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Whether Men Would Have Been Born in a State of Righteousness? | On the contrary,
Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul."
I answer that,
Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, mu... |
It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." | These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. |
Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous. | Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God,... |
Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born Confirmed in Righteousness? | On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." From which words we gather ... |
It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.": "If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children woul... | If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not ha... |
Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. | Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc." |
Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. | This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the paren... |
Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been ... | There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. 64, A. 2). |
Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with Perfect Knowledge? | On the contrary,
The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.
I answer th... |
It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. | The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. |
Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. | Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the h... |
Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. | Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles. |
Whether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth? | On the contrary,
In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
I answer that,
As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;... |
It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). ... | The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. |
Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. | Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99,... |
Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place? | On the contrary,
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual."
I answer that,
As Augustine say... |
It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire... | Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, whic... |
Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. | Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?" |
Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. | The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. |
Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. | The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a... |
Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. | According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were a... |
Whether Paradise Was a Place Adapted to Be the Abode of Man? | On the contrary,
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image."
I answer that,
As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there w... |
It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have b... | The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual natur... |
Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no... | It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his s... |
Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. | Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. |
Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradi... | Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabita... |
Whether Man Was Placed in Paradise to Dress It and Keep It? | On the contrary,
It is written (Gen. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
I answer that,
As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself w... |
Whether Man Was Created in Paradise? | On the contrary,
It is written (Gen. 2:15): "God took man and placed him in paradise."
I answer that,
Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attribu... |
It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. | The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature. |
Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. | Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ. 103-119) |
Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone? | On the contrary,
It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."
I answer that,
Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance... |
It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed. | A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow direct... |
Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed. | In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governi... |
Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed... | The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, i... |
Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside the World? | On the contrary,
It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.
I answer that,
As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end... |
It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is somethi... | We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wheref... |
Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things. | The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen th... |
Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the... | A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10. |
Whether the World Is Governed by One? | On the contrary,
We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated... |
It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. | Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of governors. |
Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one. | Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe. |
Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. | If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible. |
Whether the Effect of Government Is One or Many? | On the contrary,
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.
I answer that,
The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by ac... |
It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect. | The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another. From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections. |
Whether All Things Are Subject to the Divine Government? | On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His go... |
It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to ... | These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those thi... |
Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. | Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously,... |
Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. | The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God. |
Whether all things are immediately governed by God? | On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by Go... |
It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the se... | Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. |
Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately. | If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one. |
Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs a... | That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence. |
Whether Anything Can Happen Outside the Order of the Divine Government? | On the contrary,
It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."
I answer that,
It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this i... |
It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists. | There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. |
Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. | Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24). |
Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for some... | Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself s... |
Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government? | On the contrary,
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
I answer that,
We may consider the order of Divine providence in tw... |
It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. 3:8): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord." | Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. Reply Obj.... |
Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government. | From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things. |
Whether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by God? | On the contrary,
It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."
I answer that,
Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a pe... |
It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. T... | Being naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His inf... |
Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can G... | God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison ... |
Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a na... | This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above. |
Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature,... | The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. |
Whether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately? | On the contrary,
A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
I answer that,
As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally... |
It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately. | God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation. |
Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them. | Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another. |
Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its becoming, but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their becoming, for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being. | No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves th... |
Whether God Can Annihilate Anything? | On the contrary,
It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
I answer that,
Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cann... |
It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything. | Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly ... |
Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything. | God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve thing... |
Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anythin... | If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action. |
Whether Anything Is Annihilated? | On the contrary,
It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
I answer that,
Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as w... |
It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing. | That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding al... |
Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. | A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so fa... |
Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing. | Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that the... |
Whether God Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form? | On the contrary,
It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
I answer that,
God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matt... |
It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form i... | An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and mineral... |
Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal c... | This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter. |
As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes. | The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause. |
Whether God Can Move a Body Immediately? | On the contrary,
God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen. 1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.
I answer that,
It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce al... |
It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is... | There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures b... |
Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. | God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness. |
Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be... | The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover of bulk, by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power of ... |
Whether God Moves the Created Intellect Immediately? | On the contrary,
The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect.
I answer that,
As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move ... |
It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mo... | The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. |
Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which i... | The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle. |
Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect. | The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,... |
Whether God Can Move the Created Will? | On the contrary,
It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
I answer that,
As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who cr... |
It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. | A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not f... |
Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will. | To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. |
Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will. | If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. |
Whether God Works in Every Agent? | On the contrary,
It is written (Isa. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
I answer that,
Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it ... |
It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. | God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous. |
Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. | One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent. |
Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God d... | God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained. |
Whether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature? | On the contrary,
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
I answer that,
From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a mult... |
It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural... | In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be agains... |
Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. | The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order. |
Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said. | God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change. |
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Summa Theologica Q&A Dataset
Welcome to the Summa Theologica Q&A Dataset, where medieval theology meets modern AI in a glorious, slightly absurd clash of eras. This dataset takes Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica—a 13th-century theological heavyweight—and chops it up into neat little user/assistant pairings, perfect for training your AI to pontificate on the nature of paradise or argue about angels on pinheads.
What's in the Box?
- Format: JSON, because apparently that's the only way we store knowledge these days.
- Content: Hundreds of question-answer pairs, where:
- User: Asks profound questions like "Is paradise a corporeal place?" or other brain-benders straight from Aquinas' quill.
- Assistant: Responds with Aquinas' verbose, occasionally sassy reasoning, often citing Augustine or Isidore like the ultimate academic name-dropper.
- Example:
{ "User": "Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?", "Assistant": "On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): 'Three general opinions prevail about paradise...' [and so on, because brevity was not Aquinas' forte]." }
Why This Dataset Exists
Because someone thought, "Hey, what if we turned a 700-year-old theological tome into a chatbot's training fodder?" And here we are. Use it to:
- Train your AI to sound like a medieval scholar with a penchant for overexplaining.
- Generate the most erudite chatbot responses this side of the 13th century.
- Confuse your friends by dropping "corporeal vs. spiritual paradise" debates at parties.
How to Use It
- Clone this dataset from Hugging Face (you know the drill).
- Feed it into your favorite language model. Bonus points if it starts citing Aristotle unprompted.
- Watch your AI wax poetic about lunar circles and the "right hand of the heavens."
- Regret nothing, because life's too short to not have fun with theology.
Caveats
- Length: Aquinas didn't believe in short answers. Some responses are longer than your average TikTok attention span.
- Tone: Expect a mix of divine wisdom, philosophical flexing, and the occasional medieval mic-drop.
- Relevance: If you're looking for practical data, like stock prices or cat memes, this ain't it.
License
Public domain, because Aquinas has been dead for a while, and we're pretty sure he won't sue.
Contributing
Got more medieval theology to add? Found a typo in our parsing of the Summa? Submit a pull request, and we'll consider canonizing you (just kidding about that last part... or are we?).
Acknowledgments
- Thomas Aquinas, for writing the Summa Theologica and giving us something to parse.
- Augustine and Isidore, for being the most-quoted wingmen in history.
- The brave souls who read this README and still decide to download.
Now go forth and make your AI debate the nature of paradise. Or, you know, just use it to sound smart at trivia night.
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