes while omitting extraneous detail. Despite its expressive power, quantifying the efficiency of semantic abstraction in sketches remains challenging. Existing evaluation methods that rely on reference images, low-level visual features, or recognition accuracy do not capture abstraction, the defining property of sketches. To address these limitations, we introduce SEA (Sketch Evaluation metric for Abstraction efficiency), a reference-free metric that assesses how economically a sketch represents class-defining visual elements while preserving semantic recognizability. These elements are derived per class from commonsense knowledge about features typically depicted in sketches. SEA leverages a visual question answering model to determine the presence of each element and returns a quantitative score that reflects semantic retention under visual economy. To support this metric, we present CommonSketch, the first semantically annotated sketch dataset, comprising 23,100 human-drawn sketches across 300 classes, each paired with a caption and element-level annotations. Experiments show that SEA aligns closely with human judgments and reliably discriminates levels of abstraction efficiency, while CommonSketch serves as a benchmark providing systematic evaluation of element-level sketch understanding across various vision-language models.

This paper, for the first time, marries large foundation models with human sketch understanding. We demonstrate what this brings -- a paradigm shift in terms of generalised sketch representation learning (e.g., classification). This generalisation happens on two fronts: (i) generalisation across unknown categories (i.e., open-set), and (ii) generalisation traversing abstraction levels (i.e., good and bad sketches), both being timely challenges that remain unsolved in the sketch literature. Our design is intuitive and centred around transferring the already stellar generalisation ability of CLIP to benefit generalised learning for sketches. We first "condition" the vanilla CLIP model by learning sketch-specific prompts using a novel auxiliary head of raster to vector sketch conversion. This importantly makes CLIP "sketch-aware". We then make CLIP acute to the inherently different sketch abstraction levels. This is achieved by learning a codebook of abstraction-specific prompt biases, a weighted combination of which facilitates the representation of sketches across abstraction levels -- low abstract edge-maps, medium abstract sketches in TU-Berlin, and highly abstract doodles in QuickDraw. Our framework surpasses popular sketch representation learning algorithms in both zero-shot and few-shot setups and in novel settings across different abstraction boundaries.

For an autonomous agent to fulfill a wide range of user-specified goals at test time, it must be able to learn broadly applicable and general-purpose skill repertoires. Furthermore, to provide the requisite level of generality, these skills must handle raw sensory input such as images. In this paper, we propose an algorithm that acquires such general-purpose skills by combining unsupervised representation learning and reinforcement learning of goal-conditioned policies. Since the particular goals that might be required at test-time are not known in advance, the agent performs a self-supervised "practice" phase where it imagines goals and attempts to achieve them. We learn a visual representation with three distinct purposes: sampling goals for self-supervised practice, providing a structured transformation of raw sensory inputs, and computing a reward signal for goal reaching. We also propose a retroactive goal relabeling scheme to further improve the sample-efficiency of our method. Our off-policy algorithm is efficient enough to learn policies that operate on raw image observations and goals for a real-world robotic system, and substantially outperforms prior techniques.

Various methods have been proposed for utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) in autonomous driving. One strategy of using LLMs for autonomous driving involves inputting surrounding objects as text prompts to the LLMs, along with their coordinate and velocity information, and then outputting the subsequent movements of the vehicle. When using LLMs for such purposes, capabilities such as spatial recognition and planning are essential. In particular, two foundational capabilities are required: (1) spatial-aware decision making, which is the ability to recognize space from coordinate information and make decisions to avoid collisions, and (2) the ability to adhere to traffic rules. However, quantitative research has not been conducted on how accurately different types of LLMs can handle these problems. In this study, we quantitatively evaluated these two abilities of LLMs in the context of autonomous driving. Furthermore, to conduct a Proof of Concept (POC) for the feasibility of implementing these abilities in actual vehicles, we developed a system that uses LLMs to drive a vehicle.

Large Language Models have emerged many intellectual capacities. While numerous benchmarks assess their intelligence, limited attention has been given to their ability to explore, an essential capacity for discovering new information and adapting to novel environments in both natural and artificial systems. The extent to which LLMs can effectively explore, particularly in open-ended tasks, remains unclear. This study investigates whether LLMs can surpass humans in exploration during an open-ended task, using Little Alchemy 2 as a paradigm, where agents combine elements to discover new ones. Results show most LLMs underperform compared to humans, except for the o1 model, with those traditional LLMs relying primarily on uncertainty driven strategies, unlike humans who balance uncertainty and empowerment. Representational analysis of the models with Sparse Autoencoders revealed that uncertainty and choices are represented at earlier transformer blocks, while empowerment values are processed later, causing LLMs to think too fast and make premature decisions, hindering effective exploration. These findings shed light on the limitations of LLM exploration and suggest directions for improving their adaptability.

Images usually convey richer detail than text, but often include redundant information which potentially downgrades multimodal reasoning performance. When faced with lengthy or complex messages, humans tend to employ abstract thinking to convert them into simple and concise abstracts. Inspired by this cognitive strategy, we introduce Visual Abstract Thinking (VAT), a novel thinking paradigm that prompts Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) with visual abstract instead of explicit verbal thoughts or elaborate guidance, permitting a more concentrated visual reasoning mechanism. Explicit thinking, such as Chain-of-thought (CoT) or tool-augmented approaches, increases the complexity of reasoning process via inserting verbose intermediate steps, external knowledge or visual information. In contrast, VAT reduces redundant visual information and encourages models to focus their reasoning on more essential visual elements. Experimental results show that VAT consistently empowers different models, and achieves an average gain of 17% over GPT-4o baseline by employing diverse types of visual abstracts, demonstrating that VAT can enhance visual reasoning abilities for MLLMs regarding conceptual, structural and relational reasoning tasks. VAT is also compatible with CoT in knowledge-intensive multimodal reasoning tasks. These findings highlight the effectiveness of visual reasoning via abstract thinking and encourage further exploration of more diverse reasoning paradigms from the perspective of human cognition.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

One of the key capabilities of intelligent agents is the ability to discover useful skills without external supervision. However, the current unsupervised skill discovery methods are often limited to acquiring simple, easy-to-learn skills due to the lack of incentives to discover more complex, challenging behaviors. We introduce a novel unsupervised skill discovery method, Controllability-aware Skill Discovery (CSD), which actively seeks complex, hard-to-control skills without supervision. The key component of CSD is a controllability-aware distance function, which assigns larger values to state transitions that are harder to achieve with the current skills. Combined with distance-maximizing skill discovery, CSD progressively learns more challenging skills over the course of training as our jointly trained distance function reduces rewards for easy-to-achieve skills. Our experimental results in six robotic manipulation and locomotion environments demonstrate that CSD can discover diverse complex skills including object manipulation and locomotion skills with no supervision, significantly outperforming prior unsupervised skill discovery methods. Videos and code are available at https://seohong.me/projects/csd/

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Modern LLMs show mastery over an ever-growing range of skills, as well as the ability to compose them flexibly. However, extending model capabilities to new skills in a scalable manner is an open-problem: fine-tuning and parameter-efficient variants risk catastrophic forgetting, while context-based approaches have limited expressiveness and are constrained by the model's effective context. We explore skill neologisms--i.e., soft tokens integrated in the model's vocabulary and optimized to improve capabilities over a specific skill--as a way to selectively extend model capabilities to new skills without weight updates. We first observe that off-the-shelf pre-trained LLMs already demonstrate tokens associated with procedural knowledge. We then show that skill neologisms can be learned to improve model capabilities on specific skills while being composable with out-of-distribution skills, and that independently trained skill neologisms can be composed zero-shot. These results suggest that skill neologisms may provide a scalable path towards skill-based continual learning.

Latent space is rapidly emerging as a native substrate for language-based models. While modern systems are still commonly understood through explicit token-level generation, an increasing body of work shows that many critical internal processes are more naturally carried out in continuous latent space than in human-readable verbal traces. This shift is driven by the structural limitations of explicit-space computation, including linguistic redundancy, discretization bottlenecks, sequential inefficiency, and semantic loss. This survey aims to provide a unified and up-to-date landscape of latent space in language-based models. We organize the survey into five sequential perspectives: Foundation, Evolution, Mechanism, Ability, and Outlook. We begin by delineating the scope of latent space, distinguishing it from explicit or verbal space and from the latent spaces commonly studied in generative visual models. We then trace the field's evolution from early exploratory efforts to the current large-scale expansion. To organize the technical landscape, we examine existing work through the complementary lenses of mechanism and ability. From the perspective of Mechanism, we identify four major lines of development: Architecture, Representation, Computation, and Optimization. From the perspective of Ability, we show how latent space supports a broad capability spectrum spanning Reasoning, Planning, Modeling, Perception, Memory, Collaboration, and Embodiment. Beyond consolidation, we discuss the key open challenges, and outline promising directions for future research. We hope this survey serves not only as a reference for existing work, but also as a foundation for understanding latent space as a general computational and systems paradigm for next-generation intelligence.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Goal representation affects the performance of Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) algorithms by decomposing the complex learning problem into easier subtasks. Recent studies show that representations that preserve temporally abstract environment dynamics are successful in solving difficult problems and provide theoretical guarantees for optimality. These methods however cannot scale to tasks where environment dynamics increase in complexity i.e. the temporally abstract transition relations depend on larger number of variables. On the other hand, other efforts have tried to use spatial abstraction to mitigate the previous issues. Their limitations include scalability to high dimensional environments and dependency on prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a novel three-layer HRL algorithm that introduces, at different levels of the hierarchy, both a spatial and a temporal goal abstraction. We provide a theoretical study of the regret bounds of the learned policies. We evaluate the approach on complex continuous control tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness of spatial and temporal abstractions learned by this approach.

The real world is non-stationary and infinitely complex, requiring intelligent agents to learn continually without the prohibitive cost of retraining from scratch. While online continual learning offers a framework for this setting, learning new information often interferes with previously acquired knowledge, causes forgetting and degraded generalization. To address this, we propose Abstraction-Augmented Training (AAT), a loss-level modification encouraging models to capture the latent relational structure shared across examples. By jointly optimizing over concrete instances and their abstract representations, AAT introduces a memory-efficient inductive bias that stabilizes learning in strictly online data streams, eliminating the need for a replay buffer. To capture the multi-faceted nature of abstraction, we introduce and evaluate AAT on two benchmarks: a controlled relational dataset where abstraction is realized through entity masking, and a narrative dataset where abstraction is expressed through shared proverbs. Our results show that AAT achieves performance comparable to or exceeding strong experience replay (ER) baselines, despite requiring zero additional memory and only minimal changes to the training objective. This work highlights structural abstraction as a powerful, memory-free alternative to ER.

Scaling up language models has been shown to predictably improve performance and sample efficiency on a wide range of downstream tasks. This paper instead discusses an unpredictable phenomenon that we refer to as emergent abilities of large language models. We consider an ability to be emergent if it is not present in smaller models but is present in larger models. Thus, emergent abilities cannot be predicted simply by extrapolating the performance of smaller models. The existence of such emergence implies that additional scaling could further expand the range of capabilities of language models.

Human brains integrate linguistic and perceptual information simultaneously to understand natural language, and hold the critical ability to render imaginations. Such abilities enable us to construct new abstract concepts or concrete objects, and are essential in involving practical knowledge to solve problems in low-resource scenarios. However, most existing methods for Natural Language Understanding (NLU) are mainly focused on textual signals. They do not simulate human visual imagination ability, which hinders models from inferring and learning efficiently from limited data samples. Therefore, we introduce an Imagination-Augmented Cross-modal Encoder (iACE) to solve natural language understanding tasks from a novel learning perspective -- imagination-augmented cross-modal understanding. iACE enables visual imagination with external knowledge transferred from the powerful generative and pre-trained vision-and-language models. Extensive experiments on GLUE and SWAG show that iACE achieves consistent improvement over visually-supervised pre-trained models. More importantly, results in extreme and normal few-shot settings validate the effectiveness of iACE in low-resource natural language understanding circumstances.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) is designed to promote research on abstract reasoning, a fundamental aspect of human intelligence. Common approaches to ARC treat it as a language-oriented problem, addressed by large language models (LLMs) or recurrent reasoning models. However, although the puzzle-like tasks in ARC are inherently visual, existing research has rarely approached the problem from a vision-centric perspective. In this work, we formulate ARC within a vision paradigm, framing it as an image-to-image translation problem. To incorporate visual priors, we represent the inputs on a "canvas" that can be processed like natural images. It is then natural for us to apply standard vision architectures, such as a vanilla Vision Transformer (ViT), to perform image-to-image mapping. Our model is trained from scratch solely on ARC data and generalizes to unseen tasks through test-time training. Our framework, termed Vision ARC (VARC), achieves 60.4% accuracy on the ARC-1 benchmark, substantially outperforming existing methods that are also trained from scratch. Our results are competitive with those of leading LLMs and close the gap to average human performance.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

A modular design encourages neural models to disentangle and recombine different facets of knowledge to generalise more systematically to new tasks. In this work, we assume that each task is associated with a subset of latent discrete skills from a (potentially small) inventory. In turn, skills correspond to parameter-efficient (sparse / low-rank) model parameterisations. By jointly learning these and a task-skill allocation matrix, the network for each task is instantiated as the average of the parameters of active skills. To favour non-trivial soft partitions of skills across tasks, we experiment with a series of inductive biases, such as an Indian Buffet Process prior and a two-speed learning rate. We evaluate our latent-skill model on two main settings: 1) multitask reinforcement learning for grounded instruction following on 8 levels of the BabyAI platform; and 2) few-shot adaptation of pre-trained text-to-text generative models on CrossFit, a benchmark comprising 160 NLP tasks. We find that the modular design of a network significantly increases sample efficiency in reinforcement learning and few-shot generalisation in supervised learning, compared to baselines with fully shared, task-specific, or conditionally generated parameters where knowledge is entangled across tasks. In addition, we show how discrete skills help interpretability, as they yield an explicit hierarchy of tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

Despite the impressive performance of large language models (LLMs), the process of endowing them with new capabilities--such as mathematical reasoning--remains largely empirical and opaque. A critical open question is whether reasoning abilities stem from the entire model, specific modules, or are merely artifacts of overfitting. In this work, we hypothesize that the reasoning capabilities in well-trained LLMs are primarily attributed to the output projection module (oproj) in the Transformer's multi-head self-attention (MHSA) mechanism. To support this hypothesis, we introduce Stethoscope for Networks (SfN), a suite of diagnostic tools designed to probe and analyze the internal behaviors of LLMs. Using SfN, we provide both circumstantial and empirical evidence suggesting that oproj plays a central role in enabling reasoning, whereas other modules contribute more to fluent dialogue. These findings offer a new perspective on LLM interpretability and open avenues for more targeted training strategies, potentially enabling more efficient and specialized LLMs.

Large language models have exhibited emergent abilities, demonstrating exceptional performance across diverse tasks for which they were not explicitly trained, including those that require complex reasoning abilities. The emergence of such abilities carries profound implications for the future direction of research in NLP, especially as the deployment of such models becomes more prevalent. However, one key challenge is that the evaluation of these abilities is often confounded by competencies that arise in models through alternative prompting techniques, such as in-context learning and instruction following, which also emerge as the models are scaled up. In this study, we provide the first comprehensive examination of these emergent abilities while accounting for various potentially biasing factors that can influence the evaluation of models. We conduct rigorous tests on a set of 18 models, encompassing a parameter range from 60 million to 175 billion parameters, across a comprehensive set of 22 tasks. Through an extensive series of over 1,000 experiments, we provide compelling evidence that emergent abilities can primarily be ascribed to in-context learning. We find no evidence for the emergence of reasoning abilities, thus providing valuable insights into the underlying mechanisms driving the observed abilities and thus alleviating safety concerns regarding their use.

Cognitive science suggests that spatial ability develops progressively-from perception to reasoning and interaction. Yet in multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), this hierarchy remains poorly understood, as most studies focus on a narrow set of tasks. We introduce SpatialTree, a cognitive-science-inspired hierarchy that organizes spatial abilities into four levels: low-level perception (L1), mental mapping (L2), simulation (L3), and agentic competence (L4). Based on this taxonomy, we construct the first capability-centric hierarchical benchmark, thoroughly evaluating mainstream MLLMs across 27 sub-abilities. The evaluation results reveal a clear structure: L1 skills are largely orthogonal, whereas higher-level skills are strongly correlated, indicating increasing interdependency. Through targeted supervised fine-tuning, we uncover a surprising transfer dynamic-negative transfer within L1, but strong cross-level transfer from low- to high-level abilities with notable synergy. Finally, we explore how to improve the entire hierarchy. We find that naive RL that encourages extensive "thinking" is unreliable: it helps complex reasoning but hurts intuitive perception. We propose a simple auto-think strategy that suppresses unnecessary deliberation, enabling RL to consistently improve performance across all levels. By building SpatialTree, we provide a proof-of-concept framework for understanding and systematically scaling spatial abilities in MLLMs.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

Agent skills, structured packages of procedural knowledge and executable resources that agents dynamically load at inference time, have become a reliable mechanism for augmenting LLM agents. Yet inference-time skill augmentation is fundamentally limited: retrieval noise introduces irrelevant guidance, injected skill content imposes substantial token overhead, and the model never truly acquires the knowledge it merely follows. We ask whether skills can instead be internalized into model parameters, enabling zero-shot autonomous behavior without any runtime skill retrieval. We introduce SKILL0, an in-context reinforcement learning framework designed for skill internalization. SKILL0 introduces a training-time curriculum that begins with full skill context and progressively withdraws it. Skills are grouped offline by category and rendered with interaction history into a compact visual context, teaching he model tool invocation and multi-turn task completion. A Dynamic Curriculum then evaluates each skill file's on-policy helpfulness, retaining only those from which the current policy still benefits within a linearly decaying budget, until the agent operates in a fully zero-shot setting. Extensive agentic experiments demonstrate that SKILL0 achieves substantial improvements over the standard RL baseline (+9.7\% for ALFWorld and +6.6\% for Search-QA), while maintaining a highly efficient context of fewer than 0.5k tokens per step. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZJU-REAL/SkillZero.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

Frontier models are transitioning from multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that merely ingest visual information to unified multimodal models (UMMs) capable of native interleaved generation. This shift has sparked interest in using intermediate visualizations as a reasoning aid, akin to human mental imagery. Central to this idea is the ability to form, maintain, and manipulate visual representations in a goal-oriented manner. To evaluate and probe this capability, we develop MentisOculi, a procedural, stratified suite of multi-step reasoning problems amenable to visual solution, tuned to challenge frontier models. Evaluating visual strategies ranging from latent tokens to explicit generated imagery, we find they generally fail to improve performance. Analysis of UMMs specifically exposes a critical limitation: While they possess the textual reasoning capacity to solve a task and can sometimes generate correct visuals, they suffer from compounding generation errors and fail to leverage even ground-truth visualizations. Our findings suggest that despite their inherent appeal, visual thoughts do not yet benefit model reasoning. MentisOculi establishes the necessary foundation to analyze and close this gap across diverse model families.

Unsupervised skill learning aims to learn a rich repertoire of behaviors without external supervision, providing artificial agents with the ability to control and influence the environment. However, without appropriate knowledge and exploration, skills may provide control only over a restricted area of the environment, limiting their applicability. Furthermore, it is unclear how to leverage the learned skill behaviors for adapting to downstream tasks in a data-efficient manner. We present Choreographer, a model-based agent that exploits its world model to learn and adapt skills in imagination. Our method decouples the exploration and skill learning processes, being able to discover skills in the latent state space of the model. During adaptation, the agent uses a meta-controller to evaluate and adapt the learned skills efficiently by deploying them in parallel in imagination. Choreographer is able to learn skills both from offline data, and by collecting data simultaneously with an exploration policy. The skills can be used to effectively adapt to downstream tasks, as we show in the URL benchmark, where we outperform previous approaches from both pixels and states inputs. The learned skills also explore the environment thoroughly, finding sparse rewards more frequently, as shown in goal-reaching tasks from the DMC Suite and Meta-World. Website and code: https://skillchoreographer.github.io/

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Recent advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across various multimodal contexts. However, their application in robotic scenarios, particularly for long-horizon manipulation tasks, reveals significant limitations. These limitations arise from the current MLLMs lacking three essential robotic brain capabilities: Planning Capability, which involves decomposing complex manipulation instructions into manageable sub-tasks; Affordance Perception, the ability to recognize and interpret the affordances of interactive objects; and Trajectory Prediction, the foresight to anticipate the complete manipulation trajectory necessary for successful execution. To enhance the robotic brain's core capabilities from abstract to concrete, we introduce ShareRobot, a high-quality heterogeneous dataset that labels multi-dimensional information such as task planning, object affordance, and end-effector trajectory. ShareRobot's diversity and accuracy have been meticulously refined by three human annotators. Building on this dataset, we developed RoboBrain, an MLLM-based model that combines robotic and general multi-modal data, utilizes a multi-stage training strategy, and incorporates long videos and high-resolution images to improve its robotic manipulation capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RoboBrain achieves state-of-the-art performance across various robotic tasks, highlighting its potential to advance robotic brain capabilities.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing on LLaMA, a prominent open-source foundational model in natural language processing. Instead of assessing LLaMA through its generative output, we design multiple-choice tasks to probe its intrinsic understanding in high-order tasks such as reasoning and computation. We examine the model horizontally, comparing different sizes, and vertically, assessing different layers. We unveil several key and uncommon findings based on the designed probing tasks: (1) Horizontally, enlarging model sizes almost could not automatically impart additional knowledge or computational prowess. Instead, it can enhance reasoning abilities, especially in math problem solving, and helps reduce hallucinations, but only beyond certain size thresholds; (2) In vertical analysis, the lower layers of LLaMA lack substantial arithmetic and factual knowledge, showcasing logical thinking, multilingual and recognitive abilities, with top layers housing most computational power and real-world knowledge.

An agent facing a planning problem can use answers to how-to questions to reduce uncertainty and fill knowledge gaps, helping it solve both current and future tasks. However, their open ended nature, where valid answers to "How do I X?" range from executable actions to high-level descriptions of X's sub-goals, makes them challenging for AI agents to ask, and for AI experts to answer, in ways that support efficient planning. We introduce How^{2}, a memory agent framework that enables agents to ask how-to questions, store the answers, and reuse them for lifelong learning in interactive environments. We evaluate our approach in Plancraft, a Minecraft crafting environment, where agents must complete an assembly task by manipulating inventory items. Using teacher models that answer at varying levels of abstraction, from executable action sequences to high-level subgoal descriptions, we show that lifelong learning agents benefit most from answers that are abstracted and decoupled from the current state. How^{2} offers a way for LLM-based agents to improve their planning capabilities over time by asking questions in interactive environments.

Computer-Using Agents (CUAs) aim to autonomously operate computer systems to complete real-world tasks. However, existing agentic systems remain difficult to scale and lag behind human performance. A key limitation is the absence of reusable and structured skill abstractions that capture how humans interact with graphical user interfaces and how to leverage these skills. We introduce CUA-Skill, a computer-using agentic skill base that encodes human computer-use knowledge as skills coupled with parameterized execution and composition graphs. CUA-Skill is a large-scale library of carefully engineered skills spanning common Windows applications, serving as a practical infrastructure and tool substrate for scalable, reliable agent development. Built upon this skill base, we construct CUA-Skill Agent, an end-to-end computer-using agent that supports dynamic skill retrieval, argument instantiation, and memory-aware failure recovery. Our results demonstrate that CUA-Skill substantially improves execution success rates and robustness on challenging end-to-end agent benchmarks, establishing a strong foundation for future computer-using agent development. On WindowsAgentArena, CUA-Skill Agent achieves state-of-the-art 57.5% (best of three) successful rate while being significantly more efficient than prior and concurrent approaches. The project page is available at https://microsoft.github.io/cua_skill/.

The viability of chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring hinges on models being unable to reason effectively in their latent representations. Yet little is known about the limits of such latent reasoning in LLMs. We test these limits by studying whether models can discover multi-step planning strategies without supervision on intermediate steps and execute them latently, within a single forward pass. Using graph path-finding tasks that precisely control the number of required latent planning steps, we uncover a striking limitation unresolved by massive scaling: tiny transformers trained from scratch discover strategies requiring up to three latent steps, fine-tuned GPT-4o and Qwen3-32B reach five, and GPT-5.4 attains seven under few-shot prompting. Although the maximum latent planning depth models can learn during training is five, the discovered strategy generalizes up to eight latent steps at test-time. This reveals a dissociation between the ability to discover a latent strategy under final-answer supervision alone and the ability to execute it once discovered. If similar limits hold more broadly, strategies requiring multiple coordinated latent planning steps may need to be explicitly taught or externalized, lending credence to CoT monitoring.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Abstract grammatical knowledge - of parts of speech and grammatical patterns - is key to the capacity for linguistic generalization in humans. But how abstract is grammatical knowledge in large language models? In the human literature, compelling evidence for grammatical abstraction comes from structural priming. A sentence that shares the same grammatical structure as a preceding sentence is processed and produced more readily. Because confounds exist when using stimuli in a single language, evidence of abstraction is even more compelling from crosslingual structural priming, where use of a syntactic structure in one language primes an analogous structure in another language. We measure crosslingual structural priming in large language models, comparing model behavior to human experimental results from eight crosslingual experiments covering six languages, and four monolingual structural priming experiments in three non-English languages. We find evidence for abstract monolingual and crosslingual grammatical representations in the models that function similarly to those found in humans. These results demonstrate that grammatical representations in multilingual language models are not only similar across languages, but they can causally influence text produced in different languages.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus for Artificial General Intelligence (ARC-AGI), introduced in 2019, established a challenging benchmark for evaluating the general fluid intelligence of artificial systems via a set of unique, novel tasks only requiring minimal prior knowledge. While ARC-AGI has spurred significant research activity over the past five years, recent AI progress calls for benchmarks capable of finer-grained evaluation at higher levels of cognitive complexity. We introduce ARC-AGI-2, an upgraded version of the benchmark. ARC-AGI-2 preserves the input-output pair task format of its predecessor, ensuring continuity for researchers. It incorporates a newly curated and expanded set of tasks specifically designed to provide a more granular signal to assess abstract reasoning and problem-solving abilities at higher levels of fluid intelligence. To contextualize the difficulty and characteristics of ARC-AGI-2, we present extensive results from human testing, providing a robust baseline that highlights the benchmark's accessibility to human intelligence, yet difficulty for current AI systems. ARC-AGI-2 aims to serve as a next-generation tool for rigorously measuring progress towards more general and human-like AI capabilities.

With LLMs shifting their role from statistical modeling of language to serving as general-purpose AI agents, how should LLM evaluations change? Arguably, a key ability of an AI agent is to flexibly combine, as needed, the basic skills it has learned. The capability to combine skills plays an important role in (human) pedagogy and also in a paper on emergence phenomena (Arora & Goyal, 2023). This work introduces Skill-Mix, a new evaluation to measure ability to combine skills. Using a list of N skills the evaluator repeatedly picks random subsets of k skills and asks the LLM to produce text combining that subset of skills. Since the number of subsets grows like N^k, for even modest k this evaluation will, with high probability, require the LLM to produce text significantly different from any text in the training set. The paper develops a methodology for (a) designing and administering such an evaluation, and (b) automatic grading (plus spot-checking by humans) of the results using GPT-4 as well as the open LLaMA-2 70B model. Administering a version of to popular chatbots gave results that, while generally in line with prior expectations, contained surprises. Sizeable differences exist among model capabilities that are not captured by their ranking on popular LLM leaderboards ("cramming for the leaderboard"). Furthermore, simple probability calculations indicate that GPT-4's reasonable performance on k=5 is suggestive of going beyond "stochastic parrot" behavior (Bender et al., 2021), i.e., it combines skills in ways that it had not seen during training. We sketch how the methodology can lead to a Skill-Mix based eco-system of open evaluations for AI capabilities of future models.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

While large language models (LLMs) are still being adopted to new domains and utilized in novel applications, we are experiencing an influx of the new generation of foundation models, namely multi-modal large language models (MLLMs). These models integrate verbal and visual information, opening new possibilities to demonstrate more complex reasoning abilities at the intersection of the two modalities. However, despite the revolutionizing prospect of MLLMs, our understanding of their reasoning abilities is limited. In this study, we assess the nonverbal abstract reasoning abilities of open-source and closed-source MLLMs using variations of Raven's Progressive Matrices. Our experiments expose the difficulty of solving such problems while showcasing the immense gap between open-source and closed-source models. We also reveal critical shortcomings with individual visual and textual modules, subjecting the models to low-performance ceilings. Finally, to improve MLLMs' performance, we experiment with various methods, such as Chain-of-Thought prompting, resulting in a significant (up to 100%) boost in performance.

We present OAKINK2, a dataset of bimanual object manipulation tasks for complex daily activities. In pursuit of constructing the complex tasks into a structured representation, OAKINK2 introduces three level of abstraction to organize the manipulation tasks: Affordance, Primitive Task, and Complex Task. OAKINK2 features on an object-centric perspective for decoding the complex tasks, treating them as a sequence of object affordance fulfillment. The first level, Affordance, outlines the functionalities that objects in the scene can afford, the second level, Primitive Task, describes the minimal interaction units that humans interact with the object to achieve its affordance, and the third level, Complex Task, illustrates how Primitive Tasks are composed and interdependent. OAKINK2 dataset provides multi-view image streams and precise pose annotations for the human body, hands and various interacting objects. This extensive collection supports applications such as interaction reconstruction and motion synthesis. Based on the 3-level abstraction of OAKINK2, we explore a task-oriented framework for Complex Task Completion (CTC). CTC aims to generate a sequence of bimanual manipulation to achieve task objectives. Within the CTC framework, we employ Large Language Models (LLMs) to decompose the complex task objectives into sequences of Primitive Tasks and have developed a Motion Fulfillment Model that generates bimanual hand motion for each Primitive Task. OAKINK2 datasets and models are available at https://oakink.net/v2.

Generative AI's novel capacities raise questions about the future role of human expertise: does AI level the playing field between professional artists and laypeople, or does expertise enhance AI use? Do the cognitive skills experts make use of in analyzing and drawing visual art also transfer to using these new tools? This pre-registered study conducts experimental comparisons between 50 professional artists and a demographically matched sample of laypeople. Our interdisciplinary team developed two tasks involving image replication and creative image creation, assessing their copying accuracy and divergent thinking. We implemented a bespoke platform for the experiment, powered by a modern text-to-image AI. Results reveal artists produced more accurate copies and more divergent ideas than lay participants, highlighting a skill transfer of professional expertise - even to the confined space of generative AI. We also explored how well an exemplary vision-capable large language model (GPT-4o) would fare: on par in copying and slightly better on average than artists in the creative task, although never above best humans. These findings highlight the importance of integrating artistic skills with AI, suggesting a potential for collaborative synergy that could reshape creative industries and arts education.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Recent reasoning-oriented LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on challenging tasks such as mathematics and science examinations. However, core cognitive faculties of human intelligence, such as abstract reasoning and generalization, remain underexplored. To address this, we evaluate recent reasoning-oriented LLMs on the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) benchmark, which explicitly demands both faculties. We formulate ARC as a program synthesis task and propose nine candidate solvers. Experimental results show that repeated-sampling planning-aided code generation (RSPC) achieves the highest test accuracy and demonstrates consistent generalization across most LLMs. To further improve performance, we introduce an ARC solver, Knowledge Augmentation for Abstract Reasoning (KAAR), which encodes core knowledge priors within an ontology that classifies priors into three hierarchical levels based on their dependencies. KAAR progressively expands LLM reasoning capacity by gradually augmenting priors at each level, and invokes RSPC to generate candidate solutions after each augmentation stage. This stage-wise reasoning reduces interference from irrelevant priors and improves LLM performance. Empirical results show that KAAR maintains strong generalization and consistently outperforms non-augmented RSPC across all evaluated LLMs, achieving around 5% absolute gains and up to 64.52% relative improvement. Despite these achievements, ARC remains a challenging benchmark for reasoning-oriented LLMs, highlighting future avenues of progress in LLMs.

Large language models can perform well on many isolated tasks, yet they continue to struggle on multi-turn, long-horizon agentic problems that require skills such as planning, state tracking, and long context processing. In this work, we aim to better understand the relative importance of advancing these underlying capabilities for success on such tasks. We develop an oracle counterfactual framework for multi-turn problems that asks: how would an agent perform if it could leverage an oracle to perfectly perform a specific task? The change in the agent's performance due to this oracle assistance allows us to measure the criticality of such oracle skill in the future advancement of AI agents. We introduce a suite of procedurally generated, game-like tasks with tunable complexity. These controlled environments allow us to provide precise oracle interventions, such as perfect planning or flawless state tracking, and make it possible to isolate the contribution of each oracle without confounding effects present in real-world benchmarks. Our results show that while some interventions (e.g., planning) consistently improve performance across settings, the usefulness of other skills is dependent on the properties of the environment and language model. Our work sheds light on the challenges of multi-turn agentic environments to guide the future efforts in the development of AI agents and language models.

Temporal action abstractions, along with belief state representations, are a powerful knowledge sharing mechanism for sequential decision making. In this work, we propose a novel view that treats inducing temporal action abstractions as a sequence compression problem. To do so, we bring a subtle but critical component of LLM training pipelines -- input tokenization via byte pair encoding (BPE) -- to the seemingly distant task of learning skills of variable time span in continuous control domains. We introduce an approach called Primitive Sequence Encoding (PRISE) that combines continuous action quantization with BPE to learn powerful action abstractions. We empirically show that high-level skills discovered by PRISE from a multitask set of robotic manipulation demonstrations significantly boost the performance of both multitask imitation learning as well as few-shot imitation learning on unseen tasks. Our code will be released at https://github.com/FrankZheng2022/PRISE.

This position paper argues that, in order to understand AI, we cannot rely on our existing vocabulary of human words. Instead, we should strive to develop neologisms: new words that represent precise human concepts that we want to teach machines, or machine concepts that we need to learn. We start from the premise that humans and machines have differing concepts. This means interpretability can be framed as a communication problem: humans must be able to reference and control machine concepts, and communicate human concepts to machines. Creating a shared human-machine language through developing neologisms, we believe, could solve this communication problem. Successful neologisms achieve a useful amount of abstraction: not too detailed, so they're reusable in many contexts, and not too high-level, so they convey precise information. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate how a "length neologism" enables controlling LLM response length, while a "diversity neologism" allows sampling more variable responses. Taken together, we argue that we cannot understand AI using our existing vocabulary, and expanding it through neologisms creates opportunities for both controlling and understanding machines better.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Memory-based self-evolution has emerged as a promising paradigm for coding agents. However, existing approaches typically restrict memory utilization to homogeneous task domains, failing to leverage the shared infrastructural foundations, such as runtime environments and programming languages, that exist across diverse real-world coding problems. To address this limitation, we investigate Memory Transfer Learning (MTL) by harnessing a unified memory pool from heterogeneous domains. We evaluate performance across 6 coding benchmarks using four memory representations, ranging from concrete traces to abstract insights. Our experiments demonstrate that cross-domain memory improves average performance by 3.7\%, primarily by transferring meta-knowledge, such as validation routines, rather than task-specific code. Importantly, we find that abstraction dictates transferability; high-level insights generalize well, whereas low-level traces often induce negative transfer due to excessive specificity. Furthermore, we show that transfer effectiveness scales with the size of the memory pool, and memory can be transferred even between different models. Our work establishes empirical design principles for expanding memory utilization beyond single-domain silos. Project page: https://memorytransfer.github.io/

Spatial cognition is fundamental to real-world multimodal intelligence, allowing models to effectively interact with the physical environment. While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant strides, existing benchmarks often oversimplify spatial cognition, reducing it to a single-dimensional metric, which fails to capture the hierarchical structure and interdependence of spatial abilities. To address this gap, we propose a hierarchical spatial cognition framework that decomposes spatial intelligence into five progressively complex levels from basic observation to high-level planning. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct SpatialBench, a large-scale, fine-grained benchmark covering 15 tasks aligned with these cognitive levels. To provide a unified evaluation across heterogeneous tasks, we further introduce a high-level capability-oriented metric that reliably assesses a model's overall spatial reasoning ability. Extensive experiments over massive MLLMs reveal distinct performance stratification across cognitive levels: models exhibit strong perceptual grounding yet remain limited in symbolic reasoning, causal inference, and planning. Additional human tests demonstrate that humans perform selective, goal-directed abstraction, while MLLMs tend to over-attend to surface details without coherent spatial intent. Our work establishes the first systematic framework for measuring hierarchical spatial cognition in MLLMs, laying the foundation for future spatially intelligent systems.

Large language models (LLMs) with enormous pre-training tokens and parameter amounts emerge abilities, including math reasoning, code generation, and instruction following. These abilities are further enhanced by supervised fine-tuning (SFT). The open-source community has studied on ad-hoc SFT for each ability, while proprietary LLMs are versatile for all abilities. It is important to investigate how to unlock them with multiple abilities via SFT. In this study, we specifically focus on the data composition between mathematical reasoning, code generation, and general human-aligning abilities during SFT. From a scaling perspective, we investigate the relationship between model abilities and various factors including data amounts, data composition ratio, model parameters, and SFT strategies. Our experiments reveal that different abilities exhibit different scaling patterns, and larger models generally show superior performance with the same amount of data. Mathematical reasoning and code generation improve as data amounts increase consistently, while the general ability is enhanced with about a thousand samples and improves slowly. We find data composition results in various abilities improvements with low data amounts, while conflicts of abilities with high data amounts. Our experiments further show that composition data amount impacts performance, while the influence of composition ratio is insignificant. Regarding the SFT strategies, we evaluate sequential learning multiple abilities are prone to catastrophic forgetting. Our proposed Dual-stage Mixed Fine-tuning (DMT) strategy learns specialized abilities first and then learns general abilities with a small amount of specialized data to prevent forgetting, offering a promising solution to learn multiple abilities with different scaling patterns.

Spatial understanding is a crucial capability for robots to make grounded decisions based on their environment. This foundational skill enables robots not only to perceive their surroundings but also to reason about and interact meaningfully within the world. In modern robotics, these capabilities are taken on by visual language models, and they face significant challenges when applied to spatial reasoning context due to their training data sources. These sources utilize general-purpose image datasets, and they often lack sophisticated spatial scene understanding capabilities. For example, the datasets do not address reference frame comprehension - spatial relationships require clear contextual understanding, whether from an ego-centric, object-centric, or world-centric perspective, which allow for effective real-world interaction. To address this issue, we introduce RoboSpatial, a large-scale spatial understanding dataset consisting of real indoor and tabletop scenes captured as 3D scans and egocentric images, annotated with rich spatial information relevant to robotics. The dataset includes 1M images, 5K 3D scans, and 3M annotated spatial relationships, with paired 2D egocentric images and 3D scans to make it both 2D and 3D ready. Our experiments show that models trained with RoboSpatial outperform baselines on downstream tasks such as spatial affordance prediction, spatial relationship prediction, and robotics manipulation.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.

Reasoning, a crucial ability for complex problem-solving, plays a pivotal role in various real-world settings such as negotiation, medical diagnosis, and criminal investigation. It serves as a fundamental methodology in the field of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). With the ongoing development of foundation models, e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a growing interest in exploring their abilities in reasoning tasks. In this paper, we introduce seminal foundation models proposed or adaptable for reasoning, highlighting the latest advancements in various reasoning tasks, methods, and benchmarks. We then delve into the potential future directions behind the emergence of reasoning abilities within foundation models. We also discuss the relevance of multimodal learning, autonomous agents, and super alignment in the context of reasoning. By discussing these future research directions, we hope to inspire researchers in their exploration of this field, stimulate further advancements in reasoning with foundation models, and contribute to the development of AGI.